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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court recently considered whether a1mmg an 
infrared thermal imaging device at a suspect's home can violate the 
Fourth Amendment. Kyllo v. United States' announced a new and 
comprehensive rule: the government's warrantless use of sense­
enhancing technology that is "not in general use" violates the Fourth 
Amendment when it yields "details of the home that would previously 
have been unknowable without physical intrusion."2 Justice Scalia's 
majority opinion acknowledged that the Court's rule was not needed 
to resolve the case before it, which dealt only with a crude infrared 
camera.3 Justice Scalia justified the broad rule on the Court's need to 
"take the long view"4 and protect the public from the threat of other 
more nefarious government surveillance technologies - including 
technologies yet to be invented.5 
As surprising as Kyllo's authorship may be,6 the opinion captures 
the prevailing zeitgeist about law, technology, and privacy. When 
technology threatens privacy, the thinking goes, the courts and the 
Constitution should offer the primary response. While Congress and 
state legislatures may have a limited role regulating government 
investigations involving new technologies, the real work must be done 
by judicial interpretations of the Fourth Amendment.7 The courts 
l. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
2. Id. at 40. 
3. See id. at 34. 
4. Id. at 40. 
5. See id. at 36 ("While the technology used in the present case was relatively crude, the 
rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in 
development."); See also id. at 36 n.3 (noting that law enforcement research teams are 
working on new technologies with the ultimate goal of being able to "see" through walls). 
6. See David Cole, Scalia's Kind of Privacy, THE NATION, July 23, 2001, at 6-7 
(expressing surprise that Justice Scalia authored the majority opinion in Kyllo). Recent 
opinions by Justice Scalia suggest that his pro-defendant stance in Kyllo no longer should be 
surprising. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 
S. Ct. 2633, 2660 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
7. See, e.g. , Michael Adler, Note, Cyberspace, General Searches, and Digital Contraband: 
the Fourth Amendment and the Net-Wide Search, 105 YALE L.J. 1093 (1996) (arguing that 
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current Fourth Amendment doctrine gives the government too much power to use new 
technologies in ways that erode privacy, and that the doctrine should be reevaluated to 
better protect privacy); Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of 
Public Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Trades Image and Identity, 82 
TEXAS L. REV. 1349, 1363 (2004) (contending that the scope of the Fourth Amendment 
protection "needs rethinking if constitutional privacy protections are to work well in twenty­
first century conditions."); Morgan Cloud, Rube Goldberg Meets the Constitution: The 
Supreme Court, Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 72 MISS. L.J. 5, 49 (2002) (arguing 
that the Supreme Court should respond to the problem of new technologies by 
"enunciat[ing] an expansive, value-based theory of the scope of the Fourth Amendment and 
its role in preserving privacy and liberty"); Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value 
and Means Models of the Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced 
Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 647, 650 (1988) (arguing that recent cases "fail[] to 
protect privacy rights, and permits their gradual decay with each improved technological 
advance"); Roberto Iraola, New Detection Technologies and the Fourth Amendment, 47 S.D. 
L. REV. 8 (2002) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment should regulate the use of detection 
technologies); Tracey Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and Technology: Virtual Fourth Amendment 
Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 72 MISS. L.J. 51, 51 (2002) (contending that as 
technology advances and allows greater means to invade privacy, the Courts should interpret 
the Fourth Amendment such that "the privacy and security protected by the Fourth 
Amendment should not depend on innovations in technology"); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The 
Founder's Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 
MINN. L. REV. 1325 (2002) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted to 
require legislative authorization of government use of new technologies to better protect 
privacy against new technologies); Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for 
Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 
1303 (2002) (arguing that courts should focus on the result of a search on privacy interest 
rather than the means of its invasion in order to guarantee robust Fourth Amendment 
protection in new technologies); David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and 
Common Law, 72 MISS. L.J. 143, 210 (2002) (suggesting that "Ky/lo is a promising decision" 
because it recognizes "the ways in which new technology can erode a traditional sphere of 
privacy" and also is sensitive to "the past, present, and the future"); Christopher Slobogin, 
Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo's Rules Governing 
Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1393, 1411 (2002) (arguing that Ky/lo is 
insufficiently protective of privacy and that "[m]embers of our society should be 
constitutionally entitled to expect that government will refrain from any spying on the home 
- technological or otherwise - unless it can demonstrate good cause for doing so"); Daniel 
J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1083, 1087 (2002) (arguing that Fourth Amendment doctrine does not protect privacy 
sufficiently against new technologies, and that Fourth Amendment law should create an 
"architecture of power" to maintain an appropriate balance of power among individuals, 
institutions, and the government in light of "the ever-increasing data flows of the 
Information Age"); David E. Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, 74 
MINN. L. REv. 563, 629 (1990) (arguing that "[n]owhere is an appropriate application of the 
warrant clause more essential to protect the security promised by the fourth amendment" 
than in the case of sense-enhancing technologies); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth 
Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2002, at 125, 131 (arguing that Fourth Amendment 
protections should be expanded "by redefining privacy from the primarily cognitive to the 
primarily affective," and that "[p]rivacy in the information age is best conceived as the 
maintenance of metaphorical boundaries that define the contours of personal identity"); 
James J. Tomkovicz, Technology and the Threshold of the Fourth Amendment: A Tale of 
Two Futures, 72 MISS. L.J. 317, 438 (2002) (arguing that in order to protect privacy from the 
threat of new technologies, "[o]fficial exploitation of a scientific or technological device 
should be considered a Fourth Amendment search"). 
This theme is also a staple of law student note topics. For examples of law student notes 
reflecting this view culled from the law reviews published in the year 2003 alone, see, e.g., 
Melissa Arbus, Note, A Legal U-Turn: The Rehnquist Court Changes Direction and Steers 
Back to the Privacy Norms of the Warren Era, 89 VA. L. REV. 1729, 1730 (2003) ("In the 
furtherance of a free society . . .  tools and technologies must be constrained by the individual 
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come first, legislatures a distant second. Justice Brandeis's famous 
dissent in Olmstead v. United States8 provides the guiding light. 
Brandeis urged in 1928 that to protect our liberties as technology 
advances, "every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the 
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be 
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment."9 Seventy-five years 
later, modern commentators echo this approach with surprising 
uniformity. The view that the Fourth Amendment should be 
interpreted broadly in response to technological change has been 
embraced by leading theorists of law and technology such as Lawrence 
Lessig, 10 leading constitutional law figures such as Laurence Tribe, 1 1 
and nearly everyone else who has written on the intersection of 
technology and criminal procedure. 12 Because of its broad support 
among leading commentators, I will label this approach the popular 
view of the Fourth Amendment and new technologies. 
Although the popular view has been justified on many different 
grounds, most expressions of it tend to rest on one or more of three 
complementary premises. The first premise is doctrinal, the second is 
historical, and the third is functional. The doctrinal premise is that the 
courts should actively monitor technology's effects on privacy because 
privacy rights embodied by the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution."); Rania M. Basha, 
Note, Kyllo v. United States: The Fourth Amendment Triumphs Over Technology, 41 
BRANDEIS L.J. 939 (2003); Scott Byrd, Note, Criminal Procedure: Searching High and Low 
for A Search in Kyllo: Justice Scalia Reaf irms Core Protections of the Fourth Amendment, 56 
OKLA. L. REV. 153 (2003); Jeffrey W. Childers, Comment, Kyllo v. United States: A 
Temporary Reprieve from Technology-Enhanced Surveillance of the Home, 81 N.C. L. REV. 
728 (2003) (criticizing the Supreme Court for not protecting privacy enough through the 
Fourth Amendment in Ky/lo); Courtney Dashiell, Comment, Thermal Imaging: Creating 
'Virtual' Space, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 351 (2003); Matthew Hector, Comment, Privacy to be 
Patched in Later - An Examination of the Decline of Privacy Rights, 36 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 985 (2003); Jessica T. Kobos, Note, Kyllo v. United States: A Lukewarm Interpretation 
of the Fourth Amendment, 64 MONT. L. REv. 519 (2003); Peter G. Madrian, Note, Devil in 
the Details: Constitutional Problems Inherent in the Internet Surveillance Provisions of the 
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 6 U. PITI. L. REV. 783 (2003); Rachel S. Martin, Note, Watch 
What You Type: As the FBI Records Your Keystrokes, the Fourth Amendment Develops 
Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1271 (2003). 
8. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
9. Id. at 478. 
10. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 222-23 (1999) 
(contending that "there is an important space for uudicial] activism" in matters of Internet 
privacy and liberty, and that it is better to "err on the side of . . .  uudicial] activism than on 
the side of . . .  uudicial] passivity" in such cases). 
11. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitution in Cyberspace, Keynote Address at the 
First Conference on Computers, Freedom, & Privacy (March 26, 1991) (transcript available 
at www.sjgames.com/SS/tribe.html) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment should apply 
broadly to new technologies so that mere "[a]ccidents of [t]echnology" do not determine 
constitutional protections, and claiming that minimalist Fourth Amendment decisions such 
as Smith v. Maryland "[s]adly . . .  retreated" from the proper broad principles of Fourth 
Amendment protection).  
12. See sources cited supra note 7. 
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Fourth Amendment doctrine demands it. The "reasonable expectation 
of privacy" test governs Fourth Amendment law,13 and it is up to the 
courts to determine when an expectation of privacy is "reasonable. "14 
As a result, the courts must update and redefine the Fourth 
Amendment as technology evolves, creating and recreating reasonable 
rules that effectively regulate law enforcement and protect privacy in 
new technologies. The historical premise suggests that the courts 
should play an active role in the regulation of new technologies 
because they have done so successfully in the past.15 In particular, the 
Supreme Court's reversal of Olmstead and recognition of Fourth 
Amendment protections against government wiretapping in Katz v. 
United States16 establish a precedent that supports future intervention. 
The third and final premise justifies a strong judicial role for reasons 
of institutional competence. Courts should take the lead crafting rules 
to protect privacy because courts are well-situated to regulate criminal 
investigations involving new technologies.17 Taken together, these 
three arguments suggest that courts must, have, and should use the 
Fourth Amendment to provide the first line of defense against 
government invasions of privacy allowed by new technologies. 
This article challenges the popular view of the role of the Fourth 
Amendment in new technologies. I will argue that the popular vision is 
based on a romantic but somewhat inaccurate view of Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, history, and function. Properly understood, 
considerations of doctrine, history, and function tend to counsel 
against an aggressive judicial role in the application of the Fourth 
Amendment to developing technologies. They teach that courts should 
place a thumb on the scale in favor of judicial caution when 
technology is in flux, and should consider allowing legislatures to 
provide the primary rules governing law enforcement investigations 
involving new technologies. While proponents of the popular view 
assume that the Fourth Amendment can play the same central role 
regulating government use of developing technologies that it has 
played in more traditional cases, there are sound reasons to treat 
developing technologies differently. These differences suggest that 
statutory rules rather than constitutional rules should provide the 
primary source of privacy protections regulating law-enforcement use 
of rapidly developing technologies. When technology is in flux, Fourth 
Amendment protections should remain relatively modest until the 
technology stabilizes. 
13. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
14. See Section I infra. 
15. See Section II infra. 
16. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
17. See Section III, infra. 
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This article aims to reorient current thinking about how the legal 
system should regulate criminal investigations involving new 
technologies. I want to nudge us away from thinking primarily in terms 
of the Fourth Amendment, and focus attention instead on legislative 
rules. I contend that the legislative branch rather than the judiciary 
should create the primary investigative rules when technology is 
changing. Contrary to the three premises underlying the popular view, 
legislative predominance in the face of developing technologies is 
consistent with current Fourth Amendment doctrine, accurately 
reflects historical practice, and is likely to continue in the future given 
the relative institutional competence of courts and legislatures. The 
institutional advantages of legislative rule making may eventually 
create a bifurcated privacy regime in which the governing law is 
primarily constitutional in most areas, but primarily statutory in areas 
of technological flux. Technological change may reveal the 
institutional limits of the modern enterprise of constitutional criminal 
procedure, exposing the need for statutory guidance when technology 
is changing rapidly. The implications for the field of criminal 
procedure are considerable. If criminal prosecutions involving new 
technologies continue to grow in number and importance, a basic 
understanding of criminal procedure rules may someday require as 
much knowledge of the United States Code as the United States 
Reports. 
By arguing in favor of judicial caution, I don't wish to suggest that 
privacy in unimportant. To the contrary: privacy is one of our most 
cherished values, and rules that effectively regulate criminal 
investigations to prevent government abuse are essential to our 
traditions. At the same time, it is wrong to assume that courts 
necessarily generate more protective rules than legislatures. In recent 
decades, legislative privacy rules governing new technologies have 
proven roughly as privacy protective as, and quite often more 
protective than, parallel Fourth Amendment rules. Judicial deference 
has often invited Congressional regulation. As a result, the key 
question is less how much criminal procedure rules should protect 
privacy than whether we should look primarily to the courts or to 
Congress to generate those rules. I believe that we should look first to 
Congress when technology is changing rapidly. A renewed focus on 
the possibilities offered by legislative rules will enable the legal system 
to generate better rules - rules that are more nuanced, clear, and that 
optimize the critical balance between privacy and public safety more 
effectively when technology is in flux. 
I will develop my argument in three parts. Each part challenges 
one of the premises supporting the popular view, and tells a cautionary 
tale about the limits of the Fourth Amendment when technology is in 
flux. Part I challenges the doctrinal premise that Fourth Amendment 
doctrine requires the courts to assume an active role that can 
March 2004] The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies 807 
adequately protect privacy in new technologies. I argue that existing 
Fourth Amendment doctrine generally counsels in favor of caution in 
cases involving new technologies. The Katz "reasonable expectation of 
privacy" test has proven more a revolution on paper than in practice; 
Katz has had a surprisingly limited effect on the largely property­
based contours of traditional Fourth Amendment law. As a result, 
courts rarely accept claims to Fourth Amendment protection in new 
technologies that do not involve interference with property rights, and 
have rejected broad claims to privacy in developing technologies with 
surprising consistency. The result is a critical gap between privacy 
rules the modern Fourth Amendment provides and privacy rules 
needed to effectively regulate government use of developing 
technologies. 
Part II challenges the historical premise and its canonical example 
of wiretapping law. The popular view teaches that the Fourth 
Amendment constitutionalized the law and successfully tamed 
wiretapping practices. I argue that the impact of the Fourth 
Amendment on wiretapping law generally has been considerably 
overstated. Wiretapping law may be constitutional in theory thanks to 
Berger v. New York18 and Katz v. United States,19 but it remains largely 
statutory in fact. Courts interpreting the Fourth Amendment have 
generally deferred to statutory law in this area. In the decades since 
Katz v. United States, only a handful of judicial decisions have found 
that government wiretapping violated the Fourth Amendment. Nor is 
the dominance of statutory rules within wiretapping law necessarily 
unusual. The statutory Wiretap Act offers only one example of how 
criminal investigations in developing technologies have tended to be 
governed by statute. Although scholars tend to focus on the Fourth 
Amendment, the real privacy protection has more often derived from 
statutory law. 
Part III challenges the functional premise of the popular vision. It 
argues that regulating developing technology through the Fourth 
Amendment poses significant difficulties for courts. The context of 
judicial decisionmaking presents few opportunities to clarify the law. 
Judicial decisions tend to incorporate outdated assumptions of 
technological practice, leading to rules that make little sense in the 
present or future. Courts also lack the information needed to 
understand how the specific technologies in cases before them fit into 
the broader spectrum of changing technologies, and cannot update 
rules quickly as technology shifts. Legislatures do not offer a panacea, 
but they do offer significant institutional advantages over courts. 
Legislatures can enact comprehensive rules based on expert input and 
can update them frequently as technology changes. As a result, 
18. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
19. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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legislatures can generate more nuanced, balanced, and accurate 
privacy rules when technology is in flux. Courts should recognize their 
institutional limitations and remain cautious until the relevant 
technology and its applications stabilize. 
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE DEFERENCE NORM IN NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES 
Explanations of how the Fourth Amendment applies to developing 
technologies usually go something like this: the touchstone of the 
modem Fourth Amendment is the "reasonable expectation of 
privacy" test.20 Police investigations that violate a reasonable 
expectation of privacy are unconstitutional unless the police obtain a 
warrant or some other exception applies. What counts as a 
"reasonable expectation of privacy" is very much up for grabs, 
however.21 In this era of high-tech surveillance and the Internet, no 
one knows whether an expectation of privacy in a new technology is 
"reasonable."22 Part of the problem is that the test is largely circular: a 
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy when the courts decide 
to protect it through the Fourth Amendment.23 As a result, the law 
necessarily tasks the courts with fashioning Fourth Amendment 
protections in advanced technologies.24 To decide the scope of Fourth 
20. This test first appeared in Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
21. See, e.g. , JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY 
IN AMERICA 60-61 (2001). Cf CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS § 4.03(f) at 1 16 (3d ed. 
1993) (noting the Supreme Court's "mixed signals" on the question of how to determine a 
reasonable expectation of privacy). 
22. See ROSEN, supra note 21, at 60-61 ;  Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted 
Physical Surveillance: The American Bar Association 's Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 383, 401 (1997) (contending that the courts apply a multi-factored analysis to 
decide whether government conduct violates a reasonable expectation of privacy, and then 
concluding that "many of the factors that courts consider . . .  are of dubious value"); A. 
Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor ls the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the 
Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 823-33 (1995) (discussing whether an expectation of 
privacy in encrypted communications is "reasonable"). 
23. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Constitutional Circularity, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1 ,  60-61 
(2001) ("Fourth Amendment doctrine, moreover, is circular, for someone can have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in an area if and only if the Court has held that a search in 
that area would be unreasonable."); ROSEN, supra note 21, at 60 ("Harlan's test was 
applauded as a victory for privacy, but it soon became clear that it was entirely circular."). 
24. See, e.g. , l WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 2.l(d) at 391 (3d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2004) ("The criteria for 
reasonable expectations must be abstracted from the flow of life, and it is the judge's task to 
find and articulate those societal standards." (quoting Steven C. Douse, Note, The Concept 
of Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 154, 179-180 (1972))); See 
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV 349, 403 
(1974) ("The ultimate question, plainly, is a value judgment . . .  that the Fourth amendment 
inexorably requires the Court to make."); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 166 (1978) (White, 
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Amendment protection in a high-tech world, a judge must ruminate 
over the importance of privacy and the meaning of "reasonableness," 
and then make a normative assessment of what privacy protections 
should exist. 
In this Part, I will argue that this popular understanding of the 
Fourth Amendment is generally at odds with how courts have applied 
the Fourth Amendment. Judges generally have declined to assume this 
active role because Fourth Amendment doctrine has remained heavily 
tied to real property concepts. In most contexts, whether an 
expectation of privacy is deemed reasonable can be answered by 
whether it is backed by what I will call a 'loose' version of real 
property law. Under these precedents, a "reasonable expectation of 
privacy" is not the same as the privacy that a reasonable person would 
expect. Instead, it acts as a term of art tied largely to traditional 
property law concepts. The difference often creates a wide gap 
between the privacy rules reasonable people want and the deferential 
rules that the Fourth Amendment provides. When technology is new 
or in flux, and its use may have privacy implications far removed from 
property law, Fourth Amendment rules alone will tend not to provide 
adequate privacy protections. Statutory protections are needed to 
protect privacy and regulate government uses of developing 
technologies. 
A. Property Law and the Fourth Amendment 
Scholars often describe Fourth Amendment law as unruly.25 With 
so many decided cases and so few agreed-upon principles at work, 
trying to understand the Fourth Amendment is a bit like trying to put 
together a jigsaw puzzle with several incorrect pieces: no matter which 
way you try to assemble it, a few pieces won't fit.26 In this section, I 
argue that despite this difficulty, a strong and underappreciated 
connection exists between the modem Fourth Amendment and real 
property law. Descriptively speaking, the basic contours of modem 
Fourth Amendment doctrine are largely keyed to property law. 
Although the phrase "reasonable expectation of privacy" sounds 
mystical, in most (though not all) cases, an expectation of privacy 
J., dissenting) (contending that the reasonable expectation of privacy test is defined by the 
scope of privacy protection that is "essential to securing 'conditions favorable to the pursuit 
of happiness' " (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting))). 
25. See, e.g. , Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 47, 49-50 (1974) (describing Fourth Amendment law as "a body of doctrine that is 
unstable and unconvincing"); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 
MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468-72 (1985) (describing the fourth amendment as "the Supreme 
Court's tarbaby: a mass of contradictions and obscurities"). 
26. See id. 
810 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 102:801 
becomes "reasonable" only when it is backed by a right to exclude 
borrowed from real property law. 
Consider Fourth Amendment protections in the home. A 
homeowner has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home: "At 
the very core (of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to 
retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable 
governmental intrusion."27 A renter of a house or apartment has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his home as well.28 So long as the 
tenant complies with the rental contract that grants him the right to 
exclude others in exchange for rent money, he enjoys the full panoply 
of Fourth Amendment protections.29 If the tenant's nonpayment of 
rent leads to eviction proceedings, however, the tenant loses his 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his home when he loses his right 
to be on the premises according to state property law.30 Similar rules 
apply to Fourth Amendment rights in hotel rooms and storage 
lockers.31 A person who rents out a hotel room or storage locker 
enjoys Fourth Amendment rights in the rented space so long as he 
complies with the rental contract.32 When he ceases to pay rent and no 
longer enjoys a legal right to exclude others from the space, however, 
his Fourth Amendment protections in the space quickly disappear.33 
27. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). 
28. See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment protects a leaseholder from a search by the police consented to by the 
landowner). 
29. See United States v. Showalter, 858 F.2d 149, 151 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that 
defendants who had "resided on the property under a lease agreement with the owner . . .  
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises"). See also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 
U.S. 83, 95-96 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
Id. 
Of course this is not to say that the Fourth Amendment protects only the Lord of the Manor 
who holds his estate in fee simple. People call a house "their" home when legal title is in the 
bank, when they rent it, and even when they merely occupy it rent free - so long as they 
actually live there. 
30. See, e.g. , Simpson v. Saroff, 741 F. Supp. 1073, 1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (citing cases); 
United States v. Botelho, 360 F. Supp. 620, 624 (D. Haw. 1973) (holding that whether a 
tenant retained Fourth Amendment rights in a rented apartment depended on whether he 
had a right to occupy the premises under state property law). 
31. See, e.g., United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597, 600 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) ("For Fourth 
Amendment purposes, a hotel room is treated essentially the same, if not exactly the same, 
as a home."). 
32. See, e.g . ,  Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964) (upholding Fourth 
Amendment rights in a rented hotel room); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 721 n.6 
(1984) (noting that defendants ordinarily retain Fourth Amendment rights in their storage 
lockers). 
33. See United States v. Dorais, 241 F.3d 1 124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that "a 
defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room when the rental period 
has expired and the hotel has taken affirmative steps to repossess the room"); United States 
v. Poulsen 41 F.3d 1330, 1337 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that defendant's nonpayment of rent 
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The Fourth Amendment rights track the right to exclude others under 
state property law.34 
The Fourth Amendment rights of visitors to homes follow similar 
principles. The key question is whether the homeowner or his agent 
has explicitly or implicitly delegated to the visitor the homeowner's 
right to exclude others from the property. For example, if the visitor is 
living at the home with the owner's consent, the visitor enjoys full 
Fourth Amendment protections.35 The same goes for an overnight 
guest who was invited to stay at the home by the homeowner.36 If the 
visitor is not staying on the property with the homeowner's consent or 
otherwise has no previous relationship with the owner, however, he 
cannot establish a reasonable expectation of privacy there.37 Thus, 
a squatter who trespasses on the land of another and lives there 
without authorization cannot establish a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the land.38 Because the squatter has "no legal right to 
occupy the land,"39 he cannot earn Fourth Amendment protections 
even in his home. 
Nor are the rules governing homes unique. The same principles 
govern Fourth Amendment protection in automobiles. The owner of a 
car enjoys Fourth Amendment protection in the car, as does a guest 
who has been allowed to use the car by the owner.40 A person who is 
for storage locker extinguished his Fourth Amendment rights in the locker when it ended 
defendant's right to exclude others from accessing the locker under state property law). 
Id. 
34. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n.12 (1978). 
One of the main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others, see W. 
Blackstone, Commentaries, Book 2, ch. 1, and one who owns or lawfully possesses or 
controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of 
this right to exclude. 
35. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 n.1 1 (1968) (holding that an 
unreasonable search of a grandmother's house violated her resident grandson's Fourth 
Amendment rights). 
36. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98-99 (1990) (concluding that an authorized 
overnight guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home he is visiting). 
37. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (holding that two men visiting an 
apartment to package cocaine did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
apartment given "the purely commercial nature of the transaction engaged in here, the 
relatively short period of time on the premises, and the lack of any previous connection 
between respondents and the householder"). Cf Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 
(1978) (noting that a burglar who has entered a home to commit a crime cannot have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy there). 
38. See Amezquita v. Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1975) (holding that squatters 
residing on government land did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
homes). 
39. Id. 
40. See United States v. Baker 221 F.3d 438, 442 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that a defendant 
who drove a car with the permission of the owner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the car); United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1418 (7th Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. 
Muhammad, 58 F.3d 353, 355 (8th Cir. 1995) ("Both parties agree that the defendant must 
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found driving a stolen car, however, does not enjoy Fourth 
Amendment protection within it.41 The same rules apply to rental cars. 
Whether a person has Fourth Amendment rights in a rental car 
depends upon whether his name appears on the rental contract: if his 
name does appear on the contract, he is a legitimate user with Fourth 
Amendment rights.42 If his name does not appear, he does not have 
the owner's permission to drive the car and will have no Fourth 
Amendment rights in the car.43 
The same property-based rules apply to Fourth Amendment rights 
in "closed containers,"44 a category that the courts have used to 
describe everything from sealed letters45 and boxes46 to computer 
files.47 The owner of a closed container ordinarily has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in· its contents.48 This is true regardless of 
whether the container is locked securely or merely covered by a flimsy 
opaque cover.49 If the owner abandons the container, relinquishing his 
property right, a government search of the container cannot violate his 
Fourth Amendment rights.50 Similarly, an individual normally will not 
retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a stolen 
container because he lacks a property interest in the container.51 
present at least some evidence of consent or permission from the lawful owner/renter to give 
rise to an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy."). 
41. See United States v. Sholola, 124 F.3d 803, 815 n.14 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Garcia, 
897 F.2d at 1417); United States v. Tropiano, 50 F.3d 157, 161 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing cases). 
42 See United States v. Wellons, 32 F.3d 1 17, 119 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing cases). 
43. See id. 
44. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982). 
45. Walter v. United States 447 U.S. 649, 654-55 n.5 (1980) (quoting Ex Parte Jackson, 
96 U.S. 727, 732 (1878)). 
46. Ross, 456 U.S. at 822. 
47. Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 410 (4th Cir. 2001) (Michael, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) ("Courts have not hesitated to apply established Fourth Amendment 
principles to computers and computer files, often drawing analogies between computers and 
physical storage units such as file cabinets and closed containers." (citing cases)). 
48. Ross, 456 U.S. at 822. 
49. See id. 
For just as the most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely entitled to the same guarantees 
of privacy as the most majestic mansion, so also may a traveler who carries a toothbrush and 
a few articles of clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf claim an equal right to conceal his 
possessions from official inspection as the sophisticated executive with the locked attache 
case. 
50. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988) (concluding that defendants did 
not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in opaque containers of garbage that they had 
left at the edge of their property with the purpose to convey to garbage collectors). 
51. See, e.g. ,  United States v. Lyons, 992 F.2d 1029, 1031 (10th Cir. 1993) (concluding 
that a defendant had no Fourth Amendment rights in the contents of stolen computer hard 
drives) ("Because expectations of privacy derive in part from the right to exclude others 
from the property in question, lawful possession is an important consideration in 
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Even the rights of an owner are not absolute under the Fourth 
Amendment.52 The courts have sanctioned a wide range of invasive 
warrantless surveillance techniques that threaten privacy but not 
property. So long as the surveillance does not invade the individual's 
right to exclude others - the very essence of the property right53 -
the surveillance generally does not violate his reasonable expectation 
of privacy. For example, the police can invade the privacy of a 
homeowner by standing in the public street and peeking into his home 
through a window,54 and can use a flashlight that illuminates the 
inside.55 The police can rent helicopters, fly high enough to reach 
public airspace where property rights no longer govern, and then take 
photographs of the home.56 Police informants can also assume 
undercover identities and trick the homeowner into letting them inside 
while wearing a recording device,57 or else convince another person 
who has common authority over the home to consent to a search.58 All 
of these techniques are invasive. All of them appear to violate the 
homeowner's "right to be let alone."59 None of these techniques 
violate the homeowner's property rights, however, and under existing 
law none of them constitute a Fourth Amendment search. 
determining whether a defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area 
searched, i.e. the hard disks."). 
52. See California v. Ciarolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (noting that the fact that property 
is considered within the curtilage of the home "does not itself bar all police observation"). 
53. See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 
(1998) (noting that the essence of a property right is the right to exclude others); Felix S. 
Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 374 (1954) (same). 
54. See, e.g. , Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2042 (2001) (noting that under 
modern Fourth Amendment law, "the lawfulness of warrantless visual surveillance of a 
home has still been preserved."); Ciarolo, 476 U.S. at 213 ("The Fourth Amendment 
protection of the home has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to 
shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares."). See also Texas v. 
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983) (holding that police can peer through a window inside a 
defendant's automobile without implicating the Fourth Amendment). 
55. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 305 (1987) (holding that law enforcement 
officers' use of a flashlight to illuminate the inside of a barn does "not transform their 
observations into an unreasonable search within the meaning of [the] Fourth Amendment."). 
56. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (plurality) (concluding that warrantless 
aerial surveillance from public airspace does not violate the Fourth Amendment); see id. at 
452 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
Id. 
57. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1971). 
58. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). 
[W)hen the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof of voluntary consent, it 
is not limited to proof that consent was given by the defendant, but may show that 
permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over 
or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected. 
59. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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Moving beyond searches, the Fourth Amendment rules governing 
seizures are explicitly property-based. Whereas a search occurs when 
government action violates a defendant's reasonable expectation of 
privacy, a seizure occurs only when the government action causes a 
"meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests 
in . . .  property."60 This standard allows the government to photocopy a 
defendant's papers61 or make an electronic copy of his computer files62 
without that copying constituting a Fourth Amendment seizure. 
Because the copying does not dispossess the owner of the original 
property, copying does not seize anything according to current Fourth 
Amendment doctrine.63 
Of course, I cannot claim that all Fourth Amendment decisions 
track real property law. Important exceptions exist. For example, the 
Supreme Court has tended to ignore property principles when 
evaluating Fourth Amendment restrictions on bodily outputs. The 
Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not protect 
handwriting samples64 or the human voice,65 not because they are not 
property but because they are not sufficiently private.66 Similarly, the 
Court has enacted sui generis rules for how the Fourth Amendment 
applies to government workplaces. In O'Connor v. Ortega,67 the Court 
held that a government employee will enjoy a reasonable expectation 
60. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
61. See United States v. Thomas, 613 F.2d 787, 793 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that the 
FBI did not "seize" defendant's written and photographic materials when they photocopied 
the materials, because the FBI did not affect the owner's possession of the originals). 
62. See United States v. Gorshkov, No. CR00-550C, 2001 WL 1024026, at *3 (W.D. 
Wash. May 23, 2001). 
ld. 
(T]he agents' act of copying the data on the . . .  computers was not a seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment because it did not interfere with Defendant's or anyone else's 
possessory interest in the data. The data remained intact and unaltered. It remained 
accessible to Defendant and any co-conspirators or partners with whom he had shared 
access. The copying of the data had absolutely no impact on his possessory rights. 
63. But see United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1455 (9th Cir. 1986) (concluding that 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 allows the police to obtain a warrant authorizing 
them to view a defendant's property but not seize any tangible property, on the ground that 
the Rule allows the police to obtain a warrant to seize property, and viewing the property 
constitutes a seizure of "information regarding the 'status of the [property to be viewed]' "). 
64. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21 (1973). 
65. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973). 
66. See Mara, 410 U.S. at 21 ("Handwriting, like speech, is repeatedly shown to the 
public, and there is no more expectation of privacy in the physical characteristics of a 
person's script than there is in the tone of his voice."); Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 14 ("The 
physical characteristics of a person's voice, its tone and manner, as opposed to the content of 
a specific conversation, are constantly exposed to the public. Like a man's facial 
characteristics, or handwriting, his voice is repeatedly produced for others to hear."). 
67. 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (plurality opinion). 
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of privacy only if under "actual office practices and procedures"68 the 
employee's workspace is not "open to fellow employees or to the 
public."69 Government employee privacy hinges not on the usual right 
to exclude, but rather on whether it is reasonable in context for 
employees to expect that others will not enter their space.70 Another 
possible exception is the 'open fields' doctrine, which allows the 
government to trespass onto uncultivated land belonging to the 
defendant so long as they do not approach areas immediately adjacent 
to the home.71 Despite these examples, I think that my softer 
point survives. Although no one theory explains the entire body of 
Fourth Amendment doctrine, property law provides a surprisingly 
accurate guide. 
B. Katz v. United States and the Property-Based View 
How can this property-based Fourth Amendment be squared with 
the leading case in Fourth Amendment law, Katz v. United States?12 
Fourth Amendment scholarship generally teaches that under Katz the 
modern Fourth Amendment protects privacy, not property,73 and that 
it protects privacy primarily by answering the normative question of 
when an expectation of privacy should be deemed constitutionally 
"reasonable."74 This section argues that the mainstream academic 
68. Id. at 717. 
69. Id. at 718. 
70. See id. at 717; Rossi v. Town of Pelham, 35 F. Supp. 2d 58, 63-64 (D.N.H. 1997). This 
standard differs significantly from the standard analysis applied in private workplaces. 
Private-sector employees will generally retain an expectation of privacy in their work space 
unless that space is "open to the world at large." United States v. Lyons, 706 F.2d 321, 326 
(D.C. Cir. 1983). Thus, if two private-sector employees share an office, the sharing of the 
office does not eliminate Fourth Amendment protection. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 
369 (1968). In contrast, sharing an office will normally eliminate Fourth Amendment 
protection for a government employee. See, e.g. , Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 152 (2d 
Cir. 1994) (holding that judge's search through his law clerk's desk and file cabinets did not 
violate the clerk's reasonable expectation of privacy because of the clerk's close working 
relationship with the judge). See also O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 730-31 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(noting the difference between the expectation-of-privacy analysis offered by the O'Connor 
plurality and that traditionally applied in private workplace searches). 
71. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183-84 (1984) ("(I]n the case of open fields, 
the general rights of property protected by the common law of trespass have little or no 
relevance to the applicability of the Fourth Amendment."). An "open field" is "any 
unoccupied or undeveloped area outside of the curtilage," or one which is too far, too 
exposed, and not intimate enough to be protected like the house. See United States v. Dunn, 
480 U.S. 294, 304 (1987). 
72. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
73. See, e.g., JEROLD H. ISRAEL & WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN A 
NUTSHELL 60 (5th ed., 1993) ("Th(e] property approach was rejected in Katz v. U.S. (1967), 
in favor of a privacy approach."). 
74. See ANDREW E. TASLITZ & MARGARET L. PARIS, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 95 (1997) ("The Katz test demands that the courts define privacy and 
determine when it can be reasonably protected."). See also supra notes 24-25 and 
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understanding has often overlooked the continuing influence of 
property concepts because it has tended to misconstrue cases that 
rejected strict common law property rules as Fourth Amendment 
guides. While existing scholarship often interprets the shift as a 
wholesale rejection of property-based principles in Fourth 
Amendment law, it is better understood as a shift of degree from 
common law rules to the looser property-based approach that 
currently governs. Viewed in this light, the Katz "reasonable 
expectation of privacy" test has more bark than bite and has not 
substantially changed the basic property-based contours of Fourth 
Amendment law. 
It is generally agreed that before the 1960s, the Fourth 
Amendment was focused on the protection of property rights against 
government interference.75 The Fourth Amendment was enacted 
largely in response to English cases such as Entick v. Carrington,76 in 
which Lord Camden had declared that "our law holds the property of 
every man so sacred, that no man can set his foot upon his neighbor's 
close without his leave; if he does he is a trespasser . . . .  [and] if he will 
tread upon his neighbor's ground, he must justify it by law."77 In light 
of this history, early courts interpreted the Fourth Amendment as a 
claim against government interference with property rights, and in 
particular, rights against trespass. 
The classic case illustrating the property-based Fourth 
Amendment is Olmstead v. United States78 from 1928. Olmstead was 
the first wiretapping case decided by the Supreme Court. Government 
agents climbed up telephone poles on public streets outside Roy 
Olmstead's home and offices and tapped telephone lines running to 
and from them.79 The Court held that the wiretapping was not a 
"search" or "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment.80 Chief Justice 
accompanying text. A few scholars have noticed the continuing vitality of real property law 
to the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment 
Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 316-20 (1988) (noting 
that Fourth Amendment rules in practice are often tied to property rights); Daniel B. 
Yeager, Search, Seizure and the Positive Law: Expectations of Privacy Outside the Fourth 
Amendment, 84 1. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 249, 251 (1993). These scholars are in a distinct 
minority, however. 
75. See, e.g. , Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 303-06 (1967). 
76. 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765). 
77. Id. at 817. 
78. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
79. See id. at 457. As the majority opinion notes, Olmstead's criminal operation was "a 
conspiracy of amazing magnitude," and the wiretapping was similarly widespread. See id. at 
455. For an informative history of the Olmstead case, see WALTER F. MURPHY, 
WIRETAPPING ON TRIAL, A CASE STUDY IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1965). 
80. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466 ("We think, therefore, that the wire tapping here disclosed 
did not amount to a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."). 
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Taft reasoned that the wiretap was not a search because it did not 
violate Olmstead's property rights: in the language of the Court, 
" [t)here was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants."81 
Justice Brandeis dissented, offering a dramatically different approach 
to the Fourth Amendment. According to Brandeis, "the physical 
location" of the telephone wires was "immaterial."82 Privacy mattered, 
not property: " [E]very unjustifiable intrusion by the Government 
upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, 
must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment."83 Despite 
Justice Brandeis's eloquence, his approach to the Fourth Amendment 
was endorsed only by two other Justices.84 
How to interpret what happened in the 1960s is the real crux of the 
matter. Existing scholarship generally teaches that the Supreme Court 
rejected the property-based approach of Olmstead in 1967 when it 
decided Katz v. United States.85 According to this theory, Katz rejected 
the property-based view and replaced it with a "reasonable 
expectation of privacy" test that echoes Justice Brandeis's dissent in 
Olmstead.86 Under this interpretation, the "reasonable expectation of 
privacy" test has a normative component a la Justice Brandeis. As 
Professor Amsterdam wrote in his seminal and oft-quoted 1974 article, 
the question of when an expectation of privacy is reasonable "is a 
value judgment" that looks to whether the government practice is 
81. Id. at 464. 
82. Id. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
83. Id. at 478. 
84. Four Justices dissented in Olmstead: Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Butler and Stone. 
Each wrote their own dissents. Justice Stone agreed explicitly with Justice Brandeis's 
approach: Justice Butler did so implicitly. Justice Holmes, however, did not agree with 
Brandeis's approach to the Fourth Amendment, and instead wished to overturn the 
conviction on the theory that evidence collected in violation of state laws (here state 
wiretapping laws) should be suppressed. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 469 (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) ("While I do not deny it I am not prepared to uoin Justice Brandeis and ] say that 
the penumbra of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments covers the defendant . . . .  "). 
85. See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth 
Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 248 (1993) ("At the beginning of the decade, the 
Court hinted that it was ready to jettison the property-privacy nexus, but the doctrine 
survived until the Court's 1967 decision in Katz v. United States."); ISRAEL & LAFAVE, supra 
note 73, at 60 ("Th[e] property approach was rejected in Katz v. U.S. (1967), in favor of a 
privacy approach."). 
86. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 10, at 1 16 ("It took forty years for the Supreme Court to 
embrace Brandeis's picture of the Fourth Amendment . . .  [in] Katz v. United States."); Scott 
E. Sundby, Everyman's Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government 
and Citizen?, 94 COLUM . L. REV. 1751, 1756 (1994) ("Justice Brandeis's view of the Fourth 
Amendment became accepted by the Court in a later eavesdropping case, Katz v. United 
States."); Fred H. Cate, The Changing Face of Privacy Protection in the European Union and 
the United States, 33 IND. L. REV. 173, 199 (1999) ("Almost forty years later, the Court 
adopted Justice Brandeis' reasoning in Katz v. United States."); Anjali Singhal, The Piracy of 
Privacy? A Fourth Amendment Analysis of Key Escrow Cryptography, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y 
REV. 189, 192 (1996) ("Brandeis' dissent was adopted by a majority forty years later in Katz 
v. United States."). 
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"[c]onsistent with the aims of a free and open society."87 This approach 
envisions Katz as a test that embraces whatever rules are needed to 
protect privacy against new technologies. 
As a description of existing judicial practice, however, this popular 
view is misleading. Katz did not adopt Brandeis's approach in 
Olmstead. Brandeis's dissent receives no mention in any of the 
opinions filed in the Katz case. Ironically, the only mention of 
Brandeis occurs when the majority rejects the view that the Fourth 
Amendment protects the right to be let alone that Brandeis described 
in his famous law review article The Right To Privacy.88 More broadly, 
Katz can plausibly be read (and implicitly has been read by many 
courts) not as rejecting the existing property view of the Fourth 
Amendment, but as merely reemphasizing the Court's turn to a looser 
version of the property focused approach first introduced in 1960 in 
Jones v. United States.89 To understand existing judicial practice, I 
think it helps to start with Jones, and see the later doctrine articulated 
in Katz as a reflection of the loose property-based view from Jones. 
Cecil Jones was arrested inside an apartment in Washington, DC, 
in possession of narcotics and narcotics paraphernalia. The apartment 
belonged to Jones's friend Evans, who had given Jones the key and 
allowed him to stay at the apartment for a few nights while Evans was 
out of town. Following Jones's arrest, Jones moved to suppress the 
evidence found in Evans's apartment. The District Court rejected 
Jones's claim on the ground that Jones was not "a person aggrieved" 
by the search who could challenge its legality under the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure.90 Both then and now, this inquiry has been 
considered analogous to asking whether the defendant had Fourth 
Amendment standing.91 The District Court's decision reflected the 
87. Amsterdam, supra note 24, at 403. See also Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two 
Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 1 19, 124 (2002) (arguing that the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test forces 
"(d]ecisions . . .  (to] rest on normative choices."). 
88. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 (citing Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. 
L. REv. 193 (1890)). The Court in Katz rejected the broad Brandeisian formulation with the 
following analysis: 
[T]he Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional "right to 
privacy." That Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental 
intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all. 
Other provisions of the Constitution protect personal privacy from other forms of 
governmental invasion. But the protection of a person's general right to privacy - his right 
to be let alone by other people - is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, 
left largely to the law of the individual States. 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51. 
89. 362 U.S. 257 (1960). 
90. See Jones v. United States, 262 F.2d 234, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (discussing the District 
Court's opinion). 
91. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 (1978). 
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common law property distinctions that the lower courts (although 
never the Supreme Court) had followed to determine standing to 
challenge warrants. In those decisions, the courts had held that 
"ownership" established standing, as did "dominion" and the status of 
being a "lessee or licensee." In contrast, "guests," "invitees," and 
employees who held "occupancy" but not "possession" lacked a 
sufficient property interest to challenge illegal searches.92 Because 
Jones was merely a guest, he lacked standing to challenge the search of 
his friend's apartment. 
The Supreme Court took a different view. Writing for the Court, 
Justice Frankfurter argued that arcane common law property rules 
should not resolve the standing inquiry: 
[I]t it is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding 
the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in 
evolving the body of private properly law which, more than almost any 
other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is 
largely historical. . . . Distinctions such as those between 'lessee,' 
'licensee,' 'invitee' and 'guest,' often only of gossamer strength, ought not 
to be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to 
constitutional safeguards.93 
In place of common law property distinctions, the Court adopted a 
looser standard that focused on whether the defendant's presence was 
"legitimate" or "wrongful": 
No just interest of the Government in the effective and rigorous 
enforcement of the criminal law will be hampered by recognizing that 
anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its 
legality by way of a motion to suppress, when its fruits are proposed to be 
used against him. This would of course not avail those who, by virtue of 
their wrongful presence, cannot invoke the privacy of the premises 
searched.94 
Jones does not reject property as a guide to determine standing to 
challenge search warrants. Rather, Jones suggests that when using 
property as a guide, a broader conception of property should govern, 
not the arcane and hypertechnical distinctions of common law 
property rules. As the Court later expressed in a 1978 case, Rakas v. 
Illinois,95 while "arcane distinctions developed in property . . .  ought 
not to control"96 the Fourth Amendment inquiry, "property concepts 
92. The cases are collected in Jones, 362 U.S. at 265-66. 
93. Jones, 362 U.S. at 266 (internal citations omitted). 
94. Id. at 267. 
95. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
96. Id. at 143 (emphasis added). 
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in determining the presence or absence of the privacy interests 
protected by [the Fourth] Amendment"97 are still useful. 
This brings us back to Katz. Today, Katz is canonized as a 
landmark decision that dramatically changed Fourth Amendment law. 
Professor Amsterdam called it a "watershed in fourth amendment 
jurisprudence. "98 Others have described it as "revolutionary. "99 Yet a 
close examination of Katz suggests a plausible contrary reading: Katz 
did not revolutionize Fourth Amendment law, but merely 
reemphasized the loose property-based approach announced in Jones. 
Indeed, while Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz did introduce the 
"reasonable expectation of privacy test," that doctrinal formulation 
was apparently meant merely to articulate the legal standard that the 
Court had been tacitly applying in past cases - cases such as Jones v. 
United States. 
Katz began with an investigation into an illegal betting scheme. 
The FBI taped a microphone to the roof of a public phone booth used 
every morning by a suspect named Charles Katz.100 The microphone 
was connected by a wire to an FBI listening post.101 When Katz placed 
calls from the phone booth, the FBI turned on the microphone. The 
government played the recordings of Katz placing his bets at trial.102 
The microphone did not actually wiretap the telephone line: it merely 
recorded Katz's end of the conversations, picking up what an 
eavesdropper might have heard had he stood near the booth when 
Katz used the phone.103 The lower courts approved this warrantless 
surveillance without difficulty.104 Applying pre-Jones precedents that 
had adopted a strict property-based view of the Fourth Amendment, 
lower courts held that this monitoring did not violate Katz's Fourth 
Amendment rights because it did not physically trespass into the 
phone booth.105 
97. Id. at 143-44 n.12 (emphasis added). 
98. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 
349, 382 (1974). 
99. James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an Expanded 
Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 649 (1985) 
(referring to "(t)he Katz Revolution"); Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the 'Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy': An Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1087 
(1987) ("Katz revolutionized fourth amendment search analysis."). 
100. See Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 131 (9th Cir. 1966). The Supreme Court 
described the microphone as an "electronic listening and recording device," see Katz, 389 
U.S. at 348, but the Ninth Circuit opinion describes the device simply as a microphone. 
101. See Katz, 369 F.2d at 131. 
102. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 354 n.14. 
103. See id. 
104. See Katz, 369 F.2d at 134. 
105. See Katz, 369 F.2d at 134. 
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The Supreme Court took a different view. Echoing Jones, the 
Court stated that technical notions of common law trespass no longer 
governed the Fourth Amendment inquiry. The "narrow view"106 of 
property rights simply could "no longer be regarded as controlling. "107 
The Court suggested that a broader approach applied that allowed "a 
person in a telephone booth [to] rely upon the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment."108 Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart did 
not define the contours of this broader approach. Instead, Justice 
Stewart made the conclusory statement that, "One who occupies [a 
telephone booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that 
permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words 
he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world."109 
Exactly why the user of the phone booth was constitutionally 
entitled to his privacy was left to the reader's imagination. The Court 
did state that "the Fourth Amendment protects people rather than 
places,"1 10 but this memorable line was apparently more a response to 
the litigants' briefs than a new principle of Fourth Amendment law.m 
106. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 352. 
109. Id. 
1 10. See id. at 347. 
1 11 .  Katz's brief had argued to the Court that the very nature of phone booths triggered 
Fourth Amendment protection; any time the government wanted to collect information from 
a phone booth, Katz contended, the government needed a warrant. Katz's brief framed "the 
crucial inquiry as . . .  whether a public telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area." 
Brief for Petitioner at 12, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz argued that the 
Court's past Fourth Amendment decisions had recognized that business offices, stores, hotel 
rooms, automobiles, and taxicabs were all constitutionally protected areas, such that "it 
would be unreasonable to suggest that any less protection should be afforded to the user of a 
closed door public telephone booth." Id. at 14. The Solicitor General's brief for the United 
States offered a mirror image at this argument: it claimed that the very nature of phone 
booths meant that Fourth Amendment protection could never exist in a phone booth. The 
Government's brief argued that "[a] row of public telephone booths, . . .  is not significantly 
different" from an open field or a public street because phone booths are exposed to the 
public, and someone speaking in a phone booth can be both readily overhead from an 
adjoining booth and also viewed through the glass. Brief for the United States at 15-16. This 
focus on a phone booth as a place followed from a sentence in an earlier case, Silverman v. 
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961). which had suggested that Fourth Amendment 
protections hinged on whether the place searched was a "constitutionally protected area." 
But the parties' abstraction of this inquiry made little sense under any conception of the 
Fourth Amendment. Even under the strict common law property view rejected in Jones, the 
Fourth Amendment protected a person's rights, namely their right to exclude others from 
their property. Consider the context in which the Court used its "people, not places" 
formulation. After reciting the questions presented by the petitioner, the Court "decline[d] 
to adopt this formulation of the issues," noting that "the correct solution of Fourth 
Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase 
'constitutionally protected area.' ": 
Because of the misleading way the issues have been formulated, the parties have attached 
great significance to the characterization of the telephone booth from which the petitioner 
placed his calls. The petitioner has strenuously argued that the booth was a "constitutionally 
protected area." The Government has maintained with equal vigor that it was not. But this 
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Only Justice Harlan articulated a coherent rationale for the Court's 
conclusion. In his famous concurrence, Harlan noted that the post­
Jones Court had properly rejected a strict common law approach to 
the Fourth Amendment because it had proved to be "bad physics as 
well as bad law."112 Justice Harlan argued that the Court's recent cases 
had focused instead on whether a defendant's expectation of privacy 
was reasonable under the circumstances.113 Harlan did not explain 
what made an expectation of privacy "reasonable," but he apparently 
saw his "reasonable expectation of privacy" framework as a 
restatement of existing law; Harlan described the test as "my 
understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions."114 
Applying this standard led Harlan to conclude that the monitoring 
violated Katz's Fourth Amendment rights. The "critical" fact was the 
relationship that Katz had established when he occupied the phone 
booth, shut the door behind him, and "pa[id) the toll that permit[ted) 
him to place a call."115 At that point, the phone booth became a 
"temporarily private place whose momentary occupants' expectations 
of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable."116 
Katz is a Rorschach test. Its vague language can support a narrow 
or broad reading equally well. But for my purpose here, note that Katz 
is correctly decided from the standpoint of the loose property-based 
approach applied in Jones. Charles Katz became entitled to Fourth 
Amendment protection when he "pa[id) the toll that permit[ted) him 
to place a call,"117 because at that point he became a legitimate user of 
the phone booth. In effect, Katz rented out the booth for the 
"momentary"118 period of his call much like a hotel guest rents out a 
hotel room for the night.119 Like the hotel guest gaining Fourth 
effort to decide whether or not a given "area," viewed in the abstract, is "constitutionally 
protected" deflects attention from the problem presented by this case. For the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places. 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51. 
1 12. Id. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
1 13. See id. at 361. ("My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior 
decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "). 
1 14. Justice Harlan then interpreted the majority opinion in Katz as holding "only" that 
telephone booths receive Fourth Amendment protection, that electronic intrusions could 
violate the Fourth Amendment, and that warrantless searches were presumptively 
unreasonable. See id. at 361. 
1 15. Id. at 361. 
1 16. Id. 
1 17. Id. at 352. 
1 18. Id. at 361. 
1 19. See supra notes 34-36, and accompanying text. 
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Amendment rights in the hotel room during his stay, Katz acquired 
the owner's privacy rights in the phone booth during the period of his 
phone call. 
From this perspective, the FBI's surveillance violated the Fourth 
Amendment because it interfered with Katz's "momentary" property 
rights, and in particular his right to exclude others. The FBI had 
installed a microphone on the property Katz had rented out and 
connected the microphone by wire to an FBI listening post. In a Fifth 
Amendment case, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV,120 the 
Supreme Court later found a similar installation to be a direct taking 
of private property requiring due compensation to the property 
owner.121 In Loretto, the owner of an apartment building challenged 
the state-sanctioned installation of cable television boxes and 
connecting wires on the outside walls and roof of her building. Even 
though the installed devices were fairly small, used previously unused 
space,122 and did not trespass into the inside of the building, the Court 
classified the installation as a "permanent physical occupation" of the 
owner's private property, "perhaps the most serious form of invasion 
of an owner's property interests."123 The same applies to Katz in the 
context of the Fourth Amendment. In Katz, the government installed 
a device on the property Katz had rented out, and used that invasion 
of his property interest to collect evidence against him. Charles Katz 
was entitled to the suppression of the fruits derived from the 
government's invasion of his property interest no less than Loretto 
was entitled to just compensation for the government's invasion of her 
property interest. By entering the phone booth and paying for a call, 
Charles Katz bought a temporary right to exclude others from the 
phone booth that was protected by the Fourth Amendment.124 
Is this the best interpretation of Katz? Not necessarily. Is it the 
only interpretation? Clearly not. Subsequent dissents by Justice 
Harlan suggest that he may have had a broader, more amorphous 
concept in mind.125 At the same time, Katz 's consistency with the 
property-based approach may help explain why the decision failed to 
120. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
121. See id. at 438. 
122 See id. at 438 n.16. 
123. See id. at 435. 
124. Cf Sklansky, supra note 7, at 158 ("[E]ven the central holding of Katz starts to look 
trivial if one ties it, as Harlan did, to an analogy between telephone booths and homes."). 
125. Just a year after Katz in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), Justice 
Harlan complained that the Court was not being true to Katz by adopting a property-based 
view of who has standing to challenge wiretapping practices. Harlan argued that only those 
who had their conversations tapped had standing; the majority opinion concluded that the 
homeowner had standing as well due to his ownership interest in the home where the 
telephone was located. See id. at 193-95 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). See also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 780 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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dislodge property principles from Fourth Amendment law. Katz was 
both consistent with and offered no clear alternative to the loose 
property approach. Absent a clear alternative to the traditional 
approach, a curious thing happened: very little changed. The Supreme 
Court considered a series of cases which required the Court to 
reaffirm or reject pre-Katz precedents in light of the new learning of 
Katz, and in case after case, the Court reaffirmed the earlier 
precedents. The Katz revolution proved a revolution more on paper 
than in practice. As a result, the Fourth Amendment today remains 
surprisingly similar to the Fourth Amendment before Katz. 126 
Consider just a few cases from the quarter-century that followed 
Katz. United States v. White127 reaffirmed On Lee v. United States,128 
which had held that the police did not need a warrant to go 
undercover and wear a "wire" that transmitted the defendant's 
conversations to a police observation post. Rakas v. Illinois129 
reaffirmed Gouled v. United States,130 which had held that Fourth 
Amendment rights are personal and cannot be asserted vicariously. 
Oliver v. United States131 reaffirmed Hester v. United States,132 retaining 
the quirky "open fields" doctrine. California v. Hodari D. 133 reaffirmed 
the common law rules governing when a person is "seized" under the 
Fourth Amendment.134 These decisions are hard to square with a 
broad revolutionary reading of Katz. 135 
126. See John M. Junker, The Structure of the Fourth Amendment: The Scope of the 
Protection, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 105, 1 125 (1989) ("What is remarkable, 
however, is how little was changed by Katz . . . .  "). See also David A. Sklansky, The Fourth 
Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739 (2000) (noting and criticizing the 
Supreme Court's reliance on common law standards in modern Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence). 
127. 401 U.S. 745, 750 (1971) ("We see no indication in Katz that the Court meant to 
disturb . . .  the result reached in the On Lee case, nor are we now inclined to overturn this 
view of the Fourth Amendment."). 
128. 343 U.S. 747 (1952). 
129. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
130. 255 U.S. 298 (1921). 
131. 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
132. 265 U.S. 57 (1924). 
133. 499 U.S. 621 (1991). 
134. Id. at 624. 
135. See, e.g. , Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 457 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he 
plurality ignores the very essence of Katz."); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 216 (1986) 
(Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's property-based view "departs 
significantly from the standard developed in Katz for deciding when a Fourth Amendment 
violation has occurred"); Dow Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 247 (1986) (Powell, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Today, while purporting to consider the 
Fourth Amendment question raised here under the rubric of Katz, the Court's analysis of the 
issue ignores the heart of the Katz standard."); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 162-63 (White, 
J., dissenting) ("Indeed, the decision today is contrary to Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissent in 
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Of course, it is debatable whether the continuing influence of 
property law remains normatively or doctrinally appropriate. The 
Supreme Court's opinions have sent conflicting rhetorical signals 
regarding the nature of the post-Katz Fourth Amendment. Sometimes 
the Court says that property is important to Fourth Amendment 
doctrine.136 At other times, the Court has claimed that "the principal 
object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather 
than property,"137 and has called Katz a "clear break"138 from prior 
law.139 In the period immediately following Katz, it made sense to 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928), expressing a view of the Fourth 
Amendment thought to have been vindicated by Katz.") . 
136. In Rakas, for example, the Court stated that "[o]ne of the main rights attaching to 
property is the right to exclude others . . .  and one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls 
property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right 
to exclude." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 (citations omitted). The Court continued: 
Id. 
Expectations of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment, of course, need not be based 
on a common-law interest in real or personal property, or on the invasion of such an interest. 
These ideas were rejected both in Jones, supra, and Katz, supra. But by focusing on 
legitimate expectations of privacy in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has not 
altogether abandoned use of property concepts in determining the presence or absence of 
the privacy interests protected by that Amendment. 
The court also stated that expectations of privacy could be legitimate based on 
"understandings that are recognized and permitted by society." Id. However, the Court has 
effectively proven itself highly reluctant to recognize those "understandings," and instead 
relies heavily on real property law. 
137. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967). 
138. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248 (1969) ("However clearly our holding in 
Katz may have been foreshadowed, it was a clear break with the past."). The Desist case held 
that Katz did not apply retroactively, which under the test in place that time allowed the 
Court to consider how different Katz was to prior law. The Court explained that Katz had 
finally held explicitly what later cases had signaled implicitly, that the strict trespass cases 
were no longer good law. See id. at 250 ("Katz for the first time explicitly overruled the 
'physical penetration' and 'trespass' tests enunciated in earlier decisions of this Court."). 
139. The Court also suggested (albeit less than coherently) that the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test has a normative component. In Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
740-41 n.5 (1979), Justice Blackmun wrote: 
Id. 
Situations can be imagined, of course, in which Katz' two-pronged inquiry would provide an 
inadequate index of Fourth Amendment protection. For example, if the Government were 
suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be subject 
to warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might not in fact entertain any actual expectation 
or [sic] privacy regarding their homes, papers, and effects. Similarly, if a refugee from a 
totalitarian country, unaware of this Nation's traditions, erroneously assumed that police 
were continuously monitoring his telephone conversations, a subjective expectation of 
privacy regarding the contents of his calls might be lacking as well. In such circumstances, 
where an individual's subjective expectations had been "conditioned" by influences alien to 
well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously could 
play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment protection 
was. In determining whether a "legitimate expectation of privacy" existed in such cases, a 
normative inquiry would be proper. 
This analysis is notably difficult to square with the Court's other Fourth Amendment 
cases. Justice Blackmun is plainly correct that a declaration that all homes will be subject to 
entry would not eliminate Fourth Amendment protection. However, the reason is not that 
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imagine that Katz might signal a dramatic shift.140 But for better or 
worse, the Court has followed a more conservative path; conservative 
not so much in the political sense (although that may be true, as well), 
but in the sense that the Court's path generally has sought to preserve 
pre-Katz precedents. Most of the Court's majority decisions have in 
effect linked when an expectation of privacy was "reasonable" with 
whether it was backed by a loose version of the right to exclude, the 
traditional cornerstone of Fourth Amendment law. 
Viewed in this light, much of the academic criticisms of the Court's 
post-Katz decisions fall a bit flat. To critics who insist that the 
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test is fundamentally normative, 
judicial decisions that deviate from the critic's normative views simply 
reflect unenlightened understandings of privacy, and are all wrongly 
decided.141 Indeed, scholars consistently denounce the Court's 
this would somehow trigger a "normative" inquiry, but because such a notice would not 
interfere with a homeowner's right to exclude. This is the same reason why Fourth 
Amendment protections in the home do not depend in any way on whether the defendant 
lives in a high crime neighborhood, has nosy neighbors, or keeps the front door unlocked. 
See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982) (noting that "the most frail cottage is 
absolutely entitled to the same guarantees of [Fourth Amendment] privacy as the most 
majestic mansion."). The Fourth Amendment protections derive from the right to exclude, 
and that does not depend on the mere likelihood that an invasion will occur. 
140. Professor LaFave's treatise quotes extensively from legal scholarship from the late 
1960s and early 1970s that views Katz as a radical break from existing law. See 1 LAFAVE, 
supra note 24, at 389-94. After quoting these sources, he laments that the Court has strayed: 
"Though this is the way that the second Katz prong ought to be interpreted, it is beyond 
question that the post-Katz decisions of the Supreme Court do not ordinarily or often square 
with the foregoing analysis." Id. at 394. 
141. See, e.g. , LAFAVE, supra note 24, at § 2.7(c) at 631 ("The result . . .  is dead wrong, 
and the Court's woefully inadequate reasoning does great violence to the theory of Fourth 
Amendment protection which the Court developed in Katz."); Gerald G. Ashdown, The 
Fourth Amendment and the 'Legitimate Expectation of Privacy', 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 
1294 (1981) (explaining Supreme Court cases rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge 
brought under Katz to the Justices' "dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule or a desire to 
accommodate state and local law enforcement," which has allowed the Court "to distort its 
perception of which privacy expectations are justifiable and deserving of protection."); 
Richard S. Julie, Note, High-Tech Surveillance Tools and the Fourth Amendment: 
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in the Technological Age, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127, 131 
(2000) ("Unfortunately, as members of the Warren Court retired and were replaced by more 
conservative members, the broad reading given [Katz] . . .  began to be turned on its head."); 
Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 IND. L.J. 
549, 554 (1990) ("The Katz standard has been twisted to allow the government access to 
many intimate details about our lives."); Jonathan Todd Laba, Comment, If You Can't Stand 
the Heat, Get Out of the Drug Business: Thermal Imaging, Emerging Technologies, and the 
Fourth Amendment, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1437, 1454 (1996) (arguing that although post-Katz 
cases claimed to be applying the Katz test, "this show of loyalty to Katz has proven specious, 
for subsequent cases have undermined the promise of Katz"); Brian J. Serr, Great 
Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 
583, 587 (1989) (arguing that "the entire course of recent Supreme Court fourth amendment 
precedent, which has narrowed significantly the scope of individual activities that are 
protected constitutionally, is misguided and inconsistent with the spirit of the fourth 
amendment."); Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of 
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings 
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opinions interpreting Katz as "dead wrong,"142 "off the mark,"143 
"misguided,"144 and "inconsistent with the spirit of the fourth 
amendment."145 To these scholars, Katz announced a true path that the 
Court subsequently failed to follow.146 But a less revolutionary 
interpretation of Katz reveals a somewhat different picture. For better 
or worse, the Supreme Court has been fairly consistent in its approach 
to the Fourth Amendment: both before and after Katz, Fourth 
Amendment protections have mostly matched the contours of real 
property law. 
C. The Deference Norm in New Technologies 
The continuing influence of real property law on the modern 
Fourth Amendment has had a profound effect on how courts have 
applied the Fourth Amendment to new technologies. New 
technologies often destabilize the relationship between property and 
privacy.147 Some technologies expose information that otherwise might 
have remained hidden; others conceal information that otherwise 
might have been exposed.148 From the viewpoint of property law, these 
details are critical. In general, the police must interfere with property 
rights to discover what is hidden; "taking action . . .  which expose[s] to 
view concealed [property]" is a Fourth Amendment search.149 Because 
the police need not interfere with property rights to see that which is 
in plain view, the viewing of already exposed information generally is 
Recognized and Permitted by Society'', 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 732 (1993) (arguing that some 
Supreme Court cases "do not reflect societal understandings" of when an expectation of 
privacy is "reasonable," and that "some of the Court's conclusions [about what expectations 
of privacy are reasonable] may be well off the mark"); Tomkovicz, supra note 99, at 647 
(explaining that post-Katz cases "neither fulfilled the promises of Katz nor been consonant 
with an appropriately conceived fourth amendment core."). 
142. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 24, at 631. 
143. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 141, at 732. 
144. Serr, supra note 141, at 587. 
145. Id. 
146. For example, Professor LaFave's treatise quotes extensively from legal scholarship 
from the late 1960s and early 1970s suggesting that Katz will bring a radical break with 
existing law. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 24, at 389-94. After quoting these sources, he then 
briefly notes that the Court has taken a very different path: "Though this is the way that the 
second Katz prong ought to be interpreted, it is beyond question that the post-Katz decisions 
of the Supreme Court do not ordinarily or often square with the foregoing analysis." Id. 
at 394. 
147. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001) ("It would be foolish to 
contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been 
entirely unaffected by the advance of technology."). 
148. I develop this later in Part III. 
149. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987) (holding that moving stereo equipment 
to see the bottom of the equipment is a search). 
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not a search under the Fourth Amendment.150 When new technologies 
change what is exposed and what is hidden, the scope of Fourth 
Amendment protections can shift depending on the details of how the 
technologies work. 
This dynamic has often led to a relatively modest and deferential 
Fourth Amendment in the area of developing technologies. Granted, 
when technology leads to the hiding of information that in the past 
would have been exposed, technological advance can expand Fourth 
Amendment protection. Consider the use of tinted windows on 
automobiles. Under the property-based Fourth Amendment, the 
police can look inside a car through a clear window.151 Looking 
through the window is not a search.152 Tinted windows, however, can 
block the ability of the police to see what is inside. To look behind a 
tinted window, the police might need to open the door or break the 
window, both of which interfere with property rights and qualify as 
Fourth Amendment searches. At least where not prohibited by 
substantive law, tinted windows can expand privacy by hiding what 
was once exposed; by expanding what property protects, the new 
technology expands the scope of Fourth Amendment protection. 
This dynamic is relatively rare, however. New technologies more 
commonly expose information that in the past would have remained 
hidden, resulting in meager Fourth Amendment protection in new 
technologies. Examples are plentiful. In California v. Ciraolo,153 the 
Supreme Court considered the Fourth Amendment implications of 
aerial surveillance enabled by the invention of the airplane. 
Investigators flew an airplane above the defendant's backyard, and 
from public airspace looked down to see whether the defendant was 
growing marijuana in the yard.154 The yard was surrounded by double 
fences, but the airplane allowed the police to observe the marijuana 
without interfering with them. The Court upheld the surveillance, 
ruling that because the plane was flown "within public navigable 
airspace . . .  [and] in a physically nonintrusive manner"155 - that is, 
without violating the defendant's property rights - the practice did 
not violate the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy.156 
The Court took the same approach when it considered the Fourth 
Amendment implications of chemical tests that can detect the 
150. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Cf 
Colb, supra note 87, at 124-26 (discussing the "exposure" line of Fourth Amendment cases). 
151. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1982). 
152. Id. 
153. 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
154. Id. at 209. 
155. Id. at 213 (citation omitted). 
156. See id. at 213-14. 
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presence of illegal narcotics. In United States v. Jacobsen,157 the Court 
reasoned that such tests do not violate a defendant's reasonable 
expectation of privacy because cocaine ownership is illegal.158 Because 
contraband cocaine cannot be legally owned, a defendant cannot claim 
a "legitimate" right in cocaine, and a chemical test that is limited in 
scope to determining the presence of illegal narcotics cannot violate a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.159 
Courts have taken a similar approach with records generated by 
communications technologies such as the telephone and the Internet. 
As several commentators have noted, communications technologies 
allow owners and operators of communications networks to build 
complete dossiers on their users.160 The telephone company can know 
exactly when a particular telephone line was used to place a particular 
call, the number dialed, and the length of the call. Internet service 
providers ("ISPs") can keep records of session times, websites visited, 
and e-mails sent and received.161 This information can allow providers 
to assemble a comprehensive picture of their users' private conduct. 
Courts have held that the Fourth Amendment protects little, if any, of 
this information. Under the property-based approach, 
the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information 
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government 
authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it 
will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the 
third party will not be betrayed.162 
Once a user discloses information to the provider, the user 
relinquishes any Fourth Amendment protection in the information by 
virtue of losing the right to exclude. Although the information may 
157. 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
158. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123; see also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 302 (1967) 
(defining contraband as an item for which "a valid exercise of the police power renders 
possession of the property by the accused unlawful and provides that it may be taken" 
(quoting Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921))). Common examples of items 
that fall within this definition include child pornography, United States v. Kimbrough, 69 
F.3d 723, 731 (5th Cir. 1995), pirated software and other copyrighted materials, United 
States v. Vastola, 670 F. Supp. 1244, 1273 (D.N.J. 1987), counterfeit money, narcotics, and 
illegal weapons. 
159. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123. 
160. See id. at 123; see also Solove, supra note 7, at 1084 ("In the Information Age, an 
increasing amount of personal information is contained in records maintained by Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs), phone companies, cable companies, merchants, bookstores, 
websites, hotels, landlords, employers and private sector entities."). 
161. See Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big 
Brother That Isn 't, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 607, 612-15 (2003) [hereinafter Kerr, Internet 
Surveillance]. (explaining the different records that Internet service providers can maintain 
relating to their users). 
162. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
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still seem private, the government does not violate any principle of 
property law by asking a third-party to disclose it. 
Following this principle, the Supreme Court held in Smith v. 
Maryland163 that telephone users do not have a "reasonable 
expectation of privacy" in the telephone numbers that they dial 
because the numbers disclosed to the telephone company.164 Courts 
have applied the same principle to information disclosed to Internet 
service providers165 and Western Union.166 Lower courts have also 
applied this approach to the interception of cordless telephone calls. 
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on this question, lower 
courts have held that government interception of a cordless phone call 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment.167 Why? Unlike traditional 
landline telephones, cordless phones broadcast a signal that can be 
picked up by others. Although intercepting a cordless phone call 
invades privacy, it invades privacy without invading property: the 
intercepting device merely picks up a signal that has been "broadcast 
over the radio waves to all who wish to overhear,"168 and is therefore 
available to the public.169 The courts have adopted similar rationales to 
reject claims of Fourth Amendment protection for other types of radio 
transmissions.170 
163. 442 U.S. 735, (1979). 
164. Id. at 742. 
165. See Guest v. Leis, 225 F.3d 325, 335-36 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding no expectation of 
privacy in non-content information disclosed to ISP); United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 
2d 504, 508-09 (W.D.Va. 1999), affd 225 F.3d 656, 2000 WL 1062039 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(unpublished table decision) (same); United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1 103, 1110 
(D.Kan. 2000) (same). 
166. See In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 827 F.2d 301, 302-03 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding 
that Western Union customers have no reasonable expectation of privacy in Western Union 
records concerning the customers' activities). 
167. See, e.g. , Price v. Turner, 260 F.3d 1144, 1 149 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
McNulty (In re Askin), 47 F.3d 100, 104-106 (4th Cir. 1995) (involving a call made to a 
cordless telephone user); McKamey v. Roach, 55 F.3d 1236, 1239-40 (6th Cir. 1995); Tyler v. 
Berodt, 877 F.2d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 1989) (involving a call from a cordless phone). Notably, 
however, at least one court has suggested that as the technology becomes more advanced 
and such phone calls are harder to intercept, interception may begin to violate the Fourth 
Amendment because it would be more "reasonable" to expect privacy against interception. 
See, e.g. , United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171, 180 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Although we express no 
opinion as to what features or circumstances would be necessary to give rise to a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, it should be obvious that as technological advances make cordless 
communications more private at some point such communication will be entitled to Fourth 
Amendment protection."). 
168. McKamey, 55 F.3d at 1239-40. 
169. Of course, Congress can protect such calls when the Fourth Amendment does not. 
In the case of cordless telephone calls, Congress added statutory protection against their 
interception in 1994. See id. at 1238 n.1. 
170. See, e.g. , United States v. Rose, 669 F.2d 23, 25 (1st Cir. 1982) (rejecting a claim of 
Fourth Amendment protection in an intercepted radio transmission); United States v. 
Peterson, 812 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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These cases suggest that courts generally do not engage in creative 
normative inquiries into privacy and technological change when 
applying the Fourth Amendment to new technologies. For better or 
for worse, courts have tended to apply the same property-based 
principles to such cases that they have applied elsewhere. This has 
focused attention on whether government investigators collect 
information that technology has hidden or information that 
technology has exposed. Because many technologies expose new 
forms of information rather than hide them, the property law 
principles driving the Fourth Amendment have led to only weak 
Fourth Amendment protections in new technologies.171 
D. Property-Defeating Surveillance Technologies: Knotts, Karo, and 
Kyllo 
The Court's broad commitment to property principles in Fourth 
Amendment law has been tested by cases involving property-defeating 
surveillance technologies, and in particular United States v. Knotts,172 
171. A student note in the Yale Law Journal from 1996 has led some commentators to 
reach a similar conclusion, albeit for an incorrect reason. See Adler, supra note 7. In this 
Note, the author concludes that the Fourth Amendment balancing test for reasonableness 
will gut Fourth Amendment protections involving computers because the government may 
be able to create new search tools that can conduct "perfect" searches. Specifically, the 
author argues that the reasonableness of a Fourth Amendment search depends on how 
narrowly tailored the search is, and reasons that Internet technologies will allow the 
government to execute searches online without warrants because Internet search tools can 
be used in very narrowly tailored ways. See id. at 1 106. 
Although this framework has been accepted by several commentators, see, e.g. , LESSIG, 
supra note 10, at 17-19, ROSEN, supra note 21, at 38-40, I believe that it is incorrect from the 
standpoint of existing Fourth Amendment doctrine. Adler fails to recognize that the 
Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment balancing cases generally deal with searches 
conducted for non-law-enforcement reasons. In these so-called "special needs" cases, the 
government is allowed a more relaxed standard so long as the non-law-enforcement need 
outweighs the privacy intrusion. For example, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. U.S. 523 
(1967), held that government housing inspectors could enter homes in a limited capacity to 
inspect homes for housing code violations. And in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the 
Court held that a cop could briefly frisk a suspect for weapons to protect the officer's safety. 
Adler's framework improperly assumes that this relaxed balancing test would also apply 
to government searches executed for traditional Jaw enforcement purposes. The courts have 
not allowed this, however. When a search is conducted for a Jaw enforcement purpose, 
courts do not apply a balancing test or weigh the intrusiveness of the search. Rather, the 
search itself violates a reasonable expectation of privacy, requiring either a warrant or an 
exception to the warrant requirement such as exigent circumstances, no matter how narrowly 
tailored or unobtrusive the search may be. See, e.g. , Nat'! Federation of Fed. Empl. v. 
Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 943 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("The government may not take 
advantage of any arguably relaxed . . .  standard for warrantless searches . . .  when its true 
purpose is to obtain evidence of criminal activity . . . .  ") . Note that the Fourth Amendment 
generally does not allow police officers who are particularly skilled at finding evidence of 
crime to execute more warrantless searches than those who are not. This is true because 
whether the officer can execute a narrowly tailored search is normally not relevant to the 
Fourth Amendment inquiry. The same goes for searches undertaken remotely by computers, 
or through any other technological means. 
172. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
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United States v. Karo,173 and Ky/lo v. United States.174 In these cases, 
police used new surveillance technologies that threatened to eliminate 
property as a guide to what is hidden and what is exposed in the home. 
Here the Court has deviated from a strict focus on how the technology 
works and instead created rules to preserve the degree of surveillance 
authority in the home that property law principles have traditionally 
allowed. Although these cases (and particularly Ky/lo) can be read 
plausibly as suggesting a broad and even creative view of how the 
Fourth Amendment should respond when technology threatens 
privacy, I think a better reading is that these cases are essentially 
conservative, reinforcing the primacy of property law. The cases carve 
out an exception to the usual methodology to achieve the traditional 
goal of property protection in the home, but at least so far do not 
signal a broader commitment to expansive Fourth Amendment 
protections in new technologies. 
The first of these cases is United States v. Knotts, 175 which involved 
the use of an electronic tracking device to investigate a 
methamphetamine manufacturing ring. To monitor the conspiracy, the 
police placed a radio transmitter that emitted periodic signals inside a 
five gallon drum of chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamine. 
The drum was then sold to a member of the conspiracy named 
Petschen, who kept the drum (and with it, the tracking device) in his 
car.176 The police traced Petschen's location based on the signals they 
received from the transmitter, and learned that Petschen had driven 
the car on to Knotts's property. The police used this information to 
obtain a warrant to search Knotts' farm, where they discovered "a 
fully operable, clandestine drug laboratory."177 Knotts then challenged 
the warrantless use of the tracking device (but not its installation, 
oddly enough) as a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
The Court concluded that the warrantless use of the tracking 
device did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the information 
that the police obtained using the surveillance technology was 
essentially public. The police could have obtained the same 
information by "following Petschen at a distance throughout his 
journey,"178 which would not have required a warrant. In other words, 
what really mattered was not the technical details of how the 
information was obtained - the usual inquiry - but rather what 
information was obtained. Because the location of Petschen's car was 
173. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
174. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
175. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
176. See id. at 279. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 285. 
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the kind of public information that any onlooker could observe, it did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment to invade Petschen's property 
rights to obtain it. 
The flip side of Knotts arrived the next year in United States v. 
Karo.179 The facts of Karo closely resemble those of Knotts: an 
electronic tracking device was placed in a container and sold to a 
suspected co-conspirator in a narcotics ring.180 The police then learned 
the whereabouts of the conspiracy by following the tracking device. In 
Karo, however, the defendant brought the container into several 
private homes, and the signal allowed the police to know that the 
container was inside those homes.181 Once again the police used the 
information to obtain a warrant, and a search of the homes revealed a 
narcotics operation. This time, however, the Court ruled that the 
surveillance violated the defendant's reasonable expectation of 
privacy.182 Why the difference? Because this time the tracking device 
had sent a signal from "a private residence, a location not open to 
visual surveillance."183 The information obtained through the tracking 
device was information that a police officer normally would need to 
enter the home to obtain,184 and since entering a home was a search, so 
was using a tracking device inside one.185 Once again, the Court looked 
to whether the police traditionally would have needed a warrant to 
collect the information that they collected. 
This brings us to Ky/lo v. United States,186 the Court's recent 
decision on thermal imaging devices. Ky/lo involved a camera that 
179. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
180. Id. at 707. 
181. Id. at 709-10. 
182 Id. at 717. 
183. Id. at 714. 
184. The Court observed: 
In this case, had a DEA agent thought it useful to enter the . . .  residence to verify that the 
ether was actually in the house and had he done so surreptitiously and without a warrant. 
there is little doubt that he would have engaged in an unreasonable search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
Id. at 715. 
185. According to the Court, a contrary rule "would present far too serious a threat to 
privacy interests in the borne . . .  " Id. at 716. In a partial concurrence, Justice Stevens noted 
that this result matched the Court's usual property-based approach to the Fourth 
Amendment as well, but the majority focused solely on assessing the privacy implications of 
the information: 
When the Government attaches an electronic monitoring device to [a defendant's] property, 
it infringes that exclusionary right; in a fundamental sense it has converted the property to its 
own use. Surely such an inversion is an "interference" with possessory rights; the right to 
exclude, which attached as soon as the can re�pondents purchased was delivered, had been 
infringed. 
Id. at 729 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
186. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
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detected infrared radiation, a type of radiation that all objects emit 
naturally.187 The human eye does not normally detect this radiation 
because the wavelength of the light is longer than visible light. Certain 
chemicals can detect and measure this radiation, however, which 
allows "infrared cameras" to be designed that can take a picture of the 
infrared light emitted by the object viewed.188 Such cameras are often 
known as "thermal imaging devices" because the amount of infrared 
light an object emits varies based on the object's temperature.189 By 
measuring the infrared radiation emitted by an object, the thermal 
imaging device determines the temperature of the surface of the 
object, down to a depth of about one-thousandth of an inch.190 
In Kyllo, the police directed an infrared thermal imaging device at 
the exterior of the defendant's home to help establish that the 
defendant was growing marijuana inside his home.191 The device 
reported that the roof over the garage and a side wall of the Kyllo's 
home were unusually hot, likely evidence of heat lamps being used to 
help grow marijuana inside.192 The police used the thermal image to 
create a case for probable cause to justify a search of the home, and 
the resulting search warrant led to the discovery that Kyllo was in fact 
growing marijuana under lights.193 Kyllo argued that the use of the 
infrared device violated his Fourth Amendment rights, but the Ninth 
Circuit rejected the claim.194 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the 
unanimous judgment of others Courts of Appeals that imaging did not 
violate a reasonable expectation of privacy because the imaging device 
merely received and recorded the infrared radiation, much like the 
human eye merely received radiation in the form of visible light.195 
These decisions focused on how the technology worked: because the 
imaging device merely observed passively, it did not actively "search" 
the home. 
The Supreme Court reversed.196 Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice 
Scalia followed Karo and Knotts: the use of the imaging device was a 
Fourth Amendment 'search,' Scalia wrote, because it used technology 
to obtain "information regarding the interior of the home that could 
187. Id. at 31. 
188. See J. M. LLOYD, THERMAL IMAGING SYSTEMS 2 (1997). 
189. See id. 
190. See id. at 2-5. 
191. Ky/lo, 533 U.S. at 29. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999). 
195. See id. at 1045. 
196. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
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not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion. "197 
Granted, the device did not actually 'see' inside the home, but the 
information obtained by measuring the temperature of the outside of 
the home provided a great deal of information about the likely 
temperature inside the home, information the Court construed as 
private.198 The Court concluded that "[w]here . . .  the Government uses 
a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the 
home that would previously have been unknowable without physical 
intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively 
unreasonable without a warrant."199 This test is rather mystifying from 
the standpoint of physics,200 but matches the general approach of 
Knotts and Karo. Just as Knotts and Karo measure the intrusiveness of 
tracking devices compared to the bench mark of visual surveillance, 
Kyllo measures the intrusiveness of sense-enhancing devices directed 
at the home compared to the traditional benchmark of physical 
intrusion. 
At first blush, Kyllo and Karo may appear to embrace expansive 
Fourth Amendment protections in new technologies. I think it is more 
accurate to understand these cases as conservative decisions. They are 
conservative in that they are trying to retain the very core of 
traditional Fourth Amendment protections: the protection of 
information about the home traditionally enforced by property law. 
Tracking devices and thermal imaging devices threaten to expose 
information within the home that property has traditionally hidden; 
they reveal the location and temperature of items inside the home not 
visible with the naked eye. Faced with technologies that threaten to 
defeat property's ability to safeguard traditional privacy protections in 
the home, the Court has fashioned new rules in an effort to retain the 
traditional protections set by property law. These cases differ from the 
rest of the Court's property-based decisions in that they do not focus 
on how the technology works or on whether information obtained has 
been exposed or hidden. But they do so in a narrow way to achieve the 
traditional goal of Fourth Amendment protection in the home. 
Lower court interpretations of Karo and Ky/lo reinforce the 
modesty of this enterprise. Both cases have been interpreted quite 
narrowly. For example, the lower courts have not expanded Karo 
197. Id. at 534 (internal quotations omitted}. 
198. See id. at 40 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
199. Id. 
200. The difficulty is that under Ky/lo the frequency of light determines whether it 
receives Fourth Amendment protection. Light in the visible spectrum does not receive 
Fourth Amendment protection: looking at an object using human eyes is not search. 
However, light in the infrared spectrum is protected by the Fourth Amendment, at least 
when the object emitting the infrared light is a home. From the standpoint of physics, this is 
something like saying that the government needs a search warrant to look at blue objects but 
not red objects. 
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beyond the specific domain of tracking devices. Karo is cited most 
frequently for the principle that the Fourth Amendment offers special 
protections to the home.201 Most of the other cases citing Karo deal 
with specific factual variations involving tracking devices, and 
particularly the line between Karo and Knotts. For example, the 
Fourth Circuit has held that locating a stolen mail bag that contains a 
tracking device is closer to Knotts than Karo.202 One district court 
concluded that using tracking device placed in postal mail is closer to 
Karo than Knotts;203 and another district court held that placing a 
tracking device on a sailing ship is closer to Knotts than Karo.204 One 
federal district court relied on Karo to reject a motion to dismiss under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b )(6) when the plaintiff in a Bivens 
action made a general claim that the defendants had "surveilled" 
him,205 but the unpublished opinion doesn't explain whether the result 
had anything to do with the specific holding of Karo.206 Beyond that, 
the courts have not found Karo and Knotts relevant to broader 
questions in Fourth Amendment law, and when Karo has been raised 
by defendants, courts have declined to extend its approach to other 
areas.207 
Kyllo has met a similar fate, at least so far. It has been cited mostly 
for the same proposition as Karo: that the Fourth Amendment offers 
special protections to the home.208 Kyllo has been applied to other 
cases involving the use of a thermal imaging device directed at a 
201. See, e.g. , United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 53-54 
(1993) ("Good's right to maintain control over his home, and to be free from governmental 
interference, is a private interest of historic and continuing importance." (citing United 
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-715 (1984))). 
202. United States v. Jones, 31 F.3d 1304 (4th Cir. 1994). 
203. United States v. Dowdy, 688 F. Supp. 1477 (D. Colo. 1988). 
204. United States v. Juda, 797 F. Supp. 774, 783 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
205. Altieri v. Pennsylvania State Police, No. Civ.A.98-CV-5495, 2000 WL 427272 (E.D. 
Pa. Apr. 19, 2000) (unpublished opinion). 
206. See id. at *3. 
207. For example, in United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the D.C. 
Circuit rejected the argument that Karo and Knotts were relevant to the question of whether 
a dog sniff that led to the discovery of narcotics was a Fourth Amendment search. The court 
found Knotts and Karo "factually distinct" and of only "marginal" relevance. See id. at 
474 n.5 
Notably, however, a handful of lower court decisions relied on Karo to conclude that 
thermal imaging devices violate the Fourth Amendment, an approach the Supreme Court 
adopted in Ky/lo. See United States v. Elkins, 95 F. Supp. 2d 796, 812 (W.D. Tenn. 2000), 
modified, 300 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1507 (10th 
Cir. 1995), vacated, 83 F.3d 1247, 1250-51 (10th Cir. 1996) (en bane) (declining to "decide the 
constitutionality of the warrantless use of the thermal imager . . .  "); United States v. Field, 
855 F. Supp. 1518, 1530 (W.D. Wisc. 1994). 
208. Loria v. Gorman, 306 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Tolar, 268 F.3d 
530, 532 (7th Cir. 2001). 
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home.209 But no judicial opinion has extended the holding of Kyllo to 
any other fact pattern to broaden the scope of Fourth Amendment 
protections. One Sixth Circuit decision ponders but does not decide 
whether Kyllo applies to use of a thermal imaging device directed at a 
commercial building.210 One unpublished district court decision211 
contemplates but does not decide whether Kyllo implicitly overruled 
United States v. Place,212 which had held that a dog sniff of a package 
(for drugs) was not a "search."213 But no case has taken Kyllo beyond 
the facts of the case itself, and no court has viewed Kyllo as a symbolic 
endorsement of broad privacy rights in new technologies. Ironically, 
the one post-Kyllo case relying on the decision in substance (albeit 
questionably) used Ky/lo to narrow the scope of Fourth Amendment 
protection, rather than broaden it.214 While Kyllo has been hailed as a 
"landmark "215 in the law reviews, so far it has hardly made a peep in 
the courts. 
209. As the Ninth Circuit recently noted: 
Depew's argument that law enforcement agents entered the curtilage of his house when they 
conducted a thermal scan of the building has been rendered moot by the Supreme Court's 
recent decision in Ky/lo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001). 
Under Ky/lo, the thermal scan was a search, and hence violated the Fourth Amendment, no 
matter where the agents were standing when they conducted it. The information gained from 
the thermal scan therefore cannot be used to support the probable cause determination 
underlying the search warrant that was issued. 
United States v. Depew, 17 Fed. Appx. 563, 563-64 (9th Cir. 2001). 
210. United States v. Elkins, 300 F.3d 638, 647 (6th Cir. 2002). 
211.  United States v. Richard, No. CRIM. 01-20048-01 ,  2001 WL 1033421, at *6 n.4 
(W.D. La. Aug. 29, 2001). 
212. 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
213. See id. at 707. 
214. In United States v. Maple, 334 F.3d 15 (D.C. Cir. 2003), a police officer looked 
inside the front console of an automobile between the two front seats to find a place to put 
the defendant's cellular phone. When he opened the console, he found an illegal pistol. 
Judge Silberman held that the opening of the console was constitutional, relying at least in 
part on Ky/lo. See id. at 19-20. Ky/lo had introduced an originalist interpretation of "search," 
which according to Justice Scalia meant to look through "for the purpose of finding 
something." Id. at 19 (citing Ky/lo, 533 U.S. 27, 33 n.1 (2001)). Judge Silberman reasoned 
that under Ky/lo, no search had occurred, because the officer had not been looking for 
anything when he opened the console. See id. at 20. This is notably incorrect from the 
standpoint of the property-based approach to the Fourth Amendment; by opening the 
defendant's console, the police officer interfered with the defendant's right to exclude others 
from the console, triggering the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 24 (Rogers, J., dissenting) 
("Under the Supreme Court's precedents, . . . the officer's opening of the closed 
compartment . . .  constituted a search . . . .  "). 
215. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 6, at 7. See also Sklansky, supra note 7, at 144-45 
(describing Ky/lo as a "likely touchstone[]" for future Supreme Court cases on the Fourth 
Amendment, concluding that its reasoning was "expansive," and that the case has 
"significance beyond its narrow holding and beyond its value as a curiosity"). Cf Arbus, 
supra note 7, at 1769 (arguing that Ky/lo helped begin "a new era of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence"). 
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E. Why the Fourth Amendment A lone Cannot Protect Privacy in New 
Technologies 
This Article has so far challenged the doctrinal foundations of what 
I have labeled the popular view of the Fourth Amendment in new 
technologies. It has made a descriptive doctrinal claim: while Katz had 
revolutionary promise, cases interpreting Katz and the "reasonable 
expectation of privacy" test have mostly focused on the details of how 
new technologies work and whether they interfere with traditional 
property rights. Most existing Fourth Amendment rules in new 
technologies are based heavily on property law concepts, and as a 
result offer only relatively modest privacy protection in new 
technologies. The cases are not entirely consistent. But understood as 
a whole, the existing body of doctrine reflects a relatively humble and 
deferential judicial attitude. 
The key implication of this deferential stance is that we should not 
expect the Fourth Amendment alone to provide adequate protections 
against invasions of privacy made possible by law enforcement use of 
new technologies. The popular view effectively equates a reasonable 
expectation of privacy with the expectation of privacy that a 
reasonable person would expect. If this were the case, legislative 
privacy protections would be unnecessary. After all, the normative 
expectations of privacy of a reasonable person are the same as the 
governing privacy rules that a reasonable person would want, which 
are the same as the rules that an idealized legislature would enact. If 
the Fourth Amendment set such goals and courts could achieve them 
competently, there would be no need for legislative action. Existing 
precedents suggest a different practice, however. A "reasonable 
expectation of privacy" has not been equated with the expectation of 
privacy of a reasonable person; rather, it has been used as a term of art 
based heavily on property law principles. As a result, existing Fourth 
Amendment rules are not necessarily the rules that sensible legislators 
might enact and reasonable citizens might desire. Especially in the 
area of high technology, the property-based Fourth Amendment does 
not guarantee that the rules governing law enforcement are optimal 
rules that effectively balance the competing concerns of privacy and 
effective law enforcement. 
Additional privacy protections are needed to fill the gap between 
the protections that a reasonable person might want and what the 
Fourth Amendment actually provides. As we will see in the next part, 
those protections historically have come from Congress. And as we 
will see in the final Part, Congress will likely remain the primary 
source of privacy protections in new technologies thanks to 
institutional advantages of legislatures. 
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II. WIRETAPPING LAW AND LEGISLATIVE REGULATION OF 
GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS INVOL YING NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
The popular view that the Fourth Amendment should be 
interpreted broadly in cases involving new technologies often relies 
explicitly or implicitly on the history of the Fourth Amendment. 
Proponents sometimes tell a story that goes something like this: in the 
beginning, the Olmstead majority failed to recognize that the Fourth 
Amendment should regulate wiretapping. Olmstead prevailed for forty 
years, during which wiretapping and other invasive government 
surveillance practices remained rampant.216 Everything changed when 
the Supreme Court decided Katz v. United States in 1967. The Katz 
majority adopted Justice Brandeis's Olmstead dissent and 
constitutionalized wiretapping law,217 ushering in a constitutional 
order.218 The moral of the story is that courts can step in and 
successfully constitutionalize law enforcement practices involving new 
technologies. Although wiretapping law is only one corner of high­
tech privacy law, the wiretapping example offers an optimistic lesson: 
just as the Supreme Court saved wiretapping law decades ago, so can 
future courts step in and create protective Fourth Amendment rules 
regulating law enforcement use of new technologies effectively. If in 
doubt, just look at the transition from Olmstead to Katz. 
This Part explores the history of wiretapping law and concludes 
that this account overstates the impact of the Fourth Amendment and 
understates the role of legislative privacy protections. To be sure, Katz 
and Berger remain good law, and modern wiretapping law reflects 
their influence. But from its inception in the mid-nineteenth century 
through the present, wiretapping law has remained a primarily 
statutory field governed by statutory commands. Indeed, it turns out 
that very few cases in the history of wiretapping law have ruled that a 
wiretapping practice violated the Fourth Amendment. Despite the big 
splash of Berger and Katz, later courts generally have declined to 
216. As Professor Gormley writes: 
By the 1950s, the technology that enabled government surveillance had grown by 
exponential leaps. Parabolic microphones, transmitters the size of cigarette packs, induction­
coil devices and miniature television transmitters made it possible for government agents, 
police, private investigators and average citizen snoopers to watch, listen and record virtually 
any sound or movement. Accompanying this perfection in technology came the growing use 
of private detectives as surreptitious information-gatherers in business and family disputes, 
extending the intrusive scope of eavesdropping to the private sector. Attempts by the states 
to curb or prohibit wiretapping were largely ineffective . . . .  By the time the United States 
entered the 1960s, most of the attempts to protect individual privacy by curbing electronic 
surveillance at the state level had failed. 
Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1363 (1992). 
217. See supra note 86. 
218. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 10, at 1 16-18; Ric Simmons, Can Winston Save Us from 
Big Brother? The Need for Judicial Consistency in Regulating Hyper-Intrusive Searches, 55 
RUTGERS L. REV. 547, 562-64 (2003). 
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extend privacy against wiretapping beyond statutory commands. 
Fourth Amendment decisions have affected the shape of legislation in 
important ways, but legislation rather than the Fourth Amendment 
has provided the primary protection against invasions of privacy from 
wiretapping. To some extent, this is not exactly news: pick up any 
practitioner's treatise on wiretapping law and you will find that it is 
concerned primarily with statutory law.219 At the same time, the extent 
to which courts have refused to regulate wiretapping practices via 
judicial standards post-Katz is quite surprising. Wiretapping law is 
more legislative and less constitutional than many realize. 
This Part examines the history of wiretapping law, with a focus on 
the source of legal protections. I divide the history of wiretapping law 
into four periods: first, pre-1934, including the period before and 
during the National Prohibition Act;220 second, from 1934 until 1967; 
third, from 1967 to 1968, involving the critical period of Berger v. New 
York,221 Katz v. United States,222 and the enactment of the federal 
Wiretap Act; and fourth, the modern era following the passage of the 
Wiretap Act. I argue that within each period, statutory protections 
rather than constitutional limits have been the primary regulators of 
wiretapping law and practice. I conclude by suggesting that the 
statutory regulation of wiretapping may be more the rule than the 
exception. While commentators have focused their attention on 
constitutional decisions, Congress has passed dozens of statutory laws 
that regulate law enforcement practices implicating new technologies. 
If wiretapping law provides a case study of whether courts or 
legislatures take the lead role in regulating privacy in new 
technologies, that case study suggests that Congress plays the lead, not 
the courts. 
A. The Origins of Wiretapping Law: Prohibition, Early Statutory 
Protections, and the Olmstead Case 
Wiretapping is the use of a device to intercept an electric or 
electronic communication sent over a wire. The practice of 
wiretapping by private parties became common soon after the arrival 
219. See, e.g. , James G. Carr, Electronic Surveillance; Clifford S. Fishman & Anne T. 
McKenna, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING (2d ed. 1995). 
220. Act of Oct. 28, 1919, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (repealed 1933).The National Prohibition 
Act was widely known as the Volstead Act, after Andrew J. Volstead, the Minnesota 
Congressman who introduced it in the House of Representatives. See generally Sidney J. 
Spaeth, The Twenty-First Amendment And State Control Over Intoxicating Liquor: 
Accommodating The Federal Interest, 79 CAL. L. REv. 161, 176 (1991). 
221. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
222. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
March 2004] The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies 841 
of the telegraph (invented by Samuel Morse in 1837223) and telephone 
(invented by Alexander Graham Bell in 1876). Business competitors 
and private snoops tapped lines, listening in on private conversations 
and often using that information for private gain.224 Legislatures and 
the public recognized the invasiveness of wiretapping quite early. 
California passed a statute that prohibited tapping telegraph lines in 
1862.225 Telephone wiretapping was prohibited in New York and 
Illinois in 1895; California extended its ban on telegraph interception 
to telephones in 1905.226 Other states followed: by 1928, more than half 
of the states had enacted criminal bans on wiretapping.227 The federal 
government also enacted a criminal ban on wiretapping in early 1918 
for the remainder of World War I, a period when the federal 
government took over control of both telephone and telegraph lines.228 
Prosecutions for illegal wiretapping remained rare, however.229 
No published decisions prior to the National Prohibition Act in 
1919 considered whether wiretapping violated the Fourth 
Amendment.230 This may surprise modern ears at first, but the context 
of early federal law enforcement helps explain it. Before Prohibition, 
the scope of the Fourth Amendment was rarely litigated. The Fourth 
Amendment regulated only the Federal government, not the states,231 
and the Federal government brought only a few thousand criminal 
223. See EDWARD V. LONG, THE INTRUDERS 36 (1967). 
224. See id. at 30-35. 
225. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45 (1967) (citing Statutes of California, 1862, 
p.288, CCLX II). 
226. See id. 
227. See id. 
228. See Law of Oct. 29, 1918, ch. 197, 40 Stat. 1017. See generally Wiretapping, 
Congress, and the Department of Justice, 9 INT'L JURID. ASS'N MONTHLY BULL. 97 (1941 ) .  
229. See Margaret Lybolt Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire Tapping, 32  CORNELL L. Q .  
514, 514 (1947) ("Prosecutions [in the early days] seem to have been rare."). For an example 
of such a prosecution, see State v. Behringer, 172 P. 660 (Ariz. 1918). Wiretapping practices 
by state and local police varied considerably. SAMUEL DASH, ET. AL., THE EAVESDROPPERS 
(1959). Although the record remains sparse, it appears that some state police agencies 
wiretapped defendants, but others did not. When the police did wiretap defendants the 
evidence was generally admitted in court even in states where the wiretapping was itself 
illegal and the officer could be (and on rare occasion was) prosecuted. See, e.g. , People v. 
Hebberd, 35 N.Y. Crim. R. 165 (1916) (prosecuting a police officer for wiretapping in the 
course of his official duties). While this may seem remarkable today, it reflected the 
prevailing common law rule that the defendant could not challenge evidence on the basis of 
how it was collected. See State v. McDonald, 177 A.D. 806, 810 (N.Y. 1917) ("The only 
question before the trial court is the relevancy and materiality as evidence of such papers, 
documents, or conversations, and no collateral inquiry as to whether they were legally or 
illegally secured will be permitted to interrupt and disorganize the trial."); Rosenzweig, 
supra, at 515 ("The general rule that the illegal manner in which evidence was obtained is 
not a valid objection to its admissibility has its roots far back in the common law."). 
230. Act of Oct. 28, 1919, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (repealed 1933). 
231 .  This conclusion was overruled in form in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) and 
in substance in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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cases nationwide per year.232 In addition, Congress did not routinely 
permit defendants to appeal their federal convictions until 1889.233 As 
a result, the Supreme Court mentioned the Fourth Amendment in 
only about two dozen cases in the first 130 years of the Amendment's 
existence, and actually interpreted the Amendment only a handful of 
times in that period.234 None of those cases involved wiretapping. 
Indeed, no published federal criminal cases mentioned wiretapping 
before the Prohibition era.235 
The National Prohibition Act of 1919 changed everything.236 The 
number of federal criminal cases skyrocketed,237 and the national 
prohibition on the transportation or distribution of alcohol created the 
need for an infrastructure that could support large-scale federal law 
enforcement.238 The number of search warrants obtained by federal 
officers spiked dramatically, as agents obtained warrants to search for 
and seize the contraband of illegal alcohol.239 The federal courts began 
232 See Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A 
Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 910 (2000). 
233. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940). 
234. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (finding a suppression remedy for 
violations of the Fourth Amendment); Wheeler v United States, 226 U.S. 478 (1913) 
(rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge to subpoena); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Interstate 
Commerce Comm'n, 221 U.S. 612 (1911) (concluding that a federal administrative order 
requiring company to file reports with the agency did not violate the Fourth Amendment); 
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911) (rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge to 
subpoena); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (articulating a Fourth Amendment standard 
for subpoenas); Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 
635 (1895) (Field, J., dissenting) (concluding in dictum that a federal law governing the 
production of witness violates the Fourth Amendment); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 
(1886) (concluding that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments block the use of a court order to 
compel a person to divulge their records); Ex Parle Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) 
(concluding that the Fourth Amendment requires the government to obtain a warrant to 
open postal mail); Den v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 286 
(1855) (holding that a warrant of distress to levy on property of a collector of public 
revenues in default does not require the support of an oath or affirmation under the Fourth 
Amendment); Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 1 10 (1807) (reviewing a warrant for 
probable cause). 
235. The first cases that mention wiretapping by federal agents are Wallace v. United 
States, 291 F. 972 (6th Cir. 1923), Wolf v. United States, 292 F. 673 (6th Cir. 1923), and Robilio 
v. United States, 291 F. 975 (6th Cir. 1923). None of the cases are explicit about what kind of 
wiretapping occurred, however, or under what circumstances. 
236. Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEXAS L. REV. 951 ,  986 
(2003) ("Long before the 'war on drugs,' the National Prohibition (or 'Volstead') Act 
provided an engine for the expansion of federal criminal law enforcement."). 
237. Simons, supra note 232, at 911. 
238. In 1917, Congress passed a statute codifying the common law process for obtaining 
search warrants. See Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 228 (repealed 1948). Section 3 of 
the Espionage Act provided, "A search warrant cannot be issued but upon probable cause, 
supported by affidavit, naming or describing the person and particularly describing the 
property and the place to be searched." Id. 
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to hear a regular run of Fourth Amendment cases as federal agents 
investigated illegal alcohol schemes.240 
Federal law enforcement policy frowned upon wiretapping as a 
tool for investigating Prohibition crimes. Under the leadership of 
Attorney General (later Justice) Harlan Fiske Stone, the Justice 
Department banned the practice.241 The nascent Federal Bureau of 
Investigations headed by J. Edgar Hoover supported this decision, and 
along with the Treasury Department opposed wiretapping entirely.242 
While there were sporadic reports of federal agents engaging in 
wiretapping in the early 1920s,243 the first significant federal 
investigation in which wiretapping played a major role was also the 
first case to make it to the Supreme Court. That case was the 
investigation of Roy Olmstead. 
The Olmstead case resulted from the decision of rogue officers 
from the federal Prohibition Office in Seattle to ignore the DOJ policy 
against wiretapping - and even the Washington state law against 
wiretapping - in order to catch local moonshine kingpin Roy 
Olmstead.244 Olmstead was a former Seattle police officer who had 
bribed state and local officials and ran a massive Seattle-based 
239. A Westlaw search for the number of times the phrase "search warrant" appeared in 
federal court decisions shows the impact of the change on the Fourth Amendment cases the 
courts evaluated. According to Westlaw's ALLFEDS-OLD database the phrase "search 
warrant" appears in the published opinions of U.S. courts the following number of times in 
particular years: 





1925 1 1 4  
1930 83 
Source: ALLFEDS-OLD database, March 1, 2003. 
240. A Westlaw search of the number of times that published federal court opinions 
included the phrase "Fourth Amendment" in different years produces the following results: 







Source: ALLFEDS-OLD database, March 1, 2003. 
241. MURPHY, supra note 79 at 13. 
242 See id. 
243. See cases cited in supra note 235. 
244. See MURPHY, supra note 79, at 14. 
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operation to import alcohol.245 To catch Olmstead, the Prohibition 
agents tapped the phone lines leading to his home and various 
business offices.246 The agents then took notes of what they heard and 
later testified about it in court. Olmstead moved to suppress the 
evidence on the ground that wiretapping violated the Fourth 
Amendment - the first time the argument had ever been made in any 
court.247 The district court rejected Olmstead's argument,248 the jury 
convicted, and a divided Ninth Circuit affirmed.249 Olmstead then 
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, and the Supreme 
Court agreed to hear the case.250 
Before the Supreme Court, the Justice Department offered only a 
half-hearted defense of the wiretapping investigation.251 The 
investigation had been conducted by rogue agents in violation of both 
DOJ policy and state law; the case hardly presented federal law 
enforcement at its best.252 At the same time, the stakes in Olmstead 
were quite high. A few years before Olmstead, the Supreme Court had 
ruled that the Fourth Amendment did not allow the government to 
obtain search warrants for "mere evidence"; the government could 
obtain warrants only to seize contraband, fruits of crime, or 
instrumentalities of crime.253 Although the scope of the "mere 
evidence" rule was never entirely clear, it likely would have seemed at 
that time that wiretapping evidence would qualify as "mere evidence." 
As a result, the Fourth Amendment issue presented in Olmstead was 
probably all or nothing: either wiretapping did not implicate the 
Fourth Amendment at all, or else it violated the Fourth Amendment 
and the government could not wiretap even with a search warrant. 
The Justice Department's cautious brief acknowledged that 
wiretapping violated DOJ policy, but argued that as a matter of 
constitutional law it did not violate the Fourth Amendment.254 The 
245. See id. at 15-17. 
246. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456 (1928). 
247. Id. at 456-57. 
248. United States v. Olmstead, 7 F.2d 760, 763 (W.D. Wash 1925). In rejecting the 
argument, the trial judge reasoned that "(t]he conversation is not a property right . . . .  I know 
of no rule of law or evidence which would exclude it, and no decision which, even by 
inference, sustains the contention of the defendant." Id. 
249. Olmstead v. United States, 19 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1927). Judge Rudkin dissented. See 
id. at 848 (Rudkin, J. ,  dissenting). 
250. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), cert. granted, 276 U.S. 609 (1928) 
251. See MURPHY, supra note 79, at 87. 
252. Cf Olmstead, 227 U.S. at 469 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
253. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), overruled by Warden v. Hayden 387 
U.S. 294, 308-309 (1967). 
254. See MURPHY, supra note 79, at 87-88. 
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Supreme Court agreed by a 5-4 vote,255 adopting the government's 
view that wiretapping from public property did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment because it did not physically trespass onto Olmstead's 
property.256 Chief Justice Taft's opinion specifically invited Congress to 
pass a statutory protection against the admission of wiretapping 
evidence, but declined to impose such a rule as a constitutional matter: 
Congress may of course · protect the secrecy of telephone messages by 
making them, when intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal 
criminal trials, by direct legislation, and thus depart from the common 
law of evidence. But the courts may not adopt such a policy by 
attributing an enlarged and unusual meaning to the Fourth 
Amendment.257 
B. 1934-1967: From the Communications Act to Berger and Katz 
The first permanent federal wiretapping law arrived just six years 
after Chief Justice Taft's invitation in Olmstead. In 1934, Congress 
passed the New Deal's Communications Act and included a provision 
prohibiting wiretapping, which was later codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605.258 
The law stated that " [n]o person not being authorized by the sender 
shall intercept any radio communication and divulge or publish the 
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such 
intercepted communication to any person."259 The statute clearly made 
wiretapping a criminal offense, but the remedy was unclear.260 In 1937, 
the Supreme Court interpreted the law to also serve an evidentiary 
function: according to the Court, the statute made all wiretapping 
evidence inadmissible in federal court.261 The Court expanded that 
holding in 1939 to require the exclusion of "fruit of the poisonous 
tree" of illegal wiretapping.262 
While this interpretation offered potentially expansive protection 
against wiretapping, its effectiveness was undercut dramatically by the 
Justice Department's interpretation of the law. Attorney General 
255. Justices Holmes, Stone, Brandeis, and Butler dissented from the majority opinion. 
See Olmstead, 227 U.S. at 469-488. 
256. See id. at 466 ("We think . . .  that the wire tapping here disclosed did not amount to 
a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."). 
257. Id. at 465-66. 
258. Sec. 605(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1 103-04 (1934). 
259. 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (2000). 
260. See, e.g. United States v. Gruber, 123 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1941) (criminal prosecution 
brought under 47 U.S.C. § 605). 
261. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 384 (1937). 
262. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). This case introduced the "fruit 
of the poisonous tree" doctrine later adopted in the Fourth Amendment context. See id. 
("[T]he trial judge must give opportunity, however closely confined, to the accused to prove 
that a substantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of the poisonous tree."). 
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(later Justice) Robert H. Jackson construed the statute as prohibiting 
the admission of wiretapping evidence in federal court, but not 
forbidding the wiretapping itself. Wiretapping was an "intercept," the 
Justice Department argued, but the statute prohibited the combination 
of intercepting and divulging or publishing the communication, which 
the Justice Department interpreted as disclosing outside law 
enforcement.263 In a pre-Bivens era, the combination of the Supreme 
Court and Justice Department interpretations of the 1934 wiretapping 
law produced an odd legislative scheme. On one hand, the statute 
effectively overruled Olmstead: wiretapping evidence became flatly 
inadmissible in court, as was other evidence derived from the 
wiretapping.264 On the other hand, the statute allowed wiretapping so 
long as the agents did not try to use the evidence in court. 
State practices varied considerably during this period. Neither 
federal statutory nor constitutional rules applied to the states at the 
time: the federal ban applied only in federal court,265 and the federal 
exclusionary rule did not apply to the states until 1961.266 By 1967, 
however, the Supreme Court could survey the statutory law of 
wiretapping and conclude that "wiretapping on the whole is outlawed, 
except for permissive use by law enforcement officials in some 
states."267 Thirty-six states had banned wiretapping.268 Of those, 
twenty-seven allowed some type of "authorized" interception by law 
enforcement.269 The most prominent law was New York's, passed in 
1942.270 New York's statute prohibited law enforcement wiretapping 
except pursuant to a search warrant signed by a judge.271 During 
the late 1940s and early 1950s, the New York statute was used 
extensively by District Attorney Frank Hogan to wiretap and 
prosecute organized trime.272 
263. Whether this interpretation was correct remains unclear. See AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS 
RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 16 n.15 (1971). 
264. United States v. Polakoff, 112 F.2d 888, 890 (2d Cir. 1940); Sablowsky v. United 
States, 101 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1938). 
265. See Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 203 (1952) ("We hold that § 605 applies only to 
the exclusion in federal court proceedings of evidence obtained and sought to be divulged in 
violation thereof; it does not exclude such evidence in state court proceedings."). 
266. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) ("We hold that all evidence obtained by 
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is . . .  inadmissible in a state court."). 
267. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1967). 
268. See id. at 48 n.5. 
269. See id. at 46. 
270. See DASH ET AL., supra note 229, at 36. 
271. See id. at 37-38. 
272 See id. at 39-41. 
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The 1960s brought rumblings of change in wiretapping law from all 
three branches of government. In 1967, President Johnson's Crime 
Commission described the existing wiretapping law as "intolerable,"273 
noting that it was both overprotective and underprotective.274 It was 
overprotective in that it did not allow federal agents to use 
wiretapping evidence in court at all, even against organized crime. On 
the other hand, the law offered no protection against wiretapping per 
se, allowing law enforcement to wiretap widely so long as they did not 
use the evidence in court. Congress became increasingly dissatisfied 
with the 1934 Communications Act. Bills to reform the wiretap laws 
had been introduced in every Congress but two since the Olmstead 
decision back in 1928, without success since 1934.275 But by the mid-
1960s, it became clear that comprehensive reform of federal 
wiretapping law was on the way. At the same time, the Warren Court 
repositioned itself to revisit Olmstead. In 1961, the Supreme Court 
ruled in Mapp v. Ohio276 that the Fourth Amendment's suppression 
remedy now applied to the states.277 This allowed the Court to 
reconsider how the Fourth Amendment applied to state wiretapping 
practices,278 and in particular to determine whether wiretapping under 
the prominent New York wiretapping law satisfied the Fourth 
Amendment. 
C. 1967 and 1968: Berger, Katz, and Title III 
The Supreme Court reviewed the New York state wiretapping 
statute just a few years after Mapp, in Berger v. New York,279 granting 
a petition following a routine unpublished affirmance by New York's 
highest court.280 Berger is unique among Fourth Amendment decisions 
in that the Court treated the case as a facial challenge to the New 
273. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 203 (1967) ("The present status of 
the law with respect to wiretapping and bugging is intolerable."). 
274. See id. at 202-03. 
275. See LONG, supra note 223, at 147. 
276. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
277. Id. at 655 (1961) ("We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in 
violation of the Constitution is . . .  inadmissible in a state court."). 
278. Before 1961, the Court had little opportunity to revisit Olmstead: wiretapping 
evidence was already inadmissible in federal court as a matter of statutory law, and although 
the Court held that the Fourth Amendment applied to the states in 1947, the suppression 
remedy did not apply. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949) (rejecting application of 
the Fourth Amendment's suppression remedy to state violations of the Fourth Amendment). 
279. The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari in the case on December 5, 
1996. See 385 U.S. 967-68 (1966). 
280. See People v. Berger, 18 N.Y.2d 638 (1966), rev'd sub nom. Berger v. New York, 
388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
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York statute.281 The Supreme Court did not answer the usual question 
of whether the government had violated the defendant's Fourth 
Amendment rights.282 Instead, the Court took the Berger case as an 
opportunity to examine the various components of the New York 
statute and explain which of them were constitutional and which were 
not. The Berger opinion tells us that to be constitutional, a wiretapping 
law must require: a) that "a neutral and detached authority" evaluate 
whether probable cause exists before wiretapping occurs;283 b) that the 
application for the court order to explain " [w]hat specific crime has 
been or is being committed," "the place to be searched," and "the 
persons or things to be seized";284 c) that the order authorizing the 
wiretapping "places a termination date" on the surveillance;285 d) that 
there is "notice as [with] conventional warrants," or "some showing of 
special facts" to excuse notice;286 and e) "a return on the warrant."287 
Because New York's statute did not have all of these requirements, 
the Supreme Court struck it down.288 
What explains the unusual facial challenge in Berger? Awareness 
of Congress's keen interest in revising the federal wiretapping laws is 
one explanation. As Justice White noted in his dissent, at the time of 
Berger Congress was in the midst of holding "extensive hearings"289 
before both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees on how to 
rewrite the wiretap laws along the lines of New York's law.290 Justice 
White noted that Congress was waiting to find out what kind of 
wiretapping law the Court might allow. "The grant of certiorari in this 
case has been widely noted," Justice White explained, "and our 
decision can be expected to have a substantial impact on the current 
281. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 90-91 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting the majority's 
unexplained decision to treat the case as a facial challenge, rather than as an as-applied 
challenge). 
282. See id. 
283. Id. at 54. 
284. Id. at 58-60. 
285. Id. at 59. 
286. Id. at 60. 
287. Id. 
288. See id. at 64. Notably, the Supreme Court also eliminated the "mere evidence" rule 
in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), decided just two weeks before Berger was 
announced. Hayden was decided on May 29; Berger was announced on June 12. With 
Hayden overruled, the Court could allow a warrant for "mere evidence of wiretapping." 
289. Berger, 388 U.S. at 1 12 (White, J., dissenting) ("Bills have been introduced at this 
session of Congress to fill this legislative gap, and extensive hearings are in progress before 
the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary, and before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary."). 
290. See id. 
March 2004] The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies 849 
legislative consideration of these issues."291 President Johnson's 
influential Crime Commission report had advised as much: the 
Commission urged Congress to enact new wiretap laws on the New 
York model, but urged that "any congressional action should await the 
outcome"292 of the then-pending Berger case. 
Berger was not the only decision that Congress was waiting for the 
Supreme Court to decide. The Court had granted certiorari in Katz v. 
United States one month before oral argument in Berger.293 
Importantly, Katz was not another wiretapping case: the surveillance 
in that case involved a microphone taped to the top of a phone 
booth.294 Commentators often overlook this because the Supreme 
Court's description of the facts seems almost intentionally vague; 
while the Ninth Circuit opinion explained that the FBI in Katz had 
merely taped a microphone to the top of the booth,295 the Supreme 
Court wrote ambiguously that the FBI had "attached an electronic 
listening and recording device"2% to the booth. In any event, by 
evaluating a bugging case as well as a wiretapping case, the Court 
made clear that it would consider both prominent forms of 
surreptitious surveillance roughly at the same time - and that 
Congress would have to wait for both. Like Berger, Katz revealed a 
legislative orientation; in his otherwise harsh dissent, Justice Black 
complimented the majority for its "good efforts" to articulate 
"methods in accord with the Fourth Amendment to guide States in the 
enactment and enforcement of laws passed to regulate wiretapping by 
government. "297 
Far from being sui generis constitutional developments, the major 
constitutional decisions in Berger and Katz were carefully timed to 
influence the shape of statutory law. The Court was eyeing Congress, 
and decided both Berger and Katz very much with Congress in mind. 
291. Id. at 1 13. 
292. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE, supra note 273, at 203. 
293. The order granting the petition for a writ of certiorari in Katz is noted at 386 U.S. 
954-55 (1967). Berger was argued on April 13, 1967. See 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
294. Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 131 (9th Cir. 1966). 
295. The Ninth Circuit explained the facts as follows: 
In the period of February 19 to February 25, 1965, at set hours, Special Agents of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation placed microphones on the tops of two of the public telephone 
booths normally used by the appellant. The other phone was placed out of order by the 
telephone company. The microphones were attached to the outside of the telephone booths 
with tape. There was no physical penetration inside of the booths. The microphones were 
activated only while appellant was approaching and actually in the booth. Wires led from 
microphones to a wire recorder on top of one of the booths. Thus the F.B.I. obtained a 
record of appellant's end of a series of telephone calls. 
Katz, 369 F.2d at 131. 
296. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
297. See Id. at 364 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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Senator McClellan had introduced S. 675, the Federal Wire 
Interception Act, a few months before Berger on January 25, 1967.298 
Two weeks after Berger, Senator Hruska introduced S. 2050, the 
Electronic Surveillance Control Act, which incorporated Berger's 
teachings.299 S .  675 and S. 2050 were then modified to comply with 
Katz in December 1967 and together formed the basis of the 
legislation that Congress ultimately passed in June 1968.300 Since 1968, 
the Federal Wiretap Act has been the governing wiretapping law in 
the United States.301 It is often referred to as "Title III" because it 
passed as the third section of the mammoth Omnibus Crime Control 
Act of 1968.302 The Senate Report that accompanied Title III made 
clear that Congress had taken the existing proposals and reformulated 
them to comply with Berger (for wiretapping) and Katz (for 
bugging).303 
D .  Wiretapping After Title III: Constitutional in Theory, Statutory in 
Fact 
The history now brings us to the modern era, the period after Katz, 
Berger, and the passage of Title III. In this period, as in previous ones, 
statutory protections rather than constitutional protections provide the 
driving force behind wiretapping law. Berger and Katz remain on the 
books, of course, but wiretapping law is largely statutory in practice. 
Fourth Amendment decisions regulating wiretapping remain notably 
rare. When confronted with claims that wiretapping violated the 
Fourth Amendment, courts typically fall back on the statutory 
protections of Title III and go no further. 
The judiciary's deferential stance began with the case law that 
followed the passage of Title III. Defendants tried to challenge Title 
III on the same facial grounds used successfully in Berger, but these 
298. See S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153. 
299. See id. 
300. See id. 
301. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2000). 
302. Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968). 
303. 
Title III prohibits all wiretapping and electronic surveillance by persons other than duly 
authorized law enforcement officials engaged in the investigations of specified types of major 
crimes after obtaining a court order, with exceptions provided for interceptions by 
employees of communications facilities whose normal course of employment would make 
necessary such interception, personnel of the Federal Communications Commission in the 
normal course of employment, and government agents to secure information under the 
powers of the President to protect the national security. This proposed legislation conforms 
to the constitutional standards set out in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2113. 
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2113. 
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claims were universally rejected.304 The formidable statutory privacy 
protections found in the Wiretap Act are no doubt responsible for 
some of this. Consider the case of a wiretap order to tap a telephone 
line. Before applying for a court order to tap the line, fede:ral 
prosecutors must: 
1) obtain high-level Justice Department approval under 
Section 2516(1); 
2) show that the wiretapping will be used to uncover 
evidence of one of the predicate felony offenses listed in 
Section 1516(1)(a)-(r); 
3) author an application supported by a "full and complete 
statements of the facts," a particular description of the 
nature and location of the place where the 
communication will be intercepted, and, if known, the 
identity of the persons whose communications will be 
intercepted, all under Section 2518(b ); 
4) show that the wiretapping was necessary because "other 
investigative procedures have been tried and failed," or 
else reasonably appear unlikely to succeed, under 
Section 2511 (2)( c ) ;  
5) offer the court a full and complete statement of  the facts 
concerning all previous related wiretap applications 
under 2511 (2)(d); 
6) show probable cause that interception of the calls under 
a wiretap order will yield communications concerning 
the criminal offense under Section 2518(3)(b ); and 
7) explain to the court the mechanism that the government 
will use to minimize the interception of communications 
unrelated to the criminal investigation pursuant to 
Section 2518(5). 
Nor do the statutory obligations end once the order is signed by 
the federal district court judge. The government must file regular 
reports to the issuing judge (typically at ten day intervals) explaining 
"what progress has been made toward achievement of the authorized 
objective" and justifying the need for further wiretapping under 
Section 2516(6). The wiretapping cannot last for "longer than is 
necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, nor in any 
event longer than thirty days" under Section 2518(5). Immediately 
304. See, e.g., United States v. Sklaroff, 506 F.2d 837, 840 (5th Cir 1975); United States v. 
Ramsey, 503 F.2d 524, 526-31 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Martinez, 498 F.2d 464, 467-68 
(6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 771-75 (2d Cir. 1973); United 
States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 978-82 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Whitaker, 474 F.2d 
1246, 1247 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489, 493-501 (3d Cir. 1973); 
United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679, 683-87 (10th Cir. 1971). 
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after the wiretapping has been completed, the records of the 
wiretapping must be made available to the issuing judge and sealed 
and kept for ten years under Section 2516(8). Within ninety days after 
the surveillance has ended, the subjects of the wiretapping (and at the 
discretion of the issuing judge, others known to have had their 
conversations recorded) must be notified that they were tapped and 
when, pursuant to Section 2518(8)(d) . Finally, the basic facts about the 
order must be included in an annual report filed by the Justice 
Department and made available to the public under Section 2519. If 
state agents want to wiretap, they must comply not only with the usual 
federal rules, but also with additional federal rules that impose special 
restrictions on state practices, and state rules that are often much more 
restrictive than federal rules.305 
Like any legislation, Title III has gaps and weaknesses. But despite 
Berger and Katz, courts have proved surprisingly reluctant to find that 
the occasional holes in the Wiretap Act violate the Fourth 
Amendment. Consider the cases involving the wiretapping of cordless 
phone calls. Before 1994, Congress chose not to extend the protections 
of the Wiretap Act to cordless telephone calls;306 "the radio portion of 
a cordless telephone communication that is transmitted between the 
cordless telephone handset and the base"307 was expressly exempted 
from the statute. This decision created a curious statutory anomaly; 
conversations on land-line phones were protected by the Wiretap Act 
while conversations on cordless phones were not. But the courts 
refused to say that the Fourth Amendment covered the ground that 
Congress had not protected: instead, the courts deferred to Congress's 
judgment and held that such calls were not covered by the Fourth 
Amendment.308 The Fourth Circuit even used the occasion to warn 
against the dangers of fashioning Fourth Amendment privacy rights in 
new technologies given Congress's statutory framework: 
In the fast-developing area of communications technology, courts should 
be cautious not to wield the amorphous "reasonable expectation of 
privacy" standard, in a manner that nullifies the balance between privacy 
305. See generally Charles H. Kennedy & Peter P. Swire, State Wiretaps and Electronic 
Surveillance After September 11,  54 HASTINGS L.J. 971 (2003). 
306. See McKamey v. Roach, 55 F.3d 1236, 1238 n.1 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting that 
Congress did not protect cordless telephone calls via Title III until it passed the 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub.L. No. 103-414, § 202(a), 108 
Stat. 4279 (1994)). 
307. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1988), repealed by Pub.L. No. 103-414, § 202(a), 108 Stat. 4279 
(1994). 
308. See McKamey, 55 F.3d at 1239-40; Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(involving a call from a cordless phone); United States v. McNulty (Jn re Askin), 47 F.3d 100, 
104-106 (4th Cir. 1995) (involving a call made to a cordless telephone user); United States 
v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171, 177-81 (5th Cir. 1992); Price v. Turner, 260 F.3d 1 144, 1 149 (9th 
Cir. 2001). 
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rights and law enforcement needs struck by Congress in Title III . . . .  As 
new technologies continue to appear in the marketplace and outpace 
existing surveillance law, the primary job of evaluating their impact on 
privacy rights and of updating the law must remain with the branch of 
government designed to make such policy choices, the legislature. 
Congress undertook in Title III to legislate comprehensively in this field 
and has shown no reluctance to revisit it. Accordingly, we must decline 
[the defendant]'s invitation to usher in through the Fourth Amendment a 
prohibition of that which Title III tells us, in no uncertain terms, 
Congress affirmatively permitted at the time this case arose. 309 
The same posture of judicial restraint led the Sixth Circuit to rule 
that plaintiffs cannot raise civil claims under the Fourth Amendment 
for illegal wiretapping, and that only statutory claims under Title III 
are allowed.310 In Adams v. City of Battle Creek,311 a city police officer 
sued the city under both the statutory Wiretap Act and the Fourth 
Amendment for wiretapping his department-issued pager.312 On 
appeal, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the "detailed legislative 
scheme"313 of the Wiretap Act should "provide the exclusive remedies 
in the field"314 of wiretapping law. The availability of statutory civil 
remedies under Title III foreclosed a civil remedy under the Fourth 
Amendment. According to the court, the Wiretap Act 
seeks to balance privacy rights and law enforcement needs, keeping in 
mind the protections of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable 
search and seizure. Congress made the Act the primary vehicle by which 
to address violations of privacy interests in the communication field" . . .  
Because no argument is made that the substantive or remedial standards 
provided by the Fourth Amendment differ from the federal statute, we 
do not reach any question of interpretation under the Fourth 
Amendment. All such constitutional issues are pretermitted. 315 
In other words, the existence of the statutory Wiretap Act effectively 
displaces any constitutional remedies that in theory should exist under 
cases like Katz and Berger. 
Courts have shown similar deference to statutory law in areas 
beyond the Wiretap Act's core concern of domestic wiretapping in 
criminal cases. For example, courts occasionally encounter cases in 
which U.S. government agents wiretap U.S. citizens overseas, beyond 
309. McNulty, 47 F.3d at 105-06 (internal citations omitted). 
310. Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 986 (6th Cir. 2001). 
311. 250 F.3d 980 (6th Cir. 2001). 
312. See id. at 980. 
313. Id. at 986. 
314. Id. 
315. Id. 
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the territorial scope of the Wiretap Act,316 often jointly with the 
governments of foreign countries.317 In the bulk of these cases, the 
courts have deferred to statutory standards abroad; courts have held 
that Fourth Amendment reasonableness hinges on whether the 
wiretapping complied with statutory law of the foreign country where 
the wiretapping occurred.318 
The same deference to legislative standards appears in cases 
exploring how the Fourth Amendment applies to covert video 
surveillance specifically exempted from the Wiretap Act. Rather than 
create new judicial standards from scratch, courts have held that the 
Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the government complies with 
equivalent statutory standards that Title III enacted to regulate audio 
wiretapping. When called to formulate Fourth Amendment standards 
in areas that Congress has left unregulated, courts have set them by 
adopting the nearest statutory requirements.319 Even when the 
Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment applied to domestic 
wiretapping conducted for national security reasons, the Court 
specifically called on Congress to enact a new statute to set up the 
legal standards.320 
316. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 279 (2d. Cir. 1974) (noting that the 
Wiretap Act does not apply outside the United States). 
317. See, e.g. , United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 490 (9th Cir. 1987); United States 
v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1093-95 (9th Cir. 1995). 
318. See, e.g. , Peterson, 812 F.3d at 490 ("If, however, United States agents' participation 
in the investigation is so substantial that the action is a joint venture between United States 
and foreign officials, the law of the foreign country must be consulted at the outset as part of 
the determination whether or not the search was reasonable."). 
319. Ric Simmons has criticized this practice in the context of video surveillance. 
See Simmons, supra note 218, at 589. Simmons charges that the courts "have relinquished 
their judicial duty to interpret the Constitution, an abdication which . . .  is especially 
problematic when it occurs in the context of surveillance techniques that are both 
extraordinarily intrusive and becoming more common and more technologically 
sophisticated every year." Id. 
320. In 1972, the Supreme Court ruled that the Katz rationale applied to domestic 
surveillance in national security cases, not merely the criminal cases regulated by Title Ill. 
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). Once again the Court 
offered extensive statutory guidance to Congress. The Court wrote: 
Given those potential distinctions between Title III criminal surveillances and those 
involving the domestic security, Congress may wish to consider protective standards for the 
latter which differ from those already prescribed for specified crimes in Title III. . . .  
It may be that Congress, for example, would judge that the application and affidavit 
showing probable cause need not follow the exact requirements of § 2518 but should allege 
other circumstances more appropriate to domestic security cases; that the request for prior 
court authorization could, in sensitive cases, be made to any member of a specially 
designated court (e.g., the District Court for the District of Columbia or the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit); and that the time and reporting requirements 
need not be so strict as those in § 2518. 
The above paragraph does not, of course, attempt to guide the congressional judgment but 
rather to delineate the present scope of our own opinion. We do not attempt to detail the 
precise standards for domestic security warrants any more than our decision in Katz sought 
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As these cases suggest, wiretapping law may be constitutional in 
theory, but it is statutory in practice. For prosecutors and defense 
attorneys, complying with wiretapping law means complying with 
statutory law; challenging wiretapping practices means challenging 
practices on statutory grounds. When wiretapping occurs inside the 
United States, courts generally refuse to construe the Fourth 
Amendment as going beyond the scope of the Wiretap Act; when 
wiretapping occurs outside the United States, courts often equate the 
Fourth Amendment with compliance with foreign statutory law. 
Berger and Katz helped shape the statutory structure at the time of the 
key statute's enactment. But despite their impact, the sources of 
wiretapping law have remained largely statutory. 
E. Privacy in New Technologies and the Statutory Norm 
Wiretapping is not an exception to the rule. A broader look at the 
legal standards that govern criminal investigations involving new 
technologies suggests that Congress has often taken the lead, and that 
judicial decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment generally have 
played a secondary role. In some instances, congressional action has 
followed Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment. For example, the Court's decision in the Keith case 
considering how the Fourth Amendment applies to national security 
wiretapping helped inspire the passage of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act in 1978. The Court's conclusion in Smith v. 
Maryland321 that the Fourth Amendment did not protect numbers 
dialed from a telephone (so-called "pen register" information)322 led 
Congress to protect such information in 1986, via the Pen Register and 
Trap and Trace Devices Statute.323 
Congress has also acted on its own initiative to protect privacy 
against the threat of new technology. For example, Congress passed 
the Privacy Act of 1974324 to give citizens the right to check and correct 
information about themselves in government computer databases.325 
Congress protected the privacy of cable television subscribers by 
passing strict restrictions against the disclosure of their personal 
to set the refined requirements for the specified criminal surveillances which now constitute 
Title III. We do hold, however. that prior judicial approval is required for the type of 
domestic security surveillance involved in this case and that such approval may be made in 
accordance with such reasonable standards as the Congress may prescribe. 
Id. at 322-24. 
321. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
322 See id. at 742. 
323. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 (2000). See generally Kerr, Internet Surveillance, supra note 
161 (discussing the Pen Register statute). 
324. Pub. L. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000)). 
325. See generally Laurie A. Doherty, Privacy Act, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1028 (1988). 
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information in the Cable Communications Privacy Act of 1984.326 Two 
years later, Congress protected the privacy of stored e-mails and 
Internet communications by passing the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act.327 Two years after that, Congress passed the Video 
Privacy Protection Act328 to protect the privacy of video store 
customers. 
Congress has also passed privacy laws outside of the high 
technology area, often in response to developments in Fourth 
Amendment law. Congress enacted the Right to Financial Privacy 
Act329 to protect the privacy of bank records after the Supreme Court 
ruled that the Fourth Amendment did not protect such records in 
1976.330 Congress created the Privacy Protection Act of 198a331 to offer 
the press special protections against searches and seizures after the 
Supreme Court declined to do so in a 1978 case.332 And this list is not 
exhaustive; other federal statutory privacy laws exist.333 
Of course, the legislative enactment of law enforcement 
regulations beyond the Fourth Amendment does not necessarily mean 
that these statutory laws are adequate. I have argued both in 
congressional testimony and in my academic writing that Congress's 
handiwork in the field of Internet surveillance law offers a promising 
framework, but needs reforms to bolster privacy protections.334 At the 
same time, Congress's track record is often ignored by scholars even 
326. Cable Communications Privacy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2000). See Doherty, supra 
note 325. 
327. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (2000). 
328. Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000); Pub. L. 100-618, § 2(a)(2), 
102 Stat. 3195 (1988). 
329. Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (2000); Pub. L. 95-630, 92 Stat. 
3697 (1978). 
330. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
331. Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2000). For a comprehensive discussion 
of the Privacy Protection Act, see UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING 
AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATIONS 61-69 (2002). 
332. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). 
333. For as more comprehensive list, see MARC ROTENBERG & DANIEL SOLOVE, 
INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 23-24 (2003). 
334. See, e.g. , Anti-Terrorism Investigations and the Fourth Amendment After September 
11, 2001, Hearing Before the House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on the Constitution, 
108th Cong. 26 (2003) (statement of Orin S. Kerr) (arguing that Congress should raise the 
standard that the government needs to satisfy to obtain a pen register order); Kerr, Internet 
Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act, supra note 161; Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the "Fog" 
of Internet Surveillance: How A Suppression Remedy Would Change Computer Crime Law, 
54 HASTINGS L.J. 805 (2003) [hereinafter Kerr, Lifting the "Fog"] (arguing that Congress 
should add a suppression remedy for violations of the Internet surveillance statutes); Orin S. 
Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act - And a Legislator's Guide to 
Amending It, GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) (arguing that Congress should raise 
the thresholds in 18 U.S.C. 2703(b) to better protect privacy). 
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when statutes provide the most important privacy protection against 
invasive government practices.335 Both criminal procedure and privacy 
law scholars have tended to focus their attention on the Fourth 
Amendment, overlooking the reality that since the 1960s Congress 
rather than the courts has shown the most serious interest in 
protecting privacy from new technologies. Judicial decisions have 
played a role by shaping legislation, but the real work that has been 
done to regulate law enforcement use of new technologies has come 
primarily from Congress, not the courts. 
III. INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE AND REGULATION OF 
GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS INVOL VINO NE W  TECHNOLOGIES 
I have argued in this Article that both the history of the Fourth 
Amendment and existing doctrine counsel against expansive 
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment in developing technologies. 
Up to now, however, I have not addressed the related normative 
questions. In this Section, I will address one important normative 
inquiry generally answered in the affirmative by proponents of the 
popular view. Assuming Fourth Amendment doctrine or theory 
renders judicial rulemaking in new technologies necessary, are courts 
institutionally equipped to regulate new technologies effectively? By 
corollary, should courts approach the task with confidence or caution? 
Proponents of broad Fourth Amendment protection generally 
believe that courts are well equipped to create effective privacy 
rules.336 If technology threatens privacy, the best source of new privacy 
protections are the judiciary rather than legislatures.337 Professor 
335. For example, in his work Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Professor Lessig 
considers a variety of ways in which new technologies may threaten how the Fourth 
Amendment protects privacy. See LESSIG, supra note 10, at 144-46. Lessig acknowledges that 
statutory protections against such privacy invasions exist and "are in fact quite rich," but 
quickly moves on to constitutional questions. Id. 
336. See, e.g. , 1 LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.1 (2d ed. 1999) (arguing 
that the courts are well equipped to regulate criminal procedure rules because courts 
understand the criminal process and are not subject to political pressures to deny basic 
liberties); Donald A. Dripps, Essay, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of 
Public Choice; Or, Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 
44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079 (1993) (arguing that legislatures do not enact criminal procedure 
laws that protect the rights of the accused because they face political pressures to punish and 
deter crime). 
337. See, e.g. , Blitz, supra note 7, at 1420-1423 (arguing that courts are able "to judge 
when the surveillance schemes involved in a particular dispute leave citizens with too little 
privacy."); Nola K. Breglio, Note, Leaving FISA Behind: The Need to Return to Warrantless 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 113 Yale L.J. 179, 215 (2003) ("When a statutory 
[surveillance] regime is failing, better that we leave it behind, return directly to the document 
the Framers handed us, and charge our judges with adapting their words to our modern 
circumstances."); Cf William J. Fenrich, Note, Common Law Protection Of Individuals' 
Rights In Personal Information, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 951 ,  986-90 (1996) (arguing that the 
courts are best equipped to create rules protecting personal privacy). 
858 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 102:801 
Lessig offers such a perspective in his book Code and Other Laws of 
Cyberspace. Lessig urges judges to be bold in their use of the Fourth 
Amendment to protect Internet privacy: he writes that "judges should 
firmly advance arguments that seek to preserve original values of 
liberty in a new context."338 Because the Fourth Amendment reflects a 
clear commitment of the Framers to protect privacy,339 judges should 
identify the values of privacy in new technologies and translate them 
in to new Fourth Amendment rules.340 Lessig singles out Justice 
Brandeis's Olmstead dissent as a model for how to interpret the 
Fourth Amendment in light of technological change: "If there is a 
justice who deserves c-world's praise, if there is a Supreme Court 
opinion that should be the model for cyberactivists in the future, if 
there is a first chapter in the fight to protect cyberspace, it is this 
Justice, this opinion, and this case."341 If courts defer to legislatures, 
Lessig warns, we will be left with laws that may or may not respect 
constitutional values.342 Thus "there is an important space for [judicial] 
activism."343 Professor Lessig suggests that lower court judges should 
act with particular confidence; "many [lower court judges] are 
extraordinarily talented and creative. Their voices would teach us 
something . . . . "344 
In this part, I will argue that such enthusiasm for judicial solutions 
overlooks significant institutional limitations of judicial rulemaking. 
Courts tend to be poorly suited to generate effective rules regulating 
criminal investigations involving new technologies. In contrast, 
legislatures possess a significant institutional advantage in this area 
over courts. While courts have successfully created rules that establish 
important privacy rights in many areas, it is difficult for judges to 
fashion lasting guidance when technologies are new and rapidly 
changing. The context of judicial decisionmaking often leaves the law 
surprisingly unclear. Courts lack the institutional capacity to easily 
grasp the privacy implications of new technologies they encounter. 
Judges cannot readily understand how the technologies may develop, 
cannot easily appreciate context, and often cannot even recognize 
338. LESSIG, supra note 10, at 222. 
339. Id. at 1 17-18. 
340. Id. at 222. 
341. Id. at 116. 
342. Lessig writes that as courts notice how their decisions may influence the 
development of the Internet, "they will increasingly defer to the political branches." Id. at 
216. "[W]e should not underestimate" the consequences of such deference, he warns: "In the 
future legislatures will act relatively unconstrained by courts; the values that we might call 
constitutional - whether enacted into our Constitution or not - will constrain these 
legislatures only if they choose to take them into account." Id. 
343. Id. at 222. 
344. Id. 
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whether the facts of the case before them raise privacy implications 
that happen to be typical or atypical. Judicially created rules also lack 
necessary flexibility; they cannot change quickly and cannot test 
various regulatory approaches. As a result, judicially created rules 
regulating government investigations tend to become quickly outdated 
or uncertain as technology changes. The context of legislative rule­
creation offers significantly better prospects for the generation of 
balanced, nuanced, and effective investigative rules involving new 
technologies. In light of these institutional realities, courts should 
proceed cautiously and with humility, allowing some room for political 
judgment and maneuvering in a setting that is in such flux.345 
My argument here is relatively narrow, and two major limitations 
are worth stating at the outset. First, my normative argument is limited 
to the field of criminal procedure, and particularly the Fourth 
Amendment. Civil law scholars have noted that courts have two 
significant institutional advantages over legislatures when technology 
is in flux. First, courts can generate rules in a case-by-case way that 
may offer significant advantages over one-size-fits all legislative 
solutions, especially when technologies are new and may change.346 
Second, legislative rules are subject to rent-seeking by special interest 
groups, while judicial decisionmaking tends to be more independent.347 
As I explain in greater detail later in the section, I find both arguments 
persuasive in the civil law context. The dynamic of criminal procedure 
is different, however. In the latter context, interstitial decisionmaking 
proves more a liability than an asset because the rules govern law 
enforcement, not private parties. Uncertain rules result in uncertain 
restrictions on government practices, which can either allow abuses or 
else chill practices needed to pursue important investigations. Further, 
privacy rules present relatively few opportunities for rent-seeking, and 
instead tend to produce strong incentives for legislators to enact rules 
that reflect majority preferences. 
The second limitation is that my argument applies only when 
technologies are in flux. My concern is the institutional competence of 
courts and legislatures when facts are changing quickly. As a result, my 
interest is not whether a given case involves a "technology" in an 
absolute sense, but rather whether the basic assumptions upon which 
rules are generated are likely to remain constant or to shift in 
unpredictable ways. The argument thus has a significant temporal 
aspect; it is not an argument against strong Fourth Amendment 
protection, but rather an argument for judicial caution in the face of 
rapid technological change. When technologies are new and their 
impact remains uncertain, statutory rules governing law enforcement 
345. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutional Caution, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 361, 363. 
346. See infra notes 485-494. 
347. See infra notes 497-498. 
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powers will tend to be more sophisticated, comprehensive, forward­
thinking, and flexible than rules created by the judicial branch. The 
temporal limitation also responds to concerns that legislatures may 
enact rules that dismiss privacy concerns. Because early adopters of 
new technologies tend to have disproportionate political influence, 
legislators often will be unusually sensitive to privacy threats raised by 
technological change. 
A. Judicial Creation of Investigative Rules When Facts A re Stable 
During the Warren Court era, scholars of criminal procedure 
debated the Court's constitutionalization of criminal procedure. For 
the most part, the debate focused on the merits of the Court's 
decisions as exercises in constitutional interpretation.348 Some found 
the Court's criminal procedure cases well-meaning but poorly 
reasoned and results-oriented; others argued that the decisions 
courageously fulfilled the promise of the Bill of Rights.349 Whatever 
the merits of these arguments, it is difficult to contest the fact that over 
the last forty years the Court has constitutionalized the law governing 
criminal investigations. Today, the law of criminal procedure is mostly 
constitutional law.350 Although some criticize the Supreme Court's 
rules as ineffective and unworkable,351 I think the Supreme Court's 
rules by and large have worked. The rules provide reasonably clear 
guidance to law enforcement, limit government power to protect 
privacy (within limits), and give the police enough authority to protect 
public safety (again, within limits).352 Although no one could agree 
entirely with tlie Court's work, from a functional perspective most of 
the Court's Fourth Amendment decisions are part of a reasonably 
coherent and sensible rule structure. 
The fact that the Supreme Court has successfully used the Fourth 
Amendment in the past to create rules governing law enforcement 
investigations prompts an important question: If the Court has 
succeeded in constitutionalizing the basic rules governing criminal 
348. But see Paul M. Bator & James Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the 
Right to Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 62, 
62-63 (1966). 
349. See, e.g. , Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 
CAL. L. REV. 929 (1965). 
350. 1 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 336, § 2.1 at 469 ("Looking to the totality of the 
[criminal] process, constitutional standards combine to constitute what is surely the single 
most important body of law regulating the process."). 
351. See CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
REVOLUTION (1993) (arguing that case-by-case decisionmaking leaves criminal procedure 
rules unclear, and that Congress should enact a federal code of criminal procedure to 
provide clear rules for the police to follow). 
352 See infra notes 353-357. 
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investigations, why can't courts do the same in cases with new 
technologies? What changes when we shift to cases with technologies 
in flux? This Part explores the characteristics of traditional cases that 
have allowed the courts to develop privacy laws that regulate them. By 
appreciating why courts can devise rules effectively in traditional 
cases, we can then understand why that ability diminishes in cases with 
developing technologies. 
Let's begin with the goals of Fourth Amendment rules. It is 
generally agreed that the general pragmatic goal of both constitutional 
and statutory law governing search and seizure is to create a workable 
and sensible balance between law enforcement needs and privacy 
interests.353 The law should allow the government to investigate crime 
effectively, facilitating the substantive goals of criminal law such as 
deterrence and retribution. At the same time, the law must limit the 
power of government, in order to protect privacy and civil liberties 
against excessive government snooping. These general goals of course 
mask a great deal of disagreement on the specifics; lines can be drawn 
in different places, and different people have different views as to how 
this balance should be reached. But at least at a more abstract level, 
the goal is a rule-structure that simultaneously respects privacy 
interests and law enforcement needs. 
A secondary goal is rule clarity. The rules of criminal procedure 
primarily regulate law enforcement instead of private parties; the rules 
tell government agents what they can and cannot do to collect 
evidence of crime and identify wrongdoers. Because these rules limit 
government power, rule clarity minimizes official discretion and 
encourages compliance.354 Unclear rules mean unclear limits on 
government power, increasing the likelihood of abuses by aggressive 
government officials.355 Clear rules also limit the shield of qualified 
353. See, e.g. , Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001) 
354. For example, this is the purpose of the Fourth Amendment's particularity 
requirement: by requiring officers to explain with particularity what exactly they want to 
seize pursuant to a warrant, the particularity requirement limits the discretion of officers 
who may otherwise use the warrant as an excuse to engage in a fishing expedition for 
evidence of criminal activity. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) 
(discussing the function of the particularity requirement); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 
192, 196 (1927) ("As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer 
executing the warrant."). 
355. As the Supreme Court has noted, Fourth Amendment rules: 
[O]ught to be expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police in the context of 
the law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged. A highly sophisticated 
set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle 
nuances and hairline distinctions, may be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds 
of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they may be "literally impossible of application by 
the officer in the field . . . .  
[A] single, familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time 
and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the 
specific circumstances they confront." 
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immunity, increasing deterrence.356 From a public safety perspective, 
clear rules also allow investigators to use the full power granted to 
them under constitutional and statutory law to pursue evidence of 
criminal activity.357 
Both goals are readily attainable through judicially crafted rules 
when technologies are stable. Consider automobile traffic stops, one of 
the most common fact patterns in Fourth Amendment law. In these 
cases, the police spot a vehicle on a public road and wish to stop the 
car and investigate further. Stopping the car is plainly a Fourth 
Amendment "seizure,"358 focusing attention on the line between a 
"reasonable" and an "unreasonable" seizure - and if a search of the 
vehicle later occurs, a "reasonable" and an "unreasonable" search. 
What can the police do? What rules exist to balance law enforcement 
needs with privacy interests? 
The Supreme Court has developed a remarkably detailed set of 
rules that govern every stage of traffic stops. The officer can stop the 
car if he has probable cause to believe that the driver has committed a 
traffic violation, no matter how minor.359 At that point, he can order 
the driver and the passengers out of the car.360 If the officer has 
reasonable suspicion that the driver is armed and dangerous, he can 
"patdown" the driver, and search the passenger compartment of the 
vehicle. Otherwise he cannot. 361 The officer can look through the 
windows of the vehicle,362 and if he has probable cause to search the 
vehicle, he can search it without a warrant,363 looking anywhere that 
evidence may be located.364 If the driver or someone else with common 
authority consents, he can search the vehicle within the scope of that 
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-by-Case 
Adjudication " versus "Standardized Procedure": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 S. Cr. REV. 
127, 142 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1122 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) 
(1972), and quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 {1979))). 
356. When the state of the law is unclear, law enforcement officers are generally 
protected from civil suits by the doctrine of qualified immunity. See Anderson v. Creighton, 
483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 
357. See Kerr, Lifting the "Fog", supra note 334, at 841 (explaining how unclear law 
enforcement rules can chill the behavior of police officers). 
358. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 {1979) {"The Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments are implicated in this case because stopping an automobile and detaining its 
occupants constitute a 'seizure' within the meaning of those Amendments, even though the 
purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief."). 
359. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 {1996). 
360. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977). 
361. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983). 
362. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983) {plurality opinion). 
363. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
364. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
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consent.365 These rules are only the beginning; a significant body of law 
exists dealing with almost every aspect of traffic stops. 
The key question for our purposes is this: what characteristics of 
traffic stops have allowed the courts to micromanage police 
procedures? I think there are two answers. First, the basic facts of 
traffic stops have proven stable across time, allowing courts to create 
rules based on reasonably ascertainable policy considerations. Courts 
have created traffic stop rules by balancing and weighing competing 
concerns such as privacy,366 officer safety,367 the need to preserve 
evidence,368 and the administrability of various rules.369 This enterprise 
is possible because from the time that the first Supreme Court traffic 
stop case was decided in the 1920s,370 the basic operation and 
capacities of automobiles have remained more or less stable.371 Policy 
concerns relating to the destruction of evidence have been based on a 
driver's ability to speed away in the vehicle and later dispose of the 
evidence, something that has not changed significantly over time.372 
Policy concerns relating to officer safety have focused on the risk that 
a suspect may have a handgun, a weapon that has remained essentially 
the same since the 1860s.373 Although automobiles and handguns are 
themselves products of technology, they are stable products, changing 
little over many decades. As a result, a rule that makes sense today 
will likely make sense tomorrow. 
The second factor allowing the courts to micromanage traffic stops 
is the familiarity of their facts. Judges understand traffic stops. They 
can picture what happened. They can strike the balance among 
privacy, safety, evidentiary integrity, and administrability because they 
365. David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, And The Future Of The 
Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. Cr. REV. 271, 275. 
366. See, e.g. , Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 1 13, 1 16-17 (1998) (ruling that the search 
incident to arrest exception does not apply when a defendant is issued a citation but not 
arrested, because the defendant's privacy interest is not outweighed by concerns of officer 
safety or the need to preserve evidence for trial). 
367. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (allowing protective sweeps 
of the areas of a car within the suspect's reach because "roadside encounters between police 
and suspects are especially hazardous, and that danger may arise from the possible presence 
of weapons in the area surrounding the suspect"). 
368. Knowles, 525 U.S. at 1 16. 
369. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) ("Courts attempting to 
strike a reasonable Fourth Amendment balance [consider other factors along with] an 
essential interest in readily administrable rules." (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 
458 (1981))). 
370. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
371. See, e.g. , LEON MANDEL, AMERICAN CARS 105-123 (1982) (describing the 
operation of a Ford Model T, the most popular car of the 1920s). 
372. Knowles, 525 U.S. at 1 16. 
373. See generally JOHN WALTER, HANDGUN: FROM MATCHLOCK TO LASER-SIGHTED 
WEAPON (1988) (discussing the evolution of handguns). 
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can appreciate the range of possible outcomes as well as the likelihood 
of those outcomes. Consider Michigan v. Long,314 in which the 
Supreme Court announced that an officer with "specific and 
articulable" facts that support a reasonable belief that a driver or 
passenger may be dangerous can make a "protective sweep" of the 
areas of the vehicle within reach.375 The Court created this rule after 
factoring in the relevant policy concerns, such as the facts that 
"roadside encounters between police and suspects are especially 
hazardous,"376 "that danger may arise from the possible presence of 
weapons in the area surrounding a suspect, "377 and the costs and 
benefits of a bright-line rule.378 The Court's rule resulted from the 
Justices' assessment of competing policy concerns, which was in turn 
based on their understanding of the facts presented in traffic stop 
cases. Of course, we may not like a particular rule in a particular case; 
we may feel that a more or less privacy protecting rule would be 
better.379 But the key is that judges are institutionally well-equipped to 
create such rules.380 The combination of stable and readily understood 
facts enables judges to generate a reasonably coherent framework 
regulating police conduct at automobile traffic stops. Judges can create 
clear rules that strike a stable balance. 
B. The Fluctuating Relationship Between Surveillance and Privacy in 
Developing Technologies 
The picture changes considerably when we turn from cases with 
stable facts to situations involving technologies in rapid flux. Why? 
New technologies make what was hard easier, enabling us to achieve 
more, do more, or do so easier, faster, or more cheaply than before. 
Consider transportation.381 Ten thousand years ago a person wishing to 
travel a long distance across land would likely walk; a thousand years 
ago she could ride a horse; a hundred years ago she could take a train; 
374. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
375. Id. at 1048. 
376. Id. at 1049. 
377. Id. 
378. See id. at 1049 n.14. 
379. Commentators regularly condemn the Supreme Court's traffic stop cases for 
drawing lines in the wrong place, and in particular for giving too much weight to law 
enforcement concerns and too little weight to privacy interests. See, e.g. , David A. Moran, 
The New Fourth Amendment Vehicle Doctrine: Stop and Search Any Car at Any Time, 47 
VJLL. L. REV. 815 (2002);  Steven A. Saltzburg, The Supreme Court, Criminal Procedure and 
Judicial Integrity, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 133, 147-50 (2003). 
380. 1 LAFAVE, ET AL., supra note 336, § 2.8 at 626-27. 
381. See generally RUTH S. COWAN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY 
Ch. 5. (1997). 
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today, she can fly in an airplane. Each of these technological advances 
makes the travel faster and the journey easier. The new technologies 
make what was hard now easy - or at least easier - and in some 
cases make the once-impossible possible.382 
In the context of the Fourth Amendment, technological change 
often upsets preexisting associations between law enforcement 
investigative steps and their privacy implications. Some new 
technologies make preexisting forms of surveillance more intrusive; 
others have the opposite effect.383 The result is a complex and often­
fluctuating relationship between surveillance and privacy. The stable 
relationship between law enforcement conduct and privacy in 
traditional cases is replaced by a fluid and often counter-intuitive 
relationship. As a result, the task of creating rules to protect privacy 
becomes significantly more dynamic and complex. 
Consider the following example: A police officer stands on the 
public street outside a home and tries to peer inside, hoping to collect 
clues of criminal activity. How much can he learn about what is going 
on inside? The answer depends heavily on existing technologies. At a 
basic level, corrective eyeglasses may allow the officer to see through 
the windows of the home more clearly. Give the officer a flashlight, 
and he will be able to peer into the house through a window at night. 
Let the officer use an infrared imaging device, and he will be able to 
see a thermal image of the exterior of the home. Give him a shotgun 
microphone, and he may be able to hear communications inside.384 All 
of these new technologies allow the officer to gather more evidence 
than before. 
The dynamic works both ways, of course. People inside the home 
could take defensive measures against each of these technologies. For 
example, they could close the shutters or use tinted windows to block 
the flashlights and glasses. They could use thermal insulators to defeat 
the thermal imager. They could use soundproofing or white-noise 
generators to counter the shotgun microphone. All of these 
technologies block the surveillance. How much information can the 
police officer glean about the house from the public street? It depends 
on the technologies in use by both the police and the targets of the 
surveillance. 
382. The effect is not always a change for the better, of course: technology enables new 
tools to be used for good or bad. 
383. Most commentators focus on the first half of this equation while ignoring the 
second half, but both are equally important. Technologies can be used both to invade privacy 
and to block invasions of privacy. An obvious example of a technology that blocks invasions 
of privacy is encryption. See generally BRUCE SCHNEIER, SECRETS & LIES: DIGITAL 
SECURITY IN A NETWORKED WORLD Pt. 2 (2000). 
384. See Mark G. Young, Note, What Big Eyes And Ears You Have!: A New Regime For 
Covert Governmental Surveillance, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1031 (2001) (describing 
shotgun microphones). 
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Wiretapping provides another example. Consider the question, 
how invasive is wiretapping? In Berger v. New York,385 Justice Douglas 
called wiretapping "a dragnet" that "intercepts the most intimate of 
conversations."386 But whether that is true depends on the type and 
form of information that travels across the wires to be tapped. This is 
not constant: as technology develops, the type of information can 
change. The invasiveness of wiretapping fluctuates with time. When 
the Supreme Court decided Berger in 1967, telecommunications wires 
primarily carried telephone signals. Tapping a wire was a gross 
invasion of privacy: it meant listening in on a private telephone 
conversation.387 Today that is less likely to be true. For example, many 
wires carry Internet communications, which may include many types 
of much less private communications. Some Internet communications 
are as private as telephone calls, but many are not: 
If you were to select a random spot on the Internet and watch the 
Internet traffic streaming by, you would pick up e-mails, Web pages in 
transit, commands sent to remote servers, picture or music files, network 
support traffic, and almost everything else in cyberspace. Many of these 
communications would deserve privacy, but others would not.388 
Fast forward to the future. Technologists predict that in a decade 
or two, Internet communications routinely will be encrypted -
scrambled using mathematical algorithms - using a form of 
essentially unbreakable encryption.389 When Internet users encrypt 
their communications, wiretapping will become largely ineffective. 
The police can tap the line, but obtain only a meaningless string of Os 
and ls that can prove difficult if not impossible to descramble. If this 
proves to be the case, wiretapping will on average be much less 
invasive than it was in the 1960s. And if it happens it will really be a 
return to the past: encrypting communications was a common measure 
in the telegraph era of the 1860s, before the telephone was even 
invented.390 In those days, tapping a wire was only one step of several 
needed to eavesdrop on a private communication.391 
The social importance of technologies can also change as related 
technologies develop. The public telephone provides an interesting 
385. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
386. Id. at 65 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
387. See id. 
388. Orin S. Kerr, Essay, Are We Overprotecting Code? Thoughts on First-Generation 
Internet Law, 57 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1287, 1300 (2000). 
389. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 10, at 35-39 ("Cryptography will change 
everything . . . .  ") ; SCHNEIER, supra note 383, at 85-100. 
390. See, e.g. , SIMON SINGH, THE CODE BOOK 60-79 (1999) (discussing the widespread 
use of encryption in the context of telegraph communications). 
391. See id. at 75. 
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example. In the 1960s, public telephones provided a vital means of 
communication for many Americans. Katz v. United States392 gave this 
role constitutional significance: in support of the Court's conclusion 
that the Fourth Amendment protected Charles Katz while he used the 
pay phone booth, the Court added a single line of explanation: "To 
read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the 
public telephone has come to play in private communication. "393 
Perhaps the Court did not mean this literally; perhaps it is rhetorical 
fluff. But if taken at face value, it would create a serious question as to 
the continuing vitality of Katz. The reason is that public telephones no 
longer play a vital role in private communication. The pay telephone 
has been largely eclipsed by the cell phone. Since the mid-1990s, over 
100 million Americans have purchased cell phones, and the number of 
public telephones in the United States has dropped by more than 
30%.394 Existing pay phones are used about half as much today as they 
were in 1996.395 As a Chicago Tribune headline recently announced, 
"Pay Phones May Go the Way of Dinosaurs."396 The Supreme Court 
could reasonably declare the public telephone "vital" in 1967; today it 
could not. 
These examples highlight how technological change complicates 
the creation of Fourth Amendment-like rules. The privacy 
implications of a rule at one time may be quite different from the 
implications of the rule at another time. 
·
The rules are based on often­
unstable assumptions, and the law's challenge is to respond to the 
changing facts. The question is, which branch of government is best 
equipped to respond to these difficulties? Legislatures or courts? 
C. The Challenge of Ex Post Decisionmaking 
Courts and legislatures generate rules of criminal procedure in 
somewhat different ways, subject to different constraints. A full 
recounting of the differences is beyond the scope of this paper. But I 
will sketch the three basic differences critical to a comparison of the 
institutional competence of courts and legislatures in this context: ex 
ante versus ex post decisionmaking, flexibility, and the information 
environment of judicial versus legislative rules. 
392. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
393. Id. at 352. 
394. See Yuki Noguchi, Requiem for the Pay Phone: As Cell Phone Use Increases, an 
Icon Gradually Dies, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2002, at El. 
395. See Virgil Larson, Cutting the Cord on Pay Phones, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 
Dec. 28, 2002, at ld. 
396. John Van, Pay Phones May Go the Way of Dinosaurs, CHI. TRIB., June 13, 
2002, at 1 .  
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The first difference is that legislatures typically create generally 
applicable rules ex ante,397 while courts tend to create rules ex post in a 
case-by-case fashion.398 That is, legislatures enact generalized rules for 
the future, whereas courts resolve disputes settling the rights of parties 
arising from a past event.399 The difference leads to Fourth 
Amendment rules that tend to lag behind parallel statutory rules and 
current technologies by at least a decade, resulting in unsettled and 
then outdated rules that often make little sense given current 
technological facts. 
Consider the hurdles that must be overcome before the courts 
resolve how the Fourth Amendment applies to a new technology. 
Because the Fourth Amendment applies only to actual searches, not to 
technologies that merely have the potential to conduct searches,400 
courts generally cannot pass on how the Fourth Amendment applies 
to a technology until long after a technology has been introduced. For 
a trial court to address the Fourth Amendment implications of a 
technology, the technology must be used by the government in the 
course of investigating a criminal offense; the use of the technology 
must yield evidence of a crime; it must lead to an arrest; and then it 
must lead to a constitutional challenge requiring judicial resolution.401 
Appellate decisions come only much later. Because plea agreements 
usually require a defendant who pleads guilty to waive a right of 
appeal, and the overwhelming majority of cases end in a plea,402 
appellate decisions come only in the rare case in which a defendant 
has been convicted at trial and then appeals, or else signs a conditional 
plea allowing an appeal. When an appeal is heard, it is usually decided 
more than a year after the initial trial court's decision. Very few 
appeals lead to published, precedential opinions. Even if the issue 
does lead to a published decision of an appellate court, Supreme Court 
review is not likely; the Court hears only about 80 or 90 cases a year. If 
397. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
Summer 1958, at 401, 412. 
398. See id. at 429-30, 435. 
399. See id. at 412 ("A legislature deals with crimes always in advance of their 
commission . . . .  It deals with them always by directions formulated in general terms."). 
400. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) (noting that the court has never 
held that "potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy constitute searches for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment"). 
401. I am assuming here that the court would address the Fourth Amendment issues in 
the context of a motion to suppress. An alternative route would be a civil action brought 
under Bivens or 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which would generally require notice of the use of the 
technology and measurable damages. 
402. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 432 (1999) (indicating that 1 .4 % of federal felony defendants 
were acquitted after trial, 4.3% were convicted after trial, the cases of 10.4% were dismissed, 
and 83.9% pleaded guilty or nolo contendere). 
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the Supreme Court does agree to resolve the case eventually, it is 
likely to happen several years after the circuit courts have first 
addressed the issue.403 
The history of Fourth Amendment law reflects this gap. The 
Supreme Court first considered the Fourth Amendment implications 
of wiretaps almost six decades after the invention of the telephone.404 
Pen registers were in widespread use by the 1960s,405 but the Supreme 
Court did not pass on whether their use violated the Fourth 
Amendment until 1979.406 Even today, no Article III court at any level 
has decided whether an Internet user has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their e-mails stored with an Internet service provider;407 
whether encryption creates a reasonable expectation of privacy;408 or 
what the Fourth Amendment implications of the "Carnivore" Internet 
surveillance tool might be.409 The technologies exist, and in the case of 
encryption and e-mail, are used by millions of Americans everyday. 
But no one really knows how the Fourth Amendment applies to them. 
This delay carries important consequences for the clarity of judicial 
rulemaking. Years may pass before a court considers how the Fourth 
Amendment regulates use of a new technology; many more years may 
pass before the issue is resolved definitively. By the time the courts 
decide how a technology should be regulated, however, the factual 
record of the case may be outdated, reflecting older technology rather 
than more recent developments.410 Further, once the law appears to be 
settled, the rapid pace of technological change may make it difficult to 
know how future courts might resolve the same problem. Existing 
precedents may have little force: an appellate decision based on a 
factual record created a few years before may no longer apply just a 
403. See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT 230-34 (1991) (explaining that the Court often allows issues to 
percolate through the lower courts before the Court will resolve it). 
404. The telephone was invented in 1876. Olmstead was decided in 1928. See supra note 
246 and accompanying text. 
405. See United States v. Guglielmo, 245 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. Ill. 1965) (considering the 
legality of a pen register device). 
406. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
407. See United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063, 1066 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting in dicta that 
"[w]hile it is clear . . .  that Congress intended to create a statutory expectation of privacy in 
e-mail files, it is less clear that an analogous expectation of privacy derives from the 
Constitution"). 
408. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption Create a 
"Reasonable Expectation of Privacy"?, 33 CONN. L. REV. 503, 513 (2001) ("The courts have 
not yet faced a direct Fourth Amendment challenge to the decryption of encrypted Internet 
communications."). 
409. See generally Frank J. Eichenlaub, Comment, Carnivore: Taking A Bite Out Of The 
Fourth Amendment?, 80 N.C. L. REV. 315 (2001). 
410. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping Into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing 
Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. REV. 269 ( 1999). 
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few years later. As Stuart Benjamin has noted, "[r]apidly changing 
facts weaken the force of stare decisis by undermining the stability of 
precedents. Appellate opinions are only as robust as the facts on which 
they are based. When those facts evaporate, the opinion on which they 
rest is weakened as well."411 Consider the lower court's findings about 
the Internet in the litigation that led to the Supreme Court's decision 
in Reno v. A CL U.412 The facts were accurate for 1996, but are not 
necessarily accurate today.413 Because constitutional rules may be 
based on changing technological facts, it may be difficult 
know whether a Fourth Amendment rule that is valid one day is valid 
the next.414 
Legislative rules are different. Legislatures can act at any time, 
even when a technology is new. As a practical matter, legislatures 
often will wait for public concern to surface before regulating a new 
technology. But recent history suggests that legislatures usually act at a 
surprisingly early stage, and certainly long before the courts. For 
example, while the courts have not yet decided how the Fourth 
Amendment protects stored e-mails, Congress enacted a 
comprehensive regime to protect the privacy of e-mails in 1986 in the 
form of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.415 Congress 
regulated the privacy of e-mail before most Americans had even heard 
of e-mail. Similarly, Congress enacted laws to regulate the 
"Carnivore" Internet surveillance system in 2001 before any Fourth 
Amendment challenges were raised to its use.416 
Congress has even acted before a technology was invented. For 
example, Congress recently passed a law blocking the Pentagon's 
proposed "Total Information Awareness" (TIA) program, which 
would have funded research into the development of computer data­
mining technology.417 Unburdened by the procedural barriers that 
limit and delay judicial power, legislatures can enact comprehensive 
rules far ahead of current practice rather than decades behind it. 
411. Id. at 272. 
412. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
413. See LESSIG, supra note 10, at 216; Benjamin supra note 410, at 294. 
414. Cf Ashcroft v. ACLU 124 S.Ct. 2783, 2794 (2004) (noting that after a delay of five 
years, "the factual record [in an Internet-related case] does not reflect current technological 
reality."). 
415. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 
(codified as amended as a note to 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2000)). 
416. See Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act, supra note 323, at 
648-58 (discussing provisions of the USA Patriot Act designed to regulate the Internet 
surveillance tool known as Carnivore). 
417. Audrey Hudson, 'Supersnoop' Scheme Blocked Pending Review by Congress; 
Privacy Issues Cited in Pentagon TIA Project, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2003, at Al. ("Key 
lawmakers have agreed to block funding for the Pentagon's Total Information Awareness 
project until Congress can review the technology's effect on privacy and civil liberties."). 
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D. The Need for Flexibility in Light of Changing Facts 
871 
A second difference between judicial and legislative rulemaking 
concerns their operative constraints. Judicial rulemaking is limited by 
strong stare decisis norms that limit the ability of judicial rules to 
change quickly; in contrast, legislatures enjoy wide-ranging discretion 
to enact new rules. The difference favors legislatures when technology 
is in flux because the privacy implications of particular rules can 
fluctuate as technology advances. To ensure that the law maintains its 
intended balance, it needs mechanisms that can adapt to technological 
change. Legislatures are up to the task; courts generally are not. 
Legislatures can experiment with different rules and make frequent 
amendments;418 they can place restrictions on both public and private 
actors; and they can even "sunset" rules so that they apply only for a 
particular period of time. The courts cannot.419 As a result, Fourth 
Amendment rules will tend to lack the flexibility that a regulatory 
response to new technologies may require. 
The statutory framework that governs Internet privacy 
demonstrates the flexibility and creative potential of legislative 
approaches. Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act ("ECPA") in 1986 to regulate the privacy of Internet 
communications.420 Since that time, Congress has amended the 
framework no less than eleven times: once in 1988,421 twice in 1994,422 
three times in 1996,423 once 1998,424 twice in 2001,425 and twice in 
2002.426 Some of those changes were only minor technical 
amendments, while others were more significant alterations to the 
statutory scheme. Moreover, the structure of Congress 's statutory 
Internet privacy laws demonstrates how legislative rules can impose 
418. See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 35 (1977). 
419. See id. at 36-37. 
420. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 
(codified as a note to 18 U.S.C. § 2510). 
421. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4398. 
422. See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 
108 Stat. 4279 (1994); Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-322, § 330003(b ), 108 Stat. 1796. 
423. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
1 10 Stat. 1214; Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-293, 110 
Stat. 3461 (1996); Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488. 
424. See Telemarketing Fraud Prevention Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-184, 112 
Stat. 520. 
425. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272; Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L.  No. 107-108, 115 Stat. 
1394 (2001 ). 
426. See 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 
116 Stat. 1758 (2002); Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. 
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creative and flexible regulatory regimes involving new technologies. 
For example, Congress opted to regulate both public and private 
parties to best protect privacy. This would be difficult if not impossible 
under the Fourth Amendment, which regulates only the goveinment 
and private parties acting on the government's behalf.427 But ECPA 
recognizes that private parties acting on their own can pose a serious 
threat to Internet privacy: if America Online can look through the e­
mails of its 30 million subscribers and disclose the evidence to the 
police without restriction, this would gut Internet privacy protections. 
The Fourth Amendment does not restrict this disclosure, but ECPA 
does:428 in addition to restricting the ability of law enforcement to 
order private ISPs to disclose communications to law enforcement,429 
the law also restricts the ability of private ISPs to disclose 
communications to law enforcement voluntarily.430 
Congress has also created new court orders as needed to deal with 
novel Internet privacy problems. Under the 1986 Act, for example, the 
government needed a search warrant to compel ISPs to disclose 
certain information, but could obtain the rest with a mere subpoena.431 
Convinced that some of the information ISPs collected deserved more 
privacy protection, Congress invented a new court order in 1994, a 
"specific and articulable facts" court order.432 The new order has a 
threshold about midway between that for a subpoena and a search 
warrant:433 to collect the information, the government must apply to a 
court and offer "specific and articulable grounds to believe that the 
records are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation."434 This new court order is only one of many Congress 
has created: a recent tally counts at least eight statutory thresholds 
that Congress has used in the area of Internet surveillance law alone.435 
427. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) ("(The Fourth Amendment] 
is '.wholly inapplicable to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private 
individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge 
of any government official. '  " (quoting Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting))). 
428. See S. REP. No. 99-541,  at 36 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3590. 
429. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2000). 
430. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2000). 
431. See H.R. REP. No. 103-827, at 12 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.A.A.N. 3489, 3492. 
432. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2000). The need for this special court order was urged by 
Senator Leahy. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, at 12 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.A.A.N. 
3489, 3492. 
433. See United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1 103, 1 109 n.8. (D. Kan. 2000) (citing 
H.R. REP. No. 103-827, at 31-32 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.A.A.N. 3489, 351 1-12). 
434. Id. 
435. See Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act, supra note 323, at 
620-21 (explaining different statutory thresholds currently used by Congress to regulate 
Internet surveillance law). 
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Congress has also experimented with rules through a "sunset" 
mechanism.436 When Congress passed the USA Patriot Act in October 
2001, it granted many powers to the government for just four years: 
the extra powers "sunset" on December 31 ,  2005, when the law will 
revert back to its pre-Patriot Act state.437 
It is far harder for the courts to adopt such flexible rules under the 
Fourth Amendment.438 Putting aside the merits of such an approach 
from the standpoint of normative constitutional theory, the task would 
create enormous practical headaches. To allow the governing rules to 
change as needed over time, courts would be forced either to expressly 
change the governing rules at regular intervals or else articulate the 
governing rule using a standard that keeps the result unclear to 
incorporate changed circumstances. Stare decisis norms make the first 
option unrealistic; it's hard to imagine the courts creating new rules 
every few years to keep the law up to date. But the latter option leads 
to intolerable uncertainty. The result is constitutional law's version of 
the Heisenberg uncertainty principle in quantum physics;439 you can 
know the law at one time or you can know its general direction, but 
you can't know both at the same time. 
We can see the challenge of changing facts in Justice Scalia's effort 
to craft a rule for sense-enhancing devices in Kyllo v. United States.440 
Justice Scalia recognized the key difficulty: thanks to technological 
change, use of a particular sense-enhancing device might seem 
objectionable in one era but routine in another.441 He thus tried to 
craft a rule that would apply across time, producing different results at 
different times. Recall the Court's holding in that case: " [w]here . . .  
the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to 
explore details of the home that would previously have been 
unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' 
and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant."442 Notably, this 
436. See id. at 607. 
437. See id. 
438. See HOROWITZ, supra note 418, at 36. 
439. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle is an observation of quantum physics that the 
more precisely the position of a particle is determined, the less precisely the momentum of 
that particle can be known. See WERNER HEISENBERG, PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY: THE 
REVOLUTION IN MODERN SCIENCE 47-48 (1958); see also Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature 
of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn From Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 17 (1989). 
440. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
441. During the oral argument of an earlier case involving the Internet, Justice Scalia 
commented, "This is an area where change is enormously rapid. Is it possible that this statute 
is unconstitutional today, or was unconstitutional 2 years ago when it was examined on the 
basis of a record done about 2 years ago, but will be constitutional next week?" Transcript of 
Oral Argument at *49, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (Reno 11) (No. 96-511), available 
at 1997 WL 136253. 
442 Ky/lo, 533 U.S. at 40. 
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rule does not mean that the warrantless use of devices such as thermal 
imagers directed at the home necessarily violates the Fourth 
Amendment; rather, the devices will violate the Fourth Amendment 
until they enter "general public use. " At some point in the future, 
thermal imaging devices will likely come into widespread use: they are 
increasingly used as non-contact thermometers by hobbyists, 
electricians, and mechanics, and can be purchased on-line for $40.443 
But how can anyone determine when the use of a thermal imaging 
device is in "general public use" so that the government can use one 
without a warrant? 
An example illustrates the difficulty. Imagine that in 2010, 5% of 
the population owns some kind of thermal imaging device, and a 
police officer decides to use one in the same way that the police did in 
the Kyllo case. The police officer uses the device, which leads to a 
warrant and an arrest in 2011 .  In 2012, the defendant challenges the 
procedure before the trial court. The trial court concludes that 5% of 
the population owned thermal imaging devices in 2010, but also 
recognizes that 8% own such devices by the time of the hearing in 
2012. The defendant is convicted and the defendant appeals: the 
briefing occurs in 2013, the oral argument is held in early 2014, and the 
appellate court issues its decision in late 2014. Assume that by late 
2014, 15% of the public owns thermal imaging devices. What is the 
relevant date that the appellate court should use to determine whether 
thermal imaging devices are in "general public use"? The time of the 
search? The trial court hearing? The filing of the appellate briefs? 
Oral argument? The appellate court's decision?444 Under the Kyllo 
test, the use of the imaging device may be unconstitutional early in the 
case but constitutional by the later stages. And what if thermal 
imaging devices come into widespread use in one generation, but later 
become obsolete thanks to a subsequent technology, and fall out of 
"general public use"? Does that mean that their use will be 
unconstitutional again? 
One might say that these questions are simply the kind of line­
drawing inquiries that lawyers can raise about the uncertainties of any 
new rule. But I disagree. The Kyllo rule is unusually unclear; it leaves 
the government with little guidance about what they can do and when 
443. Thermal imagers can be used to check for heat leaks in a home, test packages for 
broken seals, and test automotive or household electrical systems for poor contacts and short 
circuits. See InfraredThermography.com, http://www.infraredthermography.com/applicat. 
htm (last visited June 3, 2004); Thermal Imaging, Some Uses, http://www.spectra-uk.com/ 
thermuse.htm (last visited June 4, 2004); Uses of Thermal Imaging, http://www.thermis. 
force9.co.uk/uses_.html (last visited June 4, 2004). I recently purchased my own infrared 
thermal imaging device for $39.95 from www.pythons.com, a website devoted to reptile 
breeding. But this is a subject for another article. 
444. See Benjamin, supra note 410, at 312-68(noting the various options a court faces 
when facts change in the course of litigation). 
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they can do it. These uncertainties follow from the need to create a 
single rule that applies ex post in different ways as technology changes. 
Because the ideal rule may change as the technology advances, Kyllo 
keeps outcomes uncertain to make sure that the outcome can change 
as the technological facts change. The resulting rule inevitably 
sacrifices certainty ex ante to allow the courts to pronounce outcomes 
ex post. 
E. The Judicial Information Deficit 
The third important difference between judicial rules and 
legislative rules relates to the information environment in which rules 
are generated. Legislative rules tend to be the product of a wide range 
of inputs, ranging from legislative hearings and poll results to interest 
group advocacy and backroom compromises. Judicial rules tend to 
follow from a more formal and predictable presentation of written 
briefs and oral arguments by two parties.445 Once again, the difference 
offers significant advantages to legislative rulemaking. The task of 
generating balanced and nuanced rules requires a comprehensive 
understanding of technological facts. Legislatures are well-equipped to 
develop such understandings; courts generally are not. 
The information environment of judicial rulemaking is usually 
poor.446 Judges decide cases based primarily on a brief factual record, 
narrowly argued legal briefs, and a short oral argument.447 They must 
decide their cases in a timely fashion, and can put only so much effort 
into any one case.448 In some contexts, these limitations do not impose 
a heavy burden on effective judicial rulemaking. Recall the 
automobile traffic stop cases. Because judges can readily understand 
traffic stops, a brief record and narrow argument is generally sufficient 
to allow judges to create rules governing the specific facts at hand. In 
contrast, cases involving new technologies such as wireless networks, 
public-key encryption, and data-mining technologies raise more 
complicated issues. Judges struggle to understand even the basic facts 
of such technologies, and often must rely on the crutch of questionable 
445. See, e.g., Lon. L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 
353, 363-87 (1978). This description of the judicial process may be less true in the context of 
modern civil litigation, see, e.g. , Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Foreword: 
The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 ,  39-44 (1979), but is still quite accurate in the 
context of criminal litigation. 
446. See HOROWITZ, supra note 418, at 45-51 (noting the difficulty courts have in 
ascertaining "social facts," defined as "recurrent patterns of behavior on which policy must 
be based"). 
447. On occasion, an amicus curiae brief may also shed light on technological practice. 
448. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 84, 99-100 (1959) (stressing the limited time that the Supreme Court can devote to any 
particular case, and arguing that the Court should take fewer cases to provide each case with 
"fresh illumination of personal research and of hard, independent thought"). 
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metaphors to aid their comprehension.449 Judges generally will not 
know whether those metaphors are accurate, or whether the facts 
before them are typical or atypical given the technology of the past or 
the present. These dynamics make it easy for judges to misunderstand 
the context of their decisions and their likely effect when technology is 
in flux. Judges who attempt to use the Fourth Amendment to craft 
broad regulatory rules covering new technologies run an unusually 
high risk of crafting rules based on incorrect assumptions of context 
and technological practice.450 The context of judicial rulemaking is 
unusually conducive to high rates of error when technology is in flux. 
The recent work of Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule has made 
important contributions to this point. In their recent article 
Interpretations and Institutions,451 Sunstein and Vermeule consider how 
the institutional capacities of various rulemakers should inform their 
interpretive exercises. Their critique of Professor Lessig's theory of 
constitutional translation is particularly relevant here.452 Lessig's 
theory of translation requires judges to update constitutional rules as 
facts change, such that the overall effect of the rule given the new facts 
will echo the original effect of the rule given the original facts.453 
Applying this approach, Lessig supports a broad reading of the Fourth 
Amendment in new technologies, as I noted at the beginning of this 
section.454 Sunstein and Vermeule challenge the feasibility of this 
approach, arguing that judges often will lack the institutional capacity 
to "update" constitutional rules effectively as facts change: 
It takes great confidence in uudicial] capacities to think that judges can 
identify the net effects of [factual change] with enough precision to 
warrant jettisoning clear constitutional prov1s10ns and settled 
constitutional rules . . . .  There is little reason to believe that generalist 
judges, devoting a brief time to the subject and possessed of limited 
449. See Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357, 359-
62 (2003) (explaining how courts applying law to the Internet can choose between virtual 
and physical metaphors, but there is little to guide the choice of metaphor). 
450. See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 6, 
18 (1996) ("Lack of information is thus a crucial argument for decisional minimalism."); 
Sunstein, supra note 345, at 363 ("On the underlying facts, things are changing very rapidly, 
and courts know relatively little; but the facts are crucial to the analysis."). Cf Edward Lee, 
Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275, 1356 (2002). ("We 
should not encourage judicial activism in cyberspace cases if the courts lack sufficient 
expertise and information to address the rapidly changing circumstances."). 
451 .  Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretations and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 885 (2003). 
452 See id. at 941-44. 
453. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 1 165 (1993). 
454. See LESSIG, supra note 10, at 111-21 .  
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information, can form even a plausible view of the relevant 
complexities.455 
Justice Stephen Breyer has also recognized the difficulties of 
judicial creation of privacy rules in new technologies in his recent 
extra-judicial writing.456 The problem of privacy in new technologies 
"is unusually complex,"457 Justice Breyer noted, involving changing 
public perceptions, changing laws, and changing technologies. "These 
circumstances mean that efforts to revise privacy law to take account 
of the new technology will involve . . .  the balancing of values in light 
of predictions about the i:echnological future."458 Courts should not 
preempt this process through broad constitutional rulemaking, Breyer 
reasoned. While courts have a role to play, that role should be modest, 
allowing the "participatory democratic process"459 to work through 
issues first. This approach echoes the caution of Justice Breyer's 
opinion in a First Amendment case, Denver Area Educational 
Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC.4(fJ Justice Breyer voted 
to uphold rules permitting cable system operators to prohibit "patently 
offensive" indecent programming transmitted over leased access 
channels.461Although the parties framed the issue as a choice of how to 
analogize cable systems, Justice Breyer upheld the statute on a 
narrower ground that avoided reliance on a definitive analogy: 
no definitive choice among competing analogies (broadcast, common 
carrier, bookstore) allows us to declare a rigid single standard, good 
for now and for all future media and purposes . . . .  Rather, aware as we 
are of the changes taking place in the law, the technology, and the 
industrial structure related to telecommunications . . . we believe it 
unwise and unnecessary definitively to pick one analogy or one specific 
set of words now.462 
By declining to resolve definitively how the First Amendment 
applies to cable systems, Justice Breyer avoided committing to an 
answer that might seem appropriate today but cause problems as 
technology and social practices evolve. 
The limitations of judicial rulemaking in the Fourth Amendment 
context are illustrated by two recent cases applying the Fourth 
Amendment to computers. Let's start with United States v. Bach.463 
455. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 451, at 943. 
456. See Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 245 (2002). 
457. Id. at 261. 
458. Id. at 262. 
459. Id. at 263. 
460. 518 U.S. 727 (1996). 
461. See id. passim (plurality opinion). 
462. Id. at 741-42. 
463. No. CRIM.01-221, 2001 WL 1690055 (D. Minn. Dec. 14, 2001), rev'd 310 F.3d 1063 
(8th Cir. 2002). 
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Bach raised a constitutional challenge to the law enforcement practice 
of faxing search warrants to ISPs for information on their servers.464 
Rather than execute the search at the ISP, the police in Bach ordered 
the ISP that possessed the information to collect the evidence on its 
own and send it to law enforcement.465 The defendant argued that the 
Fourth Amendment required law enforcement to be physically present 
at the ISP (in this case, the California-based ISP Yahoo!)  to execute 
the warrant or at least to oversee the process. According to the 
defendant, merely faxing the warrant to Yahoo! threatened privacy 
because it granted too much discretion to Yahoo! employees who 
could easily exceed the scope of the warrant.466 The district court 
agreed, ruling that the Fourth Amendment required a law 
enforcement presence at the ISP to protect privacy: 
Police officers have taken an oath to uphold federal and state 
Constitutions and are trained to conduct a search lawfully and in 
accordance with the provisions of a warrant. Civilians, on the other hand, 
are not subject to any sort of discipline for failure to adhere to the law. In 
fact, an internet service provider is immune from suit so long as it is 
providing assistance in accordance with the terms of a warrant. Without 
an officer present, this conditional grant of immunity may become an 
irrefutable protection for internet service providers to conduct searches 
that traverse the clearly defined limits of a warrant. In the particular 
context of this case, there were no safeguards ensuring that the Yahoo 
employees conducting the search and seizure of information in [the 
defendant]'s e-mail account were cautiously abiding by the terms of 
the . . .  warrant. Accordingly, the execution of the . . .  warrant does not 
pass constitutional muster.467 
This reasoning reflected the court's best guess as to how ISPs comply 
with court orders to produce records, which informed the court's sense 
of what method for executing the warrant best protected privacy. The 
district court judge apparently assumed that the skills required to 
search a computer server are similar to the skills required to search 
physical property. In a search of physical property, an untrained 
person would be likely to destroy more property and invade more 
privacy than a trained officer. Applying this rationale to a search of a 
computer, the court reasoned that an officer's physical presence was 
required to protect privacy and comply with the Fourth Amendment. 
464. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 331, at 98 ("Once a 
magistrate judge signs the warrant . . .  investigators ordinarily do not themselves search 
through the provider's computers in search of the materials described in the warrant. 
Instead, investigators serve the warrant on the provider as they would a subpoena, and the 
provider produces the material described in the warrant."). 
465. See Bach, 2001 WL 1690055, at *1. 
466. See id. at *2. 
467. Id. at *3 (citations omitted). 
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The district court's guess was wrong, however, at least based on 
current technology. On appeal, Yahoo! and a consortium of other ISPs 
filed an amicus brief explaining how ISPs comply with search warrants 
for data stored on computer servers.468 The brief explained that 
searches for information stored in an ISP's computers require 
technical expertise and specialized knowledge to extract the 
information from the ISP's network.469 Because of these technical 
details, the brief explained, police officers are 
in no position to supervise or instruct the service provider's technicians 
as they search for the information requested in the warrant; [the 
technicians] must conduct the search themselves, from their computer 
terminals. The police officer waiting in the lobby while the technician 
works away on the computer does not in any way safeguard anyone's 
Fourth Amendment rights.470 
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court, relying largely on the 
reasoning of the Yahoo! brief.471 This time, the court held that the 
practice of faxing warrants was constitutionally reasonable. The court 
relied heavily on practical reasons, including that "the actual physical 
presence of an officer would not have aided the search (in fact may 
have hindered it),"472 and that "the technical expertise of Yahoo! 's 
technicians far outweighs that of the officers."473 How did the Eighth 
Circuit judges know these facts? Because they read them in Yahoo! 's 
amicus brief. 
While the Court of Appeals corrected the district court's error in 
Bach, the error illustrates the difficulty courts encounter trying to 
regulate new technologies through the Fourth Amendment. The 
district court guessed about ISP practices, and based a constitutional 
rule on that guess. But the guess turned out to be incorrect. 
Fortunately, the district court's ruling led to an amicus brief on appeal 
that corrected the misunderstanding. But this will happen only rarely; 
in most cases, courts will not possess an informed understanding of the 
technical facts they need to appreciate the technology they are 
attempting to regulate. They will simply guess, and create rules that 
may or may not do what the courts think they will do. Because the 
courts tend to lack knowledge of the broader technological context, 
they struggle to create workable and sensible rules governing that 
technology. 
468. Brief of Amici Curiae Yahoo! ,  Inc., et al., United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063 (8th 
Cir. 2002) (No. 02-1238 ) (on file with author). 
469. See id. at 6-7. 
470. Id. at 7. 
471. United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2002). 
472. Id. at 1067. 
473. Id. 
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Trulock v. Freeh474 provides another interesting example. Notra 
Trulock was a Department of Energy official investigated by the FBI 
for allegedly disclosing classified information.475 In the course of the 
investigation, the FBI obtained the consent of Trulock's girlfriend to 
search a computer that they both used. Trulock later filed a Bivens 
action against the FBI, alleging that the FBI "searched" Trulock's 
password-protected files stored in the computer in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.476 The complaint alleged that the girlfriend's 
consent to search the computer did not allow the FBI to search the 
password-protected files. The Fourth Circuit agreed, holding that 
searching the password-protected files was like opening a locked box 
belonging to Trulock.477 The panel split only on whether the Fourth 
Amendment violation was sufficiently clear that qualified immunity 
allowed civil liability for the violation: two judges said no, one said 
yes.478 But all three judges agreed that the search violated the Fourth 
Amendment. 
But no one asked the more basic question: What exactly did it 
mean to "search" a password-protected file? In other words, what was 
it that violated the Fourth Amendment? The opinions suggest that the 
judges understood "searching" the password-protected file to be 
something akin to rummaging through a locked box.479 But this 
metaphorical understanding tells us very little; Trulock's allegation 
that the FBI had "searched" the password-protected files could mean 
several different things. Perhaps the password-protected files were 
encrypted, and the agents merely saw the ciphertext, not the 
474. 275 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2001). In the interests of full disclosure, I should 
acknowledge that I was a lawyer at the Justice Department at the time the Trulock case was 
briefed, and served as an informal adviser on the briefing of the case. 
475. See id. at 397-98. 
476. Id. at 399. 
477. Id. at 403 ("Although Conrad had authority to consent to a general search of the 
computer, her authority did not extend to Trulock's password-protected files . . . .  Trulock's 
password-protected files are analogous to the locked footlocker inside the bedroom."). 
478. Judge Gregory and District Judge Legg said "no", see id at 403; Judge Michael 
authored a separate opinion saying "yes": 
I respectfully disagree . . .  with the majority's view that the defendants are entitled to 
qualified immunity because there was no clearly established law saying that one co-user's 
consent to search a computer does not extend to the password-protected files of another co­
user when the consenting co-user does not know the other's passwords. I would reject the 
defendants' qualified immunity defense because the unlawfulness of searching Trulock's 
password-protected files was readily apparent . . . .  
Id. at 407 (Michael, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
479. See id. at 403 (analogizing the case to United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 540-42 
(4th Cir. 1978), which had held that a mother's consent to a search of her son's bedroom did 
not allow a search of a locked footlocker in the room, and stating that "Trulock's password­
protected files are analogous to the locked footlocker inside the bedroom."); id. at 406-07 
(Michael, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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understandable plaintext. Or maybe the agents performed string 
queries for keywords that appeared in Trulock's files. Or maybe the 
agents guessed Trulock's password and then viewed his private files. 
The opinion doesn't say what exactly occurred. The Trulock court 
neither explained what kind of password protection Trulock used, nor 
what the agents might have done to circumvent the password 
protection and "search" the files. 
The difference is important, however, because many different 
types of password protection exist, all of which can be circumvented in 
various ways.480 Without knowing the technical details of what 
happened in Trulock, it's hard to know with any precision what the 
Trulock opinion prohibits. In other words, the more you understand 
about password-protection, the less clear the court's rule becomes. 
How did this happen? The likely explanation is that the judges in 
Trulock simply didn't understand enough about the technology of 
password-protection to know that their opinion left the rule unclear. 
The judges analogized searching the password-protected computer 
files to searching through a locked box, but their failure to appreciate 
the technology left the meaning of the decision a mystery. 
To be sure, legislative rulemaking is not a panacea. At the same 
time, the information environment of legislative rulemaking is 
superior to that of judicial rulemaking in the context of developing 
technologies. Legislatures can receive input from a wide range of 
sources, and can use these inputs to generate well-informed rules. The 
open legislative process and the accompanying public scrutiny tend to 
ferret out rules that are particularly unbalanced, and often lead to 
amendments that temper proposed rules that go too far in either 
direction. For example, Congress generally legislates in the area of 
high-tech privacy only after holding extensive hearings in which 
experts testify and comment on various technologies and regulatory 
strategies.481 Legislators typically ask both the Justice Department and 
civil liberties groups for comment, and consider objections from both 
sources before voting on legislation. The legislature can also amend 
480. See SCHNEIER, supra note 383, at 136-37. For example, password protection can 
refer to merely an application-layer barrier that a forensic analyst would not encounter, or 
could refer to an encryption scheme that requires the passphrase to convert ciphertext to 
plain text. 
481. As one writer explains: 
Because Congress does not have to rely on potentially inconsistent analogies to make law, 
but instead can undertake exhaustive investigations and studies by experts and gather 
constituent viewpoints, Congress is in the best position . . .  to do just what the Court said was 
necessary in Katz: protect those expectations of privacy "that society is prepared to recognize 
as reasonable.' 
Rich Haglund, Note, Applying Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices to Internet 
Communications: As Technology Changes, ls Congress or the Supreme Court Best-Suited to 
Protect Fourth Amendment Expectations of Privacy?, 5 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 137, 146 
(2003) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)). 
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proposed rules in response to concerns of the public, media coverage, 
or any experts the legislature wishes to consult.482 Given this 
environment, the legislative process tends to generate more informed 
rules governing developing technologies than is likely to result from 
the closed environment of the judicial process. 
F. The Uniqueness of Criminal Procedure: A Response to Professors 
Lessig and Sherry, and the Public Choice Theorists 
Up to now, I have focused on the institutional advantages of 
legislatures over courts. I now turn to the institutional advantages 
courts may offer over legislatures. Commentators have pointed out 
two primary advantages of judicial rulemaking in new technologies. 
The first advantage is that courts can regulate interstitially, making 
cautious judgments on a case-by-case basis.483 The second advantage 
derives from public choice theory; it posits that we cannot trust 
legislative rules to serve the public interest because legislatures can be 
captured by special interest groups that engage in rent-seeking.484 
These arguments are persuasive in the context of civil law, but for 
reasons that follow are much less convincing in the specific context of 
criminal procedure. 
Consider the argument that the interstitial, case-by-case nature of 
judicial rulemaking is well-suited to regulate new technologies.485 
Much of the scholarship in this area focuses on applying law to the 
Internet. Professor Lessig suggested in an early article that "the 
meandering development of the common law"486 will lead to the best 
rules for Internet law, especially in the area of First Amendment law. 
Professor Suzanna Sherry has reached similar conclusions in the 
context of trademark law and personal jurisdiction.487 According to 
Professor Sherry, "the common law method offers the luxury of time 
482. See Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act, supra note 323, at 
640 (discussing how input from civil libertarian experts changed provisions in the privacy 
legislation that became the USA PATRIOT Act). 
483. See infra notes 485 to 490, The classic statement belongs to Holmes: "I recognize 
without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; 
they are confined from molar to molecular motions." S. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 
205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
484. See infra notes 497 to 498. For a general introduction to public choice theory and 
the problem of rent-seeking, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND 
PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 13-17 (1991); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC 
CHOICE II (1989). 
485. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN 
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 53-97, 123-152 (1994). 
486. See Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1752 (1995). 
487. Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the Common Law in 
Cyberspace, 55 V AND. L. REV. 309, 309-313 (2002). 
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and successive experience, while still dealing with the concrete 
problems posed by the new technology."488 In contrast, legislative 
solutions will tend to impose a single approach that will often prove a 
poor fit for the problem.489 
These critiques have considerable merit in the context of civil law, 
the primary focus of Professors Lessig and Sherry. Broadly speaking, 
civil law regulates private parties interacting with other private parties, 
and seeks to assign default rules that govern the relationships among 
them.490 An important task of the rulemaker is to generate the best 
background rule. When a technology is new, case-by-case 
decisionmaking generally leads to a period of uncertain or "muddy" 
rules.491 Dan Burk has noted that "muddy" rules in areas of law that 
involve new technologies encourage parties to contract around 
ineffective default rules.492 Burk argues this may be the best possible 
outcome when technology is in flux; muddy rules allow private parties 
to resolve background rules through informal bargaining, thus arriving 
at the best legal solution over time.493 Case-by-case decisions allow 
courts to reach tentative decisions along the way until the scope of the 
problem is better understood and background norms better settled.494 
In effect, case-by-case decisions allow the legal system to grapple with 
the new technology and try out various informal solutions before a 
broader resolution emerges through the weight of experience. 
I find this argument persuasive in a civil law context, but not in the 
context of criminal procedure. The case-by-case approach necessarily 
leaves questions open, and therefore leaves the law uncertain. While 
this may facilitate bargaining in the civil context, there is no analogous 
benefit for criminal procedure. Police officers and suspects do not 
normally negotiate over the rules the police will follow. Either the 
police will take certain investigative steps or they won't; it is their 
decision to make based on existing law, not the suspect's. As a result, 
interstitial rulemaking that leaves the rules unclear lessens the clarity 
488. Id. at 317. Specifically, Professor Sherry argues that Congress should have let the 
courts answer how trademark law applies to cybersquatting rather than pass a statute (the 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act) to decide it. 
489. See id. at 311 ("[I]n the context of new computer technology, allowing time for 
incremental judicial responses is often superior to instant legislative solutions of a global 
nature."). 
490. See, e.g., R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 9-15 (1960). Of 
course, this is an enormous oversimplification. For my purposes however, it draws out the 
essential difference between criminal and civil rules. 
491. See Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 121-25 
(1999). 
492 See id. at 163-178 (outlining the benefits of "muddy" rules involving the Internet, 
especially in the area of intellectual property law). 
493. See id. 
494. See Sherry, supra note 487, at 376-377. 
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of the limits on the government's powers to invade privacy, 
underdeterring police behavior in some contexts and overdeterring it 
in others. Legal uncertainty may be a benefit in the civil context, but in 
the criminal context rule-uncertainty is a liability.495 
The judicial role in criminal procedure cases also undercuts the 
benefits of case-by-case decisionmaking because fewer and less­
representative issues are likely to pass through the courts. In civil law, 
the Brownian motion of private parties tends to queue up a diverse 
range of cases for courts to resolve. Although justiciability doctrines 
such as standing and ripeness narrow the disputes that courts will hear, 
the primary barrier to an issue reaching the courts is a plaintiff's 
decision not to raise it. Different decisions may come up in different 
ways, letting issues percolate and allowing courts to try different 
answers to different questions. In criminal law, by contrast, the 
government holds all the cards. Criminal law follows a top-down 
model: in federal law, for example, policy is set at the Department of 
Justice in Washington, D.C. The Department retains broad control 
over the issues, posture and docket of federal criminal cases.496 As a 
result, important legal issues can wait years or even decades before a 
court is required to pass on them. Recall the history of wiretapping 
law: no federal court adjudicated the legality of wiretapping until the 
1920s, about fifty years after the invention of the telephone. While 
case-by-case decisions in civil law lets the courts slowly work through 
the implications of a new technology in fact-specific ways, the same 
approach in criminal procedure leaves the law unknown until the 
government opts to push an issue to judicial resolution. 
The insights of public choice theory also have only limited force in 
the context of criminal procedure rules. Public choice theorists have 
noted that legislative decisions are often influenced by rent-seeking, 
efforts by interest groups to lobby the government to enact rules that 
benefit the group at the expense of the public.497 In contrast, judicial 
decisionmaking is generally more independent, which in theory can 
lead to better rules.498 While these insights have considerable merit in 
many contexts, they have relatively little force in the context of 
criminal procedure rules. Privacy and security may be considered 
public goods, shared equally by the public.499 The law enforcement 
495. See Bradley, supra note 351. 
496. See id. at 35-39. 
497. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory 
of Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43 (1988). 
498. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary 
in an Interest Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975). 
499. As one commentator noted: 
For example, streets which are free from criminal activity offer benefits that are 
nonexcludable and nonrivalrous. Accordingly, interest groups have little incentive to 
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interests that might seek "rents" from weak privacy legislation 
generally do not function as market actors. Governments seek 
reelection from the public, not greater profits: their interest generally 
lies more in satisfying the public than in fleecing them. As with all 
generalizations, exceptions exist. Rules governing civil forfeiture show 
the effects of rent-seeking: because law enforcement agencies profit 
from the forfeiture, they have incentives to lobby Congress for 
broader forfeiture laws.500 In addition, both law enforcement interests 
and victims of crime may lobby the legislature for greater enforcement 
of substantive criminal laws, seeking greater funding and priority 
among competing interests.501 But enforcement ordinarily does not 
impact the contours of criminal procedure rules. In most cases, law 
enforcement does not "profit" more or less based on how restricted its 
investigative powers may be, and does not have a clear economic 
incentive to lobby Congress for less privacy-protecting rules. 
It is true that law enforcement groups will often lobby for greater 
powers. It is also true that law enforcement interests often prove 
highly influential among legislators.502 But the former generally reflects 
honest (if sometimes myopic) claims of the public interest in solving 
crimes, and the latter generally reflects legitimate public preferences. 
As William Stuntz has noted, legislators pay careful attention to claims 
of law enforcement needs precisely because the public demands it.503 
Consider Stuntz's assessment of the influence of law enforcement 
interests in the context of substantive criminal law: 
Here more than most places, politicians . . .  deal with voters directly. And 
crime is one of those matters about which most voters care a great deal. 
Today it is regularly a major issue in elections at all levels of government, 
organize on the ground that the benefits of their collective action would be available to the 
public at large, yet they would have to bear the entire cost of organization. 
Lanier Saperstein, Comment, Copyrights, Criminal Sanctions and Economic Rents: Applying 
the Rent Seeking Model to the Criminal Law Formulation Process, 87 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1470, 1471 (1987). 
500. See Nancy J. King, Portioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive and 
Excessive Penalties, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 101 188-89 (1995) ("[C)ivil forfeiture may have 'more 
to do with rent-seeking by legislators and law enforcement officials than with the eradication 
of drug use.' ") (quoting DONALD J. BOUDREAUX & A.C. PRITCHARD, CIVIL FORFEITURE 
AND THE WAR ON DRUGS: LESSONS FROM ECONOMICS AND HISTORY 45 (1995)). 
501. See Saperstein, supra note 499 (arguing that the criminal copyright laws reflect rent­
seeking from copyright owners). 
502. See Dripps, supra note 336. 
503. Stuntz writes: 
Legislators presumably want to stay in office, and perhaps to position themselves for higher 
office. To do those things, legislators must please their constituents. . . . [F]or most of 
criminal law, the effect of private interest groups is small: the most important interest groups 
are usually other government actors, chiefly police and prosecutors. 
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 529 
(2001). 
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and it has been an issue in local elections for more than a century. If 
there is any sphere in which politicians would have an incentive simply to 
please the majority of voters, it's criminal law. 
Voters may know little about criminal law doctrine, but they 
presumably have some idea of the set of results they would like to see: 
conviction and punishment of people who commit the kinds of offenses 
that voters fear. Legislators, one can fairly hypothesize, have an interest 
in producing those results (or at least taking credit for them), so that 
voters will continue to support them.504 
A similar dynamic is found in the context of criminal procedure. In 
most circumstances, legislators pay careful attention to law 
enforcement requests for greater investigative powers because they 
believe greater powers will enable investigators to solve more crimes. 
But what if majoritarian preferences are insufficiently protective of 
privacy? Donald Dripps has argued that courts must intervene in the 
area of criminal procedure because statutory criminal procedure rules 
tend to create intolerable results: in Dripps's words, legislatures 
"don't . . .  give a damn about the rights of the accused."505 Dripps 
argues that legislatures cannot create privacy-protective criminal 
procedure rules because most voters identify themselves as the 
potential victims of crime rather than its perpetrators.506 While those 
who tend to be targeted by the police as suspects may want greater 
restrictions on law enforcement, those groups tend to be relatively 
politically powerless.507 Because politically powerful majorities are 
more concerned with making sure that criminals are caught, politicians 
have little to no incentive to protect the rights of the accused.508 In 
such circumstances, Dripps argues, we must rely on courts rather than 
legislatures to generate balanced rules. 
There are two reasons to approach this argument with caution. 
First, Dripps offers only sparse evidence in support of his claim.509 
504. Id. at 529-30. 
505. Dripps, supra note 336, at 1079. 
506. See id. at 1088-90. 
507. See id. 
508. See id. 
509. Dripps dismisses the many statutory privacy laws primarily by speculating about 
Congressional motive; he argues that many if not most of the laws were passed for reasons 
other than to protect privacy. For example, Dripps suggests that the Wiretap Act was passed 
not to protect privacy, but to pass constitutional muster: he writes that "the legislative 
concern behind Title III was not to protect the rights of suspects, but to provide a law 
enforcement tool that would otherwise by disallowed by the courts." Id. at 1083. As Part II 
demonstrated, it is misleading to understand the passage of the Wiretap Act as solely a 
product of a wish to provide a tool for law enforcement. Similarly, Dripps explains the 
passage of the Pen Register statute in 1986 by speculating " . . .  that the telephone companies 
resented the expense and inconvenience of installing [pen register] devices at the whim of 
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Second, the dynamic Dripps observes may be true in some context but 
not others, and the case of privacy rules involving developing 
technologies should provide some reason for optimism. New 
technologies are often used disproportionately by politically powerful 
groups. Consider the case of the Internet and the "Digital Divide."510 
The Digital Divide exists because use of computers and the Internet is 
more widespread among affluent white majorities than among 
minority groups.511 A corollary to the Digital Divide is that when 
Congress legislates in the area of Internet privacy, it is 
disproportionately legislating the privacy rights of those who are 
affluent and politically powerful. This will not always be the case. For 
example, police often have used thermal imaging devices to target 
marijuana growers. Taken as a whole, however, many criminal 
investigations involving new technologies will tend to target users of 
new technologies. Such users generally will be able to represent their 
interests before Congress effectively, resulting in a healthy debate and 
relatively favorable conditions for balanced legislative rules.512 
CONCLUSION 
Law professors love constitutional law. Constitutional arguments 
are particularly popular in the field of criminal procedure because 
memories of the Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution remain 
fresh. To many scholars, the Warren Court's decisions reflect the best 
of what criminal procedure should be - rare bright fixtures in an 
otherwise dark environment. Having found such a bright light in the 
courts not long ago, many scholars look to the courts for progress. The 
existing scholarship on privacy and new technologies reflects this bias 
police officers, and joined the ACLU in urging that some hurdle be set up between the cop­
on-the-beat and the telephone company's time and trouble." Id. at 1085. While Dripps is 
right to note that communications network providers can have a strong influence on privacy 
legislation affecting those networks, he does not explain whether this is a reason to place 
more or less trust in the legislative process. 
510. See Lee Price, Digital Divide, Digital Opportunities: A Statistical Overview, 24 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 567 (2002) (exploring the gap in computer use among 
different communities in the United States). 
511. Id. 
512. Polls taken since September 11,  2001, appear to confirm this. Post-9/11 Harris Polls 
suggest that the public is divided over the scope of the government's high-tech surveillance 
powers, but that the existing statutory rules are probably slightly more privacy protecting 
than the majority public preference would wish. See Homeland Security: American Public 
Continues to Endorse a Broad Range of Proposals for Stronger Surveillance Powers, but 
Support Has Declined Somewhat, THE HARRIS POLL #14, March 10, 2003 (available at 
www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=362). The polls suggest that about 
60% of the public would favor expanded camera surveillance, about 55% would favor law 
enforcement monitoring of Internet chat rooms, and about 45% of the public would favor 
expanded government monitoring of cell phones and e-mail. Id. While these numbers are 
merely one data point in a complex matrix, they seem to suggest that in the area of high­
technology privacy, the legislative process is likely operating reasonably effectively. 
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in favor of constitutional argument. The scholarship focuses on the 
Fourth Amendment and the judiciary as the primary source of rules to 
regulate uses of new technology. 
This article has argued that the judiciary-focused view overlooks 
the critical role that statutory privacy protections have played in 
protecting privacy in developing technologies. It has argued that 
legislatures often are better situated than courts to protect privacy in 
new technologies, and that courts should be wary of imposing broad 
privacy protections against the government's use of new technologies 
in light of the judiciary's institutional difficulties. Indeed, the courts 
and Congress may be far ahead of the game already. While scholars 
have unsuccessfully urged courts to adopt expansive visions of the 
Fourth Amendment in new technologies, Congress has quietly 
assumed the leading role in that endeavor. Today the rules governing 
law enforcement use of new technologies tend to be statutory rules, 
not constitutional ones. Traditional cases with stable technologies tend 
to be regulated by the Fourth Amendment, but cases with developing 
technologies tend to be regulated by statute. 
As technology advances and the difficulty courts face regulating 
privacy in new technologies becomes clearer, this trend toward 
statutory protections will likely accelerate. In time, we may understand 
the law of criminal procedure as a bifurcated field, with constitutional 
rules governing most traditional cases and statutory rules governing 
most cases involving new technologies. New technologies may reveal 
the limits of the modem enterprise of constitutional criminal 
procedure, making the field part constitutional and part statutory. The 
potential bifurcation of criminal procedure will pose a significant 
challenge to scholars of criminal procedure. Increasingly, an 
understanding of criminal procedure may require an understanding of 
complicated statutory provisions. The criminal procedure curriculum 
may change as well. The study of statutory privacy laws may work its 
way into courses currently dedicated to constitutional protections. 
Alternatively, new classes may appear to cover statutory privacy laws 
not covered elsewhere. Either way, developing technologies may well 
push criminal procedure to change from a primarily constitutional 
field to a more mixed field, and the scholarship will have to change 
along with it to stay relevant to law enforcement practice and judicial 
experience. 
